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tions, memoranda, signing statements, executive orders, and veto threats. By
examining these datasets of presidential policy action, from Ronald Reagan
(1981) to Barack Obama (2014), we gain a clearer insight into the decisions
that presidents make about the policy process, their strategies, and the fac-
tors that affect their abilities to make trade-offs between their policy priorities
and strategies. This dissertation makes a contribution to the presidency and
policy process literatures by moving towards a empirically-grounded study of
the presidency, one which relies on the combination of theory and data to bet-
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1.1 Presidential Decision-Making in the Modern Pres-
idency
The week of November 20, 2014 was a big policy week for President
Obama. After months of inaction by the House of Representatives following
the Senate’s passage of comprehensive immigration reform, President Obama
grew impatient. He took action into his own hands and he issued a pair
of presidential memoranda aimed at changing the immigration system. He
followed these memos up with a wide array of interactions with the press and
public to explain his actions. But that’s not all he did that week. He also
addressed the press and public following the grand jury decision in Ferguson,
MO, dealing with the shooting death of Michael Brown, an unarmed black
man, by the police; signed a memorandum reducing the amount of oil bought
from Iran; made remarks on the resignation of Chuck Hagel as his Secretary of
Defense; and proclaimed it to be National Family Week. All of these activities,
to one degree or another, required presidential attention. All of these activities
required the president to make decisions about what policy areas to prioritize
and which actions to take in order to prioritize them.
Every day the president is faced with a series of choices: what do I pay
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attention to today? Do I advance my health care reform agenda or do I focus
on foreign relations? Do I tell my budget director to focus on military spending
or on education? Should I sign an executive order or should I go to the public
and talk about an issue in order to try and get it through Congress? What
is the media doing, or Congress, and what does the public care about? All
these questions, and many more, shape the landscape of presidential decision-
making. The range of what a president can do or prioritize is vast, while his
time and ability are not.
Presidential decisions are the backbone of the president’s role in the
policy process. While formal presidential powers, as set out by the Consti-
tution, are limited, the role of the president in the policy and political world
has expanded drastically over the 20th century (Schlesinger 2004; Rudalevige
2005). Presidents are now a central figure in most major policy fights; so a
presidential decision about what to pay attention to and how to get involved
in an issue can have a profound effect on the policy process and policy outputs.
Presidential decision making matters because the choices presidents
make have long lasting and far reaching consequences for both the American
people and people around the world. On the eve of the Gulf War, President
George H. W. Bush was faced with a series of choices: to send American
troops to fight back against the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait or seek non-military
solutions; to try to form a multinational coalition or to go at the mission
alone; whether to try and topple Saddam Hussein and his regime or merely
get them out of Kuwait? The result of each of these decisions would have
2
drastic consequences for how the war could unfold; consequences that would
shape the scope of the military conflict, the number of wounded and killed, the
length of the conflict, and the events that occurred subsequently. It cannot be
overstated just how consequential a presidential decision can be.
The key to understanding all presidential decision making is to under-
stand how presidents process information. Reasonable people make decisions
based on what they know and what they want. But, human beings are not
computers; they can’t process all the information that they are receiving in a
uniform fashion. This means that the process of absorbing information, inte-
grating it into what is already known, and using it to make decisions is done
imperfectly. The study of information processing allows us to understand how
individuals deal with the information that they are exposed to.
In this dissertation, I set out a fresh approach of presidential decision
making, one that is based on how presidents process information and explains
how they prioritize policy areas and strategies. This theory highlights how the
structure of the presidency creates a decision-making process that relies on the
cognitive and emotional capacities of the individuals in the office, while the
political and policy environment put pressures on their choices. Once pres-
idents have decided to get involved in policy making, they have to process
information about the responsibilities of the office, the policy and political
environment, as well as their own political strength, to make decisions about
what policy areas to prioritize and what strategies they should use to pur-
sue those policy goals. To examine these decisions and understand the forces
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that shape them, I analyze ten datasets of presidential actions, seven of which
are original to this project. Presidential press conferences, budget messages,
State of the Union addresses, major televised addresses, addresses to a joint
session of Congress, proclamations, memoranda, signing statements, executive
orders, and veto threats give us insight into the wide range of ways that pres-
idents try to affect policy. By examining these datasets from Ronald Reagan
(1981) to Barack Obama (2014), with a total of 27,022 observations, we gain
a much clearer insight into the decisions that presidents make about the pol-
icy process, their strategies, and the factors that affect their abilities to make
trade-offs between their policy priorities and strategies. This makes a substan-
tial contribution to the presidency and policy process literatures by moving
away from purely theoretical and case-based studies of the presidential policy
decision-making toward an empirically grounded study of the president, one
which relies on the combination of theory and data to better understand the
decisions that president make and the factors that shape those decisions.
1.2 A Review of Information Processing
Decisions are a product of how information is processed. In the infor-
mation processing perspective, the individual is boundedly rational; a decision
maker who tries to make the optimal choice, but as a result of cognitive and
emotional limitations and an inability to adapt as information changes, makes
imperfect decisions (Simon 1957, 1983; Simon and Associates 1986). This per-
spective is widely used in the policy process literature, as it emphasizes the
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various challenges decision makers face (Baumgartner and Jones 2009; Jones
and Baumgartner 2005; Workman 2015; Jones, Sulkin and Larsen 2003; Jones
2001; Workman, Jones and Jochim 2009; Boydstun 2013). In the information
processing perspective, information is abundant and decision makers must try
to sort through the vast amount of information that is at their disposal in order
to make decisions. This dissertation explores how presidents process informa-
tion to make decisions about what policies to prioritize and what strategies to
utilize.
Before we can begin to understand how presidential decision-making is
shaped by information processing, we must understand why it is important
to focus on information. Information is central to decision makers’ ability to
understand policy problems (Jones and Baumgartner 2005; Jones 2001). Pol-
icy problems are the issues that require attention and they are often complex;
a function of ever changing situations and are constantly being shaped and
reshaped by the actions of decision makers (Kingdon 1984). This constant
change provides new information for decision makers and their ability to in-
corporate the new information into their understanding of the policy area is a
key factor in how they match problems with solutions.
To fully understand the information processing perspective, we must
begin by appreciating its theoretical underpinning: bounded rationality. Bounded
rationality centers around the idea that decision makers are goal oriented and
purposeful (Simon 1947). However, this framework recognizes that individuals
face many limitations, such as limits on their time and cognitive and emotional
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capacity, all of which lead actors to make errors in their decision making and
reduce their ability to adapt (Simon 1983; Jones 2001).
In order to understand decision making in a boundedly rational per-
spective, we need to appreciate the many ways decision makers are hampered
by their cognitive and emotional limitations. Individuals come into the de-
cision making process with prior knowledge and biases (Jones 2001; Tversky
and Kahneman 1973; Kahneman and Tversky 1977; Kahneman, Tversky et al.
2003). These can have a substantial impact on their ability to absorb new in-
formation, causing them to ignore some problems or information in favor of
information that confirms their views about the world (Gilovich, Griffin and
Kahneman 2002). In the development of the Iran-Contra crisis, President Rea-
gan’s belief that the spread of communism in Central and South America was
a significant threat to America dominated his decision-making (Reagan 1990,
p.476-477). His strong beliefs empowered members of his staff to continue
sending aid to the Contras in Nicaragua, despite the formal denial of aid from
Congress. This resulted in one of the greatest crises of the Reagan administra-
tion and called into question the appropriate level of presidential involvement
in decision-making. President Reagan’s emotional connection to the policy
position prevented him from being able to absorb all the information about
the political environment, namely, the level of censure that would rain down
on all connected when Congress discovered that funds were directed towards
the Contras. By ignoring Congress and relying on his own beliefs, Reagan and
his advisors created an unnecessary controversy for his own administration,
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they they might have been able to avoid had emotion and beliefs not governed
the decision making process.
Another component that is important for presidential decision-making
is the way cognitive and emotional limitations distort information. In the
previous example of President Reagan and aid to the Contras, he ignored
information, which had a drastic effect on his decisions, but this is not the only
way decision-making can go wrong. Decision makers can also struggle with
how to integrate information from different sources (Jones 2001). Cognitive
and emotional biases have the potential to cause decision makers to privilege
information from a particular source over others or to inaccurately combine
the implication of one piece of information with the implications from another
source (Jones 2001). One example of this was in President G. W. Bush’s
response following Hurricane Katrina. Before the storm, the Stafford Act
of 1988 and existing protocols dictated that the federal government was to
become involved in the disaster response only at the request of the state, with
state and local governments taking the lead. Leading up to when the storm
made landfall in New Orleans and in the immediate aftermath of Katrina,
President Bush relied on information from Governor Kathleen Blanco and
Mayor Ray Nagan,who were concerned with avoiding blame as well as solving
the problem, to make decisions about federal involvement (Bush 2010, p.309-
332). As decisions were made and new information came in about the scope of
the storm and the damage that resulted from the broken levees, it became clear
that the federal government response had come too slowly and inefficiently
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to adequately address the crisis. Additionally, President Bush’s decisions to
make a trip to California and Arizona, to do flyovers of New Orleans and
Baton Rouge, and to say that FEMA Director Michael Brown was doing “a
heck of a job,” all decisions based on his understanding of the situation and the
information he was receiving, led many Americans to believe that the President
didn’t care about victims of the storm nor that he desired to help relieve the
suffering (Bush 2010). Instead, the decision to do and say these things was
the result of distorted information and the privileging of some sources (Blanco
and Nagan) over others. The processing of information relies on the ability to
evaluate the quality of the source of information, which can be just as hard
and just as consequential as anything else.
Organizations and structures can help individuals overcome the cogni-
tive and emotional limitations that were the defining characteristic of each of
these cases (Simon 1947). Herbert Simon’s theory of organizations was built
on the idea that if people could organize, the could create structures using
the division of labor and specialization to avoid the downfalls of individual
cognition. In each of these cases, presidents could have used the structure of
the people around them to make better decisions, but the final decision-maker
aspect of the presidency prevented them from seeing the flaws in front of them.
It is worth noting, however, that organizations are not magic bullets to be used
to overcome the flaws of individual decisions makers. Organizations are made
up of individual decision makers and when there is a flawed decision at the
top of the organization it can trickle its way down, preventing the organization
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from correcting for the individual’s flaws.
In each of these cases, the cognitive and emotional limitations of the
decision makers had an obvious and substantive impact on the outcome of the
case. The impact of human limitations on decision making is not always so
clear; more often, these biases work in subtle ways, ever so slightly altering
an individual’s decisions. Thus, it is important to move away from study-
ing an individual case or decision and take a broader perspective at the way
individuals, and more specifically presidents, process information.
1.3 The President in the Policy World
The president is a central actor in the policy process. Scholars in both
the presidency and policy subfields have noted the importance of the president
for policy change (Baumgartner and Jones 2009; Kingdon 1984; Light 1991). In
many ways, the president is the ultimate policy entrepreneur, capable of linking
problems and solutions and identifying windows of opportunity to create policy
change (Cohen, March and Olsen 1972; Kingdon 1984). Presidents are also
thought to be important at many stages of the policy process from agenda
setting at the beginning (Baumgartner and Jones 2009; Kingdon 1984) through
to shaping policy in later stages of policy decision-making using veto threats
(Deen and Arnold 2002; Kernell 2006; Matthews 1989; McCarty and Poole
1995; Lewallen 2017). But the modern role of the president in the policy
process is the product of evolution over time.
At the time of the founding, the presidency was envisioned as a response
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to the failures in the Articles of Confederation — without a chief executive,
the federal government lacked the energy to move to action in response to
problems (Morris 2010). As such, the Constitution created a chief executive
and set out specific powers, limited in number, with the idea that the execu-
tive would be subordinate to the legislature. Throughout the 18th and 19th
century, presidential power waxed and waned, but the office was generally
subordinate to Congress. It wasn’t until Franklin Roosevelt that the mod-
ern presidency, with its significant policy role and expansive powers, began
to take form (Rudalevige 2005; Schlesinger 2004). In many ways, the modern
president is a policy maker that the founding fathers never would have found
acceptable.
Even though the founders never imagined the president at the center
of the policy making story, he as grown magnificently into that role. In this
dissertation, we will study presidential decisions to understand the role the
president plays in the policy process. Specifically, I am going to study what
policy areas the president pays attention to and the strategies he uses to prior-
itize that attention. Using seven new datasets, plus three existing ones, with
a total of 27,022 observations, I will examine the decisions that presidents
make to empirically explore what the presidency literature has theorize about,
confirming some expectation, while turning others on their heads. While the
bulk of the data analysis are in the fourth, fifth, and sixth chapters, I begin to
bring in data even in this chapter, as our fundamental understanding of the
presidency requires thinking about and exploring what it is that presidents
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actually do, rather than staying with what we think they do.
There have been many instances where presidential attention to a pol-
icy area was the necessary component for policy change. One instance during
the Obama administration was an attempt to tackle wide-scale immigration
reform. After years of unsuccessful legislative attempts to reform the immigra-
tion system, ranging from an effort in 2006 that took extremely different forms
in the House and Senate, with both sides refusing to budge, to the DREAM
Act, which was introduced in 2007, 2009, and 2011, and passed by the House in
2010, President Obama announced the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals
(DACA) initiative. The DACA program, which was implemented via a mem-
orandum issued by Secretary of Homeland Security Janet Napolitano, created
certain criteria that, if fulfilled, would allow undocumented immigrants, who
had been brought to the country as children and who were productive, law-
abiding individuals, to stay and work legally in the country. This policy largely
mirrored the goals enshrined in the DREAM Act, but as Congress had been
unable to pass it, and it seemed likely that the policy stalemate in Congress
would continue, presidential unilateral action was the only force that allowed
policy change to occur. While the program received Republican resistance
in Congress, presidential prerogatives were sufficiently strong and the policy
design sufficiently insulated from congressional activity to allow the policy to
go into effect.1
1The postscript to this case, with the repeal of DACA under President Trump underscores
the long-term dangers of making policy via unilateral action.
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But the story of policy change is much more complex. Presidential
attention and decision making is not always enough to create policy change.
Just as President Obama was able to change policy for the undocumented
immigrants who were brought to the country as children, he attempted to
reform the immigration system to allow the undocumented parents of U.S.
citizens to stay and work legally in the United States. President Obama’s
“Memoranda on Creating Welcoming Communities and Fully Integrating Im-
migrants and Refugees” sparked the Deferred Action for Parents of Americans
and Lawful Permanent Residents (DAPA) program. Only this time, instead of
facing resistance from Congress, who could not muster the support to overturn
the presidential action, President Obama faced significant resistance from the
states. Texas Attorney General Ken Paxton, joined by the attorneys general
of 26 other states, challenged the constitutionality of the presidential action in
district court. The judge issued a preliminary injunction against the action,
which was ultimately upheld in a 4-4 decision by the United States Supreme
Court in 2016. President Obama’s 2014 actions to expand legal status to un-
documented immigrants were never implemented. This is not the only time
presidential action ended in defeat. Presidential involvement in the policy pro-
cess is a complex thing; sometimes presidential involvement is decisive, and
sometimes it is like tilling at windmills, a seemingly possible and justified effort
that ends up being completely impossible given the broader reality.
Much of the research on presidential involvement in policy revolves
around how presidents interact with executive agencies (Lewis 2004, 2008; Moe
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1989) or the legislature (Beckmann 2010; Shull and Shaw 1999). Many of these
works examine the relationships using principal-agent models, highlighting a
formalized structure where presidents must incentivize those beneath them to
provide them with information. While these studies attempt to understanding
these complex relationships, the theories force us to look at how presidents
operate with other institutions, rather than trying to understand presidential
decision-making comprehensively.
1.3.1 Presidential Attention to Policy Areas
One characteristic of presidential decision making that is extremely
important for understanding their decisions is the limited attention of the
president. Presidents have only so much time in the day, and while they
can staff information gathering and some preliminary decision making out
to subordinates, they have to play an active role in directing the efforts of
the White House (Johnson 1974; Witherspoon 1991). This limited attention
raises questions about what policy areas we should expect to see presidential
involvement. Presidential involvement in most policy areas produces very little
direct change. Instead, change comes because many actors get involved in the
policy process surrounding an issue. That need for collective action means that
there is increased uncertainty about what will be the outcome of presidential
attention. There are a few policy areas presidential decisions are given primacy
because of the Constitution, such as foreign affairs, defense, and government
operations. Yet when we look at Figure 1.1, instead of seeing presidents restrict
13
























Source: All data including Presidential press conferences, budget messages, State of the
Union addresses, major televised addresses, addresses to a joint session of Congress,
proclamations, memoranda, signing statements, executive orders, and veto threats from
Ronald Reagan (1981) to Barack Obama (2014)
themselves to those areas in which they have a guarantee of success, we see
them get involved in a wide range of policy areas, with approximately 60% of
their attention devoted to policy outside of their constitutional obligations.
1.3.2 Presidential Tool Strategies
Setting aside the issue of what policy areas the president pays attention
to, we are left with another substantial question: what strategies do presidents
use to get involved in policy? While the president has many tools at his dis-
posal, they can be broadly categorized into three general strategies: proposal
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tools, shaping tools, and unilateral tools. When making the choice about what
strategy to take, presidents must consider the costs and odds that each type
of action will help him get his desired outcome. Unilateral actions have the
lowest costs, indeed the president makes the decision to pursue policy on his
own, and in the short term, the highest certainty of producing policy change
the president likes. Unilateral tools are not completely free of costs, however.
If something goes wrong, or the policy is very unpopular, the president has no
one else to blame: it was his action, thus his fault. Presidents also have the
ability to propose policy. These actions are also very low cost, as the president
is simply communicating what he thinks should be done, but it can also be very
ineffective as proposing policy necessarily means that there are other decision
makers involved and they can chose to ignore what the president is proposing.
Yet in spite of the potential for nothing to happen following a presidential
proposal, we regularly see the president propose policy. Indeed the president’s
most famous policy action every year is his State of the Union Address, a pure
proposal tool. The third type of strategy the president has for policymaking is
shaping policy at the later stages of the policy process. Through issuing veto
threats and making signing statements, presidents can exert force on legisla-
tive activity as it nears implementation. These actions are higher cost, as a
veto override or court challenge to bureaucratic implementation can seriously
harm the president’s political capital, but the odds of getting what he wants
can also be quite good. Congress often struggles to overcome the high bar
needed to protest presidential action, allowing presidents who want to make
15























Source: All data including Presidential press conferences, budget messages, State of the
Union addresses, major televised addresses, addresses to a joint session of Congress,
proclamations, memoranda, signing statements, executive orders, and veto threats from
Ronald Reagan (1981) to Barack Obama (2014)
policy through the shaping strategy considerable latitude. When we look at
Figure 1.2, we should expect to the president to regularly issue veto threats
and signing statements, due to that high return on investment, but in reality
we see these are much more occasional tools, as they require Congress to make
policy first.
These findings illustrate why we must look more deeply into how pres-
idents process information to understand presidential decision-making. There
are many different components to the president’s decision to get involved in
policy. We need an approach to decision making that accepts the plurality of
16
presidential attention and strategies, while helping us to understand why he
makes the choices he does.
1.4 Moving Forward
This dissertation is composed of five substantive chapters. The first,
chapter 2, introduces a new way to think about presidential decision making
through the lens of disproportionate information processing. Disproportion-
ate information processing highlights that, in a boundedly rational decision
making world, decisions are shaped by the imperfect processing of informa-
tion. In a perfect world, presidents would learn new information and promptly
incorporate it into their decision-making processes. Instead, they focus on
some bits and ignore others. Or get the new information, but misinterpret
its significance. These decisions and errors accumulate so that presidential
decision-making is imperfect and disjointed. By studying how presidents try
to cope with the influx of information to make decisions, whether through un-
derstanding the institutional structure or the way they organize their White
Houses, we can learn a great deal about the way presidents make decisions.
The next chapter, chapter 3 examines the set of 10 datasets that allows
us to understand presidential decision. Seven of these datasets are original
to this project. The seven original data sets look at presidential press confer-
ences, budget messages, major televised addresses, addresses to a joint session
of congress, presidential proclamations, memoranda, and signing statements.
The project also integrates two existing datasets from the Policy Agendas
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Table 1.1: Descriptive Statistics of Presidential Policy Tools (Total N=27,022)
Policy Tools N= Mean Obs. Max Obs. Min Obs.
Per Year (Year) (Year)
Speeches to a Joint 9 speeches 0.26 1 (Multiple) 0 (Multiple)
Session of Congress (1,966 quasi-sentences)
State of the Union 34 Speeches 1 1 1
(10,195 quasi-sentences)
Budget Messages 34 Messages 1 1 1
(4,088 quasi-sentences)
Major Televised Speeches 110 speeches 3.2 12 (1991) 0 (Multiple)
Presidential Memoranda 928 memoranda 27.3 53 (2000) 9 (Multiple)
Signing Statements 1,309 statements 38.5 95 (2000) 2 (Multiple)
Executive Orders 1,398 orders 41.1 66 (2001) 20 (2013)
Proclamations 4,410 proclamations 129.7 171 (1986) 72 (1981)
Press Conference 698 statements 20.5 42 (1994) 3 (1987)
Opening Statement
Veto Threats (1985-2014) 1,443 threats 42.4 118 (1997) 0 (Multiple)
Project: State of the Union addresses and executive orders, as well as the veto
threats dataset, by Samuel Kernell and Jonathan Lewallan, that is also hosted
by the Policy Agendas Project. All told, there are 27,023 presidential state-
ments or actions from 1981, when President Reagan took the oath of office, to
2014, six years into the Obama administration. Each statement was coded for
the policy area it focuses on. The result is the ability to examine presidential
involvement in the policy process through a number of strategies and policy
areas. This chapter examines each of these presidential policy tools and looks
at how scholar have understood them in the past, and how they can better
help us to understand the presidency. The analysis in the later chapters of the
dissertation represent the start of the analytical possibility contained in these
datasets.
The new approach to understanding presidential information process-
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ing is addressed by three main questions analyzed in chapters four to six.
Chapter four addresses the first question, which asks what policy areas do
presidents prioritize and how do presidents make trade-offs between those pol-
icy areas? The findings in this chapter suggest presidents have a core block of
issues that they routinely prioritize because they represent their constitution-
ally mandated powers, but that they also prioritize issues in response to policy
problems in the environment and party identification. The second question,
which is the focus of chapter five, asks how presidents use the different strate-
gies they have available to them. For example, why might they use unilateral
action, rather than proposing policy or shaping legislation? The findings in
this chapter suggest that presidents have a substantial preference for propos-
ing policy. This is likely because it is the lowest cost action for presidents to
take and it allows them to set the agenda of the larger policy process. Yet,
presidents also rely on their ability to shape policy and make it unilaterally.
The decision of which strategy to pursue is also influenced by the environment,
both by the House and Senate, and by timing, suggesting the presidents are
sensitive to the legislative annual calendar and the presidential election cycle.
Finally, we examine how presidents make decisions when they are considering
both the choice of policy area and the choice of strategy. The findings in this
chapter show that presidents prioritize policy differently across the different
strategies, favoring their constitutional policy duties in the proposal strategy,
but a more diverse agenda in their shaping strategy. This chapter also shows
that presidents are sensitive to different forces across the different strategies,
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with the policy environment being more influential in the proposal strategy
and the political environment being more important in the unilateral action
and shaping strategies.
In short, the goal of this dissertation is to understand the decisions
that presidents make and what that teaches us about their ability to prioritize
the information coming at them from the world around them. To do this, we
look at ten types of presidential actions, seven of which are new datasets, to
see what decisions presidents have made: decisions about what policies to pay
attention to or not pay attention to, decisions about whether to take propose,
shape, or make policy through unilateral action, and decisions about how to
unify policy areas and tool strategies. All of these choices have dramatic
consequences for the policy and the broader world.
This data-driven approach to studying the presidency is path breaking.
Many scholars have either ignored presidential decision-making studies or stuck
to a case-based approach saying that there haven’t been enough presidents in
order to study them empirically. I challenge that approach, as the unit of
analysis should not be the president, but rather the decision. By taking a
decision-based approach, rather than there being 45 presidents, there are over
27,000 decision in just the last five presidents alone. This new approach to
the unit of analysis in presidency studies makes it possible to study decision
making over time and presidents with out the “small N” problem that limited
many scholars in the past. A data driven approach to presidency studies allows
us to quantify and analyze phenomenon that we had only ever been able to
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A Behavioral Choice Theory of the President
2.1 The Components of Information Processing
The information processing perspectives relies on three core compo-
nents: the supply of information, the prioritization of information, and the
ultimate outcome, the decision. In the first half of the chapter, we will review
these three major components and illustrate how they are at the center of
presidential choice, before setting out a fresh approach to presidential decision-
making, one which recognizes the role of the president as a disproportionate
information processor. The last part of the chapter considers other psycholog-
ical approaches to understanding the presidency and considers how they fit in
with our study.
2.1.1 Information Supply
One of the central assumptions about the world in the information
processing perspective is that information is abundant and the cost associated
with acquiring information is relatively low (Jones and Baumgartner 2005;
Workman, Jones and Jochim 2009; Baumgartner and Jones 2009).1 Presi-
1This doesn’t mean the cost of processing the information is low.
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dents are constantly being bombarded by information; whether that informa-
tion coming from agencies, such as the Department of State or the Office of
Management and Budget, or political actors trying to get their desired policy
outcomes, such as Democratic members of Congress looking for gun regula-
tions, or from events, such as oil spills and terrorist attacks (Baumgartner and
Jones 2015). However, because the competition to get attention is pluralistic,
it produces an overlapping and, sometimes, redundant supply of information
(Jones, Baumgartner and De La Mare 2005).
When we think of presidential decision-making across the full scope
of issues and the wide range of actors providing information, we are struck
with the way presidents are constantly bombarded with huge amounts of in-
formation. Presidents must learn to problems solve in environments with a lot
of information where state of the policy problem is constantly evolving, and
consequently, the information that the president has is regularly updating and
changing. In the immediate aftermath of the explosion of the BP Deepwater
Horizon drilling rig on April 20, 2010, the problem was not well understood:
initially, information coming from the Coast Guard indicated that “there was
no leak at either the water’s surface or the well head at the ocean floor” (BBC
2010b). Only three days later was it announced that there was a severe oil
spill, leaking 1,000 barrels of oil a day into the Gulf (BBC 2010a). Ultimately,
it took until July 15th for the well to be capped; in the 87 days, an estimated
3.19 million barrels of oil had leaked into the Gulf (Ocean Portal Team at the
Smithsonian National Museum of Natural History 2016). When we think of
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the president from an information processing perspective, his imperfect deci-
sions and actions during that period make a great deal of sense. It took three
days following the announcement that oil was leaking for the White House to
hold a press briefing on the oil spill. In that briefing, Press Secretary Robert
Gibbs announced that the president was receiving regular updates as informa-
tion became known and that the president was dedicated to using all available
resources to confront the challenge (Gibbs 2010). The next day, the President
issued a ban on new offshore drilling leases, saying that though he “ ‘[believes]
that domestic oil production is an important part of our over all strategy for
energy security... the local economies and livelihoods of the people in the Gulf
Coast as well as the ecology of the region are at stake” (Cooper 2010). Over
the course of the next month, President Obama made four trips to the Gulf
Coast region, to see the damage and learn about the ongoing efforts to con-
tain and clean up the oil. After weeks of new information and watching the
various companies involved in the ownership and operation of the Deepwater
Horizon platform argue about responsibility and blame for the incident, Pres-
ident Obama made a televised address to the nation on June 15th, in which he
talked directly to the nation about the eight week-old crisis, saying “we will
fight this spill with everything we’ve got for as long as it takes” and that “we
will make BP pay for the damage their company has caused.” He also used the
opportunity to talk to Americans about reducing the nation’s dependence on
oil, using the crisis to illustrate why oil was not a sustainable future (Cooper
and Calmes 2010). Each action President Obama took reflected his evolving
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understanding of the problems and solutions at hand, an understanding that
developed as he was able to process and assimilate information about the oil
spill. To process all of the information and make decisions about the best
course of action to pursue and how to communicate it to other actors took
time and effort.
Decision-making is a cognitively taxing process. One of the aspects
that makes it difficult is the information supply. Information is inefficiently
supplied, coming from many sources, which often overlap, but in every sense
there is far too much for any decision maker to be able to cope with seamlessly.
Decision-makers must devise strategies for coping with the information flow.
The main way they manage the abundant information is prioritization.
2.1.2 Priorization
One of the characteristics that all decision makers have in common is
the scarcity of their attention. Attention is limited for a number of reasons.
First, there is only so much time in the day, and not all of it can be devoted
to work. Just like every other person, they must sleep, eat, and dedicate some
measure of time to other pastimes, so as to recover from the stress of the job.2
This decreases the amount of time available. Additionally, the president has
a variety of other demands on his attention besides policy. Presidents are also
2Family time and golf seem to be two of the most popular past times of presidents.
Additionally, presidents need some vacation time, though they often bring their staffs with
them so as to be able to cope with crises. Crawford, TX under President G.W. Bush and
various places around Hawaii, under President Obama, saw a fair bit of presidential time to
help them maintain sanity under the pressures of the job.
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political strategists and heads of state. This means that they must devote
attention to purely political concerns, constituent concerns, and ceremonial
matters. By combining the head of government and head of state roles into one
person, the founding fathers necessarily prevented the president from spending
all his working time on policy making.
How then do decision makers, with limited attention, cope with the
oversupply of information? They prioritize. Presidents, like any other politi-
cal actor, must make decisions about what to pay attention to, and by doing
so, they necessarily are making a decision to ignore other things (Jones and
Baumgartner 2005; Workman, Jones and Jochim 2009). In the information-
processing perspective, prioritization is necessary because the environment is
information rich (Simon 1983, 2000). One of the challenges of decision-making
is getting from raw information to problems and solution. Part of how deci-
sion makers make that leap is through interpreting information. Information
provides signals about the state of policy problems and solutions, and though
cognitive and emotional limitations do not allow decision makers to smoothly
process information, they use interpretation to make sense of what it is they are
learning (Jones and Baumgartner 2005). When signals indicate that certain
information is important—however subjective a construct that might be—that
information becomes prioritized for attention moving forward.
Institutions can help with the difficulties of limited attention by allow-
ing for specialization and parallel processing.3 The Congress is able to process
3Parallel processing is the ability to pay attention to many policy areas at once, usually
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a great deal more information than the president through the committee struc-
ture. Committees allow for members of Congress to specialize in a few areas
of policy making. This means that when a bill comes to the floor for a vote,
it has already been worked on by members with policy expertise, and the fact
that it has been approved by the committee gives a signal to co-partisans that
the bill should be approved, so that they, the members who aren’t on the com-
mittee, don’t have to devote their limited attention to the issue (Workman,
Jones and Jochim 2009; Shepsle and Weingast 1981, 1987).
Presidents, through the agencies and the Executive Office of the Presi-
dent, have many layers of people who can work on policy priorities. However,
presidents are ultimately responsible for decisions. This means that on any
big decision, the president must be briefed on the issue and make a deci-
sion for themselves; they can not merely rubber stamp the decision of one of
their subordinates, without fear of blame should it turn out to be the wrong
decision. Much of the discussion in the aftermath of the Iran-Contra affair
concerned the appropriate level of presidential knowledge and involvement in
decision-making because President Reagan had taken a hands off approach
to policy, once he had set out his desired outcome. Ultimately it was felt
that the “buck stops” with the president. He must be knowledgeable, as he is
ultimately responsible for the decisions of the executive branch. This means
that the president has to do a great deal more serial processing, focusing on
through committees or other structures that allow for specialization. Serial processing,
by contrast, means focusing on one area at a time and thus having to make decisions in
succession (Workman, Jones and Jochim 2009).
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one issue at a time; making prioritization incredibly important in presidential
decision-making.
There are many types of information that presidents need to prioritize
to make decisions. Whether it is information about what policy area to pay
attention to or what strategies and tools to use, the prioritization component
of information processing can include many stages. As I will talk about more
in the next chapter, presidential information prioritization involves two main
types of information: Information about what to pay attention to, which I call
policy prioritization, and information about what strategy to take, which I call
strategy selection. Each of these stages is a type of information prioritization
and it is important to recognize that decisions about how to prioritize these
two types of information form an iterative loop in which the choice made to
deal with one type of information informs the choice about the other type.
Yet when we talk about the information processing perspective generally, as
we have been doing in this chapter, it can be much more simple to refer to the
larger category of information prioritization.
One of the consequences of the need to prioritize in the information
processing perspective is the phenomenon of disproportionate information pro-
cessing. Disproportionate information processing can be understood as an im-
provement on incrementalism. In incrementalism, policy change comes as a
result of small adjustments on past action (Lindblom 1959; Wildavsky 1964).
This model of policy change assumed that information was smoothly inte-
grated in to knowledge and thus transformed the outputs of government sim-
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ilarly smoothly (Jones and Baumgartner 2005). Yet incrementalism does not
fully explain the policy process. While there are indeed times of incremental
change, policy change can also occur through large shifts in policy, commonly
known as punctuations (Baumgartner and Jones 2009). A major reason these
punctuations occur is because the cognitive and emotional limitations of deci-
sion makers do not allow them to smoothly integrate new information about
the world and transform it into outputs. Instead, new information is often
ignored or misinterpreted until such point as errors in the system accumulate
and force substantial attention to an issue and correspondingly substantial pol-
icy change (Jones and Baumgartner 2005). Punctuations signal a significant
change in the way an issue or policy is understood, which can occur when a
decision maker’s understanding of an issue catches up due to the integration of
new information. In that case, a punctuation is the result of disproportionate
information processing.
Later in this chapter, I will address exactly why we should understand
presidential decision making through the framework of disproportionate infor-
mation processing. However, it is clear enough that those same cognitive and
emotional limitations that disproved incrementalism are the same forces which




The final component of information processing is the decision itself.
Decisions are the concrete outcome of the processing of information. In the
information processing perspective, decisions are complex. Decisions are based
on information and prioritization within institutional structures, but they are
subject to the cognitive and emotional limitations of the decision maker. Re-
member that individuals are boundedly rational; they use their information
and priorities to try and achieve their goals, but they do so imperfectly. This
means that there are two potential outcomes: one, in which attention stays on
the policy area, where decisions are followed by additional incremental deci-
sions to make adjustments to the original decision, or a second outcome where
the issue is ignored once the initial decision is made and errors resulting from
the initial decision accumulate to the point where an emergency forms, regain-
ing the decision maker’s attention in a large punctuated fashion (Baumgartner
and Jones 2009; Baumgartner, Jones and Mortensen 2014; Jones and Baum-
gartner 2012; Boushey 2012; Baumgartner et al. 2009). Decision making as
addressed by the information processing perspective seems to do a good job
of describing the reality we see in politics. Only by trying to understand pres-
idential decision making through the lens of how he processes information can
we understand the relationship between the president and the policy process.
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2.2 A Fresh Approach to Presidential Decision Making
Presidential decision making can be understood as a series of winnowing
decisions that move the president from the consumption and processing of
information through to decisions about what policy areas to pay attention to,
what actions to take, which finally culminate in presidential actions in the
policy process.
One thing that is important to note as we move forward is that the order
of decisions as set out here is a general process. Often, the process does work
as described, where presidents decide to address a particular policy problem
and then must select the strategy they want to use to attack a particular
issue. Yet there are instances in which the decision about what to do comes
first and what policies to fill the tool with comes second, as in the State of the
Union address. Tradition dictates that presidents give a major policy speech
in January or February every year. Faced with that tradition, presidents must
decide with what to fill the speech. Some presidents decide to fill the speech
with new policy proposals, in the case of President G.W. Bush’s proposed
education reform, No Child Left Behind, in 2001. Other years, the speech is
much more a laundry list of accomplishments, trying to tout accomplishments
and please people who care about a particular policy area, as President Obama
did in his 2014 address in which he talked about everything from tax reform,
to natural gas, physical education, veterans, broadband Internet access, al
Quida, Syrian chemical weapons, and the Ukraine, along with many other
topics. Or there are moments where presidents decide to set out a big policy
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Figure 2.1: Theory of Presidential Decision Making
Information Policy Prioritization Tool Selection Decision
change via policy proposals and then the details of that policy are created
to fit the rhetoric (Tulis 2017). President Johnson created a set of policies
to alleviate poverty, by first creating a rhetorical War on Poverty and had to
fit those policies to the imagery he had set out (Tulis 2017). Additionally,
the consumption and integration of information is an ongoing process through
out decision making (Witherspoon 1991). Information is assimilated in fits
and spurts, requiring the president to make new decisions in response to new
information. As we move through the next few sections, it is important to
recognize that the sequence of events set out is an idealized process, but that
it represents the full range of decisions, even as the order of decision is not
always so neat.
In the first stage of presidential decision-making, the president must
work with his staff to winnow information that he is receives from the execu-
tive agencies and other information sources. The president and the Executive
Office of the President must work together to develop a strategy for informa-
tion prioritization. That strategy is based on the criteria that are important
to the individual president, such as the information source, preferences about
policy areas, and existing knowledge about the severity of policy problems.
These strategies develop as a function of the organization of the staff and
the relationship that the president has with individual staff members, both
32
personally and professionally (Hult and Walcott 2009). Presidential personal-
ity and psychology also shape in how they prioritize information and instruct
their staffs to pre-process information (Greenstein 2009; Light 1991; Walker
2009). The president’s personality and psychological orientation reflect many
of the cognitive and emotional limitations that form the biases that lead to
disproportionate information processing. Presidents and their individual cog-
nitive and organizational styles will have a strong effect on the prioritization
of information, which has consequences for policy selection, tool selection, and
policy outputs.
The second stage of the presidential decision-making process is the
prioritization of policy areas. Based on the processing and prioritization of
information, presidents will select which policy areas to pay attention to. The
decision is complex, as the decision to get involved in a single policy area
is not independent from the decision to pay attention to other policy areas.
It can be helpful to think of the presidential agenda space as finite, thus
the decision to get involved in a new policy area or increase attention to an
area necessarily means reducing attention to or dropping another policy area
from the agenda all together. Presidential decision-making is about constantly
making trade-off between policy areas in response to needs, preferences, and
incoming information.
The third stage of the presidential decision-making process is the selec-
tion of policy strategy, which we can think of as the selection from a particular
set of policy tools. A policy tool is any activity the president chooses to use to
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engage in policy making. These can range from tools used to propose policy,
to tools for unilateral actions. The choice of tool represents the president’s
strategy in the given policy area. Presidents have three main strategic paths:
propose policy, shape policy, or take action independently. Each of the three
main strategies can be fulfilled with a number of different policy tools that
further refine the presidential strategy. A proposal strategy is pursued, gen-
erally, because it is the easiest and safest policy choice to make. To make
policy this way, presidents must appeal to Congress, the courts, the media,
the public, and interest groups, explain their positions and implore them to
take up the preferred course of policy action. The second strategy is unilateral
action. This is where the president takes an action that, without subsequent
action from Congress or the courts, changes policy and doesn’t require any-
one else’s participation. Unilateral action, as a strategy for presidential policy
action, has grown immensely over the past 30 years in response to increased
gridlock elsewhere in the policy process (Cooper 2014; Gitterman 2017; Mayer
2009). The third strategy that presidents have a their disposal is to shape
policy towards the end of the legislative process, just as legislation is about to
be enacted. Shaping tools allow Congress to do the heavy lifting of enacting
policy change, but allows the president a voice should Congress want to enact
something that he dislikes or disagrees with. Shaping tools are very useful
as the policy outputs are laws and consequently more durable than unilateral
actions, but the president also has some credible power at that late stage in
the processes, as veto overrides are hard for the modern partisan Congress to
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execute.
The fourth stage of the presidential decision making process is the cul-
mination of the prior stages, the decision itself. This is the action that the
president takes. It is a direct result of the three prior stages in that the
information informs the choice of policy and strategy to create the action.
Presidential actions are the stage of the process that we, as scholars, get to
observe directly. From it, we can learn how, when, and under what conditions
presidents pay attention to a policy area and use a policy strategy. The pres-
idential output has the ability to directly generate the president’s preferred
outcome, whether that is policy change or stasis, but it does not guarantee
that outcome.
2.3 The President as a Disproportionate Information
Processor
Central to this theory is the need to understand the president as a
disproportionate information processor. As discussed earlier, disproportion-
ate information processing recognizes that information is not always smoothly
integrated into decision-making, because cognitive and emotional limitations
make it difficult to integrate new information. Disproportionate information
processing highlights that, when information is fully integrated, it can trig-
ger an often belated shift in attention. These belated shifts are a response
to error accumulation and friction in the political system (Jones and Baum-
gartner 2005). Presidents are highly susceptible to the forces that make in-
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formation processing disproportionate. In particular, information oversupply,
institutional friction, and serial processing have particularly strong effects on
presidents.
President’s are highly susceptible to disproportionate information be-
cause of the structure of the institution. The presidency is profoundly shaped
by the unitary nature of the executive. At the founding, the framers felt that
it was important to create an institution that could make decisions decisively
and move quickly. That “energy” has made the presidency particularly vul-
nerable to cognitive and emotional limitations because of the reliance on one
man. When the president gets an idea in his head, it can be very difficult to
dissuade him from a course of action. In the previous chapter, we discussed
the limitations that lead President Reagan into the Iran-Contra scandal. His
inability to process the information he was receiving about Congress’s position
lead him to make decisions that he might not have made if he was aware of the
potential consequences. In order to understand the president as a dispropor-
tionate information processor, we must consider the ways the president receives
information from the world around him and the way in which he processes it.
2.3.1 Information Pre-Processing
As discussed earlier, the decision-making environment is oversupplied
with information. From morning to night, the president is constantly being
exposed to new information. That information comes from many sources,
such as executive agencies, the public, Congress, the courts, the media, and
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interest groups. Presidents can receive information in two forms: raw and
pre-processed. Raw information is facts such as weather reports, foreign in-
telligence, or the text of a bill that has been introduced. Presidents are ill
equipped to process raw information, in part because raw information is the
most abundant form of information (Light 1991). Raw information has lit-
tle to no interpretation associated with it and it takes a great deal of the
president’s most precious resource—time—to process. Additionally, to get the
most out of raw information, the person processing it needs some context and
expertise; it takes skill to figure out if what is in front of you is critical or
worthless. Presidents may have subject expertise in some areas, but they are
certainly not experts in all policy areas, nor do they have the time to process
raw information even in areas where they are knowledgeable. Without filters
in place, decision makers can get overwhelmed, making it difficult to react
appropriately to all the data (Wagner 2010). A failure to have sufficient filters
in place to pre-process information for the president exacerbates the shifts in
attention from topic to topic, as unfiltered information would leave presidents
unprepared for oncoming policy problems and force them to be even more
reactive than they already are. Presidents need people to pre-process most
information.
One example of information pre-processing is the President’s Daily
Briefing (PDB), a regular meeting or memo in which the president receives
national security information and classified briefings. The PDB contains high-
level intelligence and analysis about countries and events around the world
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and how they relate to U.S. national security. The memo is produced by the
Office of the Director of National Intelligence and is specifically for presidents
and their top advisors (Priess 2016; Savage 2016). The PDB is an excellent
example of both the potentials and the pitfalls of pre-processing. National
security and world affairs are areas that produce a great deal of raw infor-
mation. Every day, thousands of U.S. intelligence agents, both domestically
and abroad, and diplomats stationed abroad gain information that could be
useful for the national interest. That information works its way up the intelli-
gence chain to Washington. While presidents need to know what is going on
around the world, they are completely incapable of processing that volume of
raw information. Instead, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence,
and the other agencies under them, pre-processes the information, drawing
on analysts with deep expertise and knowledge about different parts of the
world to decide the importance and meaning of the information. They then
decide what it is that the president needs to know that day and can provide
the president with the context he needs to make sense of that information.
This process drastically simplifies the president’s foreign policy and national
security decision making.
Yet that same process can also produce blind spots and errors in the
president’s decision making. In particular, while the PDB is shaped by expert
assessments of the urgency of world events, it is also tailored to individual
presidential interests (Savage 2016). Most days, the amount of time the pres-
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ident devotes to national security is only an hour or so.4 In this time period,
the briefer has to cover information on all the pertinent situations around the
world, but by including the president’s interests as a prioritizing factor, they
may decide not to include an emerging situation somewhere the president is
not interested in. Eventually, this de-prioritization can grow into an emer-
gency that catches a president off guard. Just as the PDB filters information
to the point where he can deal with it, it can also filter it to the point where he
is missing out on important information that he needs until it is too late. This
creates a kind of filter failure that is a hazard of information pre-processing.
The president sits at the apex of a pyramid of people who pre-process
information for him. At the base of the pyramid are many of the sources of in-
formation: the media, executive branch agencies, the public, interest groups,
Congress, the courts. These actors all provide the president with informa-
tion either through reports or their direct actions, representing the first stage
of information pre-processing. The public, courts, and Congress pre-process
information for the president by virtue of their independent actions. For ex-
ample, the president can learn about a policy area and whether he should
pay it attention by whether his co-partisans who control Congress take up
the issue. Executive branch agencies and interest groups can provide infor-
mation pre-processing by writing reports and holding meetings with members
of the intermediate level of the pre-processing pyramid. These preliminary
pre-processors have subject area expertise and can not only winnow informa-
4Of course, this changes during and after an emergency.
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Figure 2.2: Paths of Information Pre-Processing
President
White House Staff Political Appointees
Public Interest Groups Media Executive Agencies
tion down to what is important, but also provide a layer of interpretation and
information prioritization. This information is still too abundant to be of use
to the president. It requires still more pre-processing.
The next stage, situated in between these sources of information and
the president, is an intermediate stage. This stage is filled with people the
president has selected to represent him, advise him, and look out for his policy
agenda and political interests, such as appointees in executive branch agencies
and White House employees. Particularly important are the White House chief
of staff and the other members of the president’s senior staff. These people
are critical gatekeepers for presidential attention and information processing.
They are his confidants and sounding boards, as well as his most trusted
sources of information (Witherspoon 1991; Kernell and Popkin 1986). They
help him make sense of the political environment, such as what the president
can expect from Congress given the number of seats that the party holds or
what his approval rating might mean for his political capital. They can also
help process more policy specific information, taking meetings with people,
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or process reports created by the initial stage of information processors and
process it for how it fits in with the president’s priorities and preferences. If
the information fits with the president’s priorities and preferences, then that
information is more likely to make it to the president, and if it does not, then
the president is unlikely to ever see it (Witherspoon 1991).
Every president has had three or four staff members whose input on
policy as rivaled or even exceeded the influence held by members of the pres-
ident’s cabinet (Kernell and Popkin 1986). They are always on hand, always
ready to help the president with a difficult decision. The relationship that they
develop with him is critical to their ability to help him process information
and deal with the demands of the job (Witherspoon 1991). Over time, they
learn to read his moods and his state of mind, knowing when the president has
made a hasty decision that if they implemented, he would come to regret and
when the president has made up his mind—and right or wrong—they have
to deal with the decision (Kernell and Popkin 1986). The president’s chief of
staff is a particularly important figure in presidential pre-processing because in
most White Houses, he controls access to the president and is a critical gate-
keeper of information that reaches the president (Kernell and Popkin 1986).
An effective chief of staff can do a great deal to lighten the cognitive burden
on presidents, but they can also, either accidentally or intentionally, prevent
the president from getting all the information that he might need, leading to
decision making errors.
Some parts of the media can bypass the intermediate pre-processing
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stage. Presidents, in general, follow the news media quite closely. The me-
dia can provide the president a sense of how the public is reacting to political
events. Sources that the president trusts, like The New York Time or The Wall
Street Journal, or prominent journalists, like Peter Baker or Tim Russert. In
the midst of the Vietnam War, President Lyndon Johnson, while watching
a special report by Walter Cronkite on the Tet Offensive, reportedly turned
to aides and said, “If I’ve lost Cronkite, I’ve lost middle America.” The me-
dia also provide information directly to the president through investigative
reporting. These reports can uncover policy problems that the president and
his pre-processors have missed. But not all media goes directly to the presi-
dent by passing the intermediate level of pre-processing. The media provides
information of a much larger range of issues and opinions then the president
can attend. This information still has the ability to inform presidential deci-
sion making when it is picked up by the intermediate level. Consequently, the
media has the unique ability directly supply the president with information,
but also provide information to intermediate level pre-processors.
Information pre-processing has many benefits. One benefit is that it
provides a massive amount of information winnowing for the president. Presi-
dents are expected to pay attention to, and be knowledgeable of, major policy
developments in all policy areas. That is a massive undertaking for any in-
stitution, let alone one where the ultimate decisions rest in the hands of one
person. Pre-processing allows for information to be prioritized by people with
expert policy knowledge and expert knowledge of both presidential priorities
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and preferences. Another benefit of pre-processing is that it allows for infor-
mation to “compete” for attention. In a universe where the decision maker
is the only information processor, once a piece of information has been dis-
carded, it will likely stay there until the situation changes enough to make the
policy area an exigent focus. In a pre-processing universe, the decision-making
environment gets populated with sub-level decision makers, each of whom can
become a champion for information that they deem important. For example,
an interest group whose focus is the environment can try to meet repeatedly
with different intermediate-level processors to try and find one who will take
up the cause and bring the information to the next level of decision-making.
Pre-processing can lengthen the time from information generation to final de-
cision, but it can also increase probability that the information isn’t discarded
early in the decision-making process.
Information pre-processing does, however, have a number of weak-
nesses. One of the common threads in the principal-agent literature is the risk
of bureaucratic drift. Bureaucratic drift is the idea that implementing agencies
enact policy that is different from the intent of the enacting legislature (Mc-
Cubbins, Noll and Weingast 1987). In the agency control literature, scholars
consider how principals can incentivize their agents to maintain their intent or
sanction them if there is drift from the principal’s intent (Cook and Wood 1989;
Horn and Shepsle 1989; Golden 2000; Moe 1989; Waterman and Meier 1998;
Weingast 1984; Wilson 1989; Wood and Waterman 1994). This can also be a
potential problem in information pre-processing, as pre-processing is a form of
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delegation. The risk is that the information that is ultimately provided to the
president is not reflective of his, the ultimate decision maker’s priorities, but
rather the priorities of the pre-processors. One potential solution for this rests
with the intermediate level of pre-processors. They can correct for preference
drift from the level below before information reaches the president. Alterna-
tively, if the preference drift is in the intermediate level, presidents should be
able to correct it rapidly, as intermediate level pre-processors, by and large,
serve at the pleasure of the president. Unlike preliminary processors, whether
they are bureaucrats with career protections or members of Congress, an in-
termediate level pre-processor whose preferences diverge from the president’s
is gone before much damage to the president’s agenda can occur.
Another weakness of pre-processing produces similar results as the first,
but the weakness is less intentional and more accidental. In the case of in-
formation processing drift, individual preferences cause intentional provision
information that is out of line with presidential priorities. The less insidious
version comes from the fact that pre-processors are just as subject cognitive
and emotional limitations as presidents. This can cause them to ignore infor-
mation or make errors in interpretation. Cognitive and emotional limitations
at the lower levels of information processing can have disastrous consequences
for presidential decision-making, as errors get magnified as they move up the
pyramid of information processing.
Despite the very real weaknesses of pre-processing, it is a necessary com-
ponent of presidential decision-making. Presidents can’t process raw informa-
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tion themselves, so they need to rely on a vast network of people under them to
process information and make decisions. The weaknesses of pre-processing are
a large part of why the president is a disproportionate information processor.
Individual presidents have different preferences about how much they
want information to be pre-processed. Some presidents want information
highly distilled before it gets to them, while others want briefing books full of
information on a range of topics. For example, presidents have had different
preferences regarding the President’s Daily Briefing. President Clinton was
known for wanting a written briefing only, where as President G. W. Bush
wanted an in-person briefing; President Obama wanted both written and in-
person briefings, and President Trump is known for wanting in-person briefings
only once a week and single-page briefing memos (Bush 2016; Healey 2017).
This difference reflects presidential personality and cognitive style more than
anything else, but it can have significant consequences for decision-making.
A president who prefers less pre-processing might be able to make a decision
that is more in-line with his preferences, but due to the added time on the
policy area, might ignore other problems, creating an overall more punctu-
ated decision-making environment, while a president who prefers more pre-
processing may make more errors in which policy options to pursue, but they
may also be able to tackle more policy areas, as they can move swiftly from
one topic to the next.
One thing that is so interesting about presidential information process-
ing is that, while the presidential attention space is very limited, it is almost
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always diverse. Even when there are huge crises in the political and policy
world, such as in the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the agenda does
not shrink to only those topics; other policy areas stay on the agenda, though
in a diminished quantity. Presidential policy selection is complex, even in the
constraints of the limited attention space.
2.3.2 Serial Processing
The final aspect that makes the president a disproportionate informa-
tion processor is the fact that he is a serial processor. Serial processing is
the way that an individual makes decisions — focusing on one issue at a time
(Jones and Baumgartner 2005; Simon 1983). When a serial processor has to
make a number of decisions, they have to first decide the order in which they
will deal with the issues. After priorities are set out, then they work on the
first issues until it is complete and they can move on to the next. That process
forms the basis of presidential decision making.
Contrasted with serial processing is parallel processing. Parallel pro-
cessing allows for separating tasks into their sub-parts and allocating different
sub-parts to specialized units, allowing them to be handled simultaneously
(Jones and Baumgartner 2005; Simon 1983). Organizations allow for parallel
processing, as their substructures, such as committees in the case of Congress
or agencies in the case of the executive branch, allow for division of labor.
Baumgartner and Jones (2005) illustrate this point when they talk about how
the Postal Service is going to deliver mail no matter what the Department of
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Energy is doing. These sub-structures ease the burdens of information pro-
cessing for the system as a whole.
In the presidency, the advisors represent that important intermediate
level of pre-processing that helps the president to cope with his serial process-
ing nature. The relationship the president has with pre-processors is impor-
tant; those who can speak with honesty and candor will provide the president
with more information than those who are afraid for their own positions and
power if they tell him something he doesn’t want to hear. This relationship
between presidents and advisors has a significant effect on the information
that reaches the president and his ability to process information.
However, pre-processing does not change the fact that decisions from
the executive branch ultimately have to be signed off by the president. The
presidency is a serial processing institution. The ability of the president to
focus on only one thing at a time has consequences for his ability to handle in-
formation and make decisions about attention allocation. By being a primarily
serial processor, the president must prioritize extensively. A great deal of the
presidents energy must be spent on deciding what issues to pay attention to
and to update that list as information about the world and policy problems
change. Other institutions are able to prioritize more long term; setting out
plans for months in advance and rarely needing to drastically adjust the prior-
ities based on current events. The presidency is an institution in which a plan
for the week can be set out, but events can force it to be set aside by 10:01 on
Monday morning. This means that the president regularly has to evaluate his
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priorities and adjust in accordance to the changing world.
Additionally, the serial processing nature of the presidency also has an
effect on decision-making because it creates a bottleneck. The president is
ultimately responsible for the outcomes of all decisions. This means that all
major decisions need to go before the president. Because he can only focus on
one at a time, it creates a situation where information processing slows down
and a new issue cannot receive the president’s attention until he is done with
the previous issue. This slowdown has significant consequences for decision-
making and information processing.
Yet, individuals and organizations are not completely dominated by
their primary type of information processing. Individuals are capable of par-
allel processing to a limited extent, but as the complexity of the task increases,
individuals are forced to return to serial processing of tasks and information.
Additionally, organizations are not capable of parallel processing forever. At
some point, an organization must switch to serial processing to decide the
broader organizational agenda. We see this in Congress on the floors of the
House and Senate. In these chambers, the committee structure allow for policy
area specialization and division of labor, but ultimately the leadership must
make decisions about the order with which to bring issues to the floor, as
voting on the floor requires Congress to process issues one at a time.
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2.4 Individual Differences and Presidential Style: Other
Psychological Approaches to Understanding the Pres-
idency
Disproportionate information processing is not the only consideration
at play when trying to understand presidential decision making. The presi-
dency literature has used a number of different psychological approaches and
frames to understand the man in the office. While these studies have largely
focused on presidential character in order to uncover what makes a president
successful, they offer useful insights into the way presidents think and make de-
cisions, by considering different president’s cognitive and organizational styles.
Each of these psychologically driven characteristics, though not at the center
of this study, are important to consider, particularity as they shape how we
have tried to understand presidential decision making in the past.
Yet, studying the cognitive and organizational styles of presidents can’t
be the end point for presidency scholars. Just as the field of psychology moved
from the study of individual cases to general phenomena (Cronbach, Rajarat-
nam and Gleser 1963) and organizational theory has move toward a behav-
ioral theory (Cyert, March et al. 1963), so too must the study of presidential
decision-making. The work of this dissertation is a part of that leap, as in-
stead of trying to explain and understand the differences between individual
presidents, we are trying to understand the ways that all presidents tackle the
cognitively-complex job of the presidency. However, the past scholarship on
the presidency is worthy of review as these characteristics form the basis of
49
the cognitive and emotional limitations that are at the center of the general
framework of disproportionate information processing.
2.4.1 Cognitive Styles
One thing that is noteworthy for this theory of presidential informa-
tion processing is how much the institution of the presidency is influenced by
the serial processing capacity of the individual who is president. While the
president does have access to staff and others who pre-process information for
him, the president is responsible for the final decision more than almost any
other political actor in government. This means that he needs to be able to
think clearly and make decisions quickly and decisively. In addition to the
substantive decisions presidents must make, they must also constantly evalu-
ate the organization of their pre-processors, deciding again and again whether
the structure is working and if the particular individuals closest to them are
helping with the decision making process. These constant decisions make the
president much more of a serial processor than any other political institution.
The serial processing nature of the presidency has significant conse-
quences for decision-making. One such consequence is that the capacity of the
presidency is strongly shaped by the cognitive capacity of the individual in the
office. Officeholders always shape their institutions, but in larger institutions,
the institutional capacity is shaped by the sum of the actors, rather than being
dependent on one actor. In the presidency, the institution is shaped by the cog-
nitive capacity and the orientation the individual in the office has towards the
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job. Differences in these outlooks and abilities have significant consequences
for how the institution operates and interacts with other institutions and po-
litical actors. Additionally, the abilities of the individual have a substantial
impact on how they handle the demands of the task, particularly how they
process information. Greenstein’s seminal work on presidential character ex-
amines how differences in characteristics, such as public communication style,
organizational capacity, political skill, vision, cognitive style, and emotional
intelligence shape presidents and reshape the presidency each time there is a
change in officeholder (Greenstein 2009).
Greenstein highlights two characteristics in particular that have an im-
pact on presidential information processing: cognitive style and emotional
intelligence. In Greenstein’s own words, cognitive style is “ ‘[the way] the
president processes the Niagara of advice and information that comes his way”
(2009). Emotional intelligence can best be understood as how president’s man-
age their emotions (Greenstein 2009); does a president channel a defeat into
productive energy that propels him forward or is it a stumbling block, one
which makes it more difficult to get things done in the future? As we have dis-
cussed extensively, presidents are overloaded with information and faced with
many challenges that stand in the way of accomplishing their goals. How they
handle that overload and those challenges speaks to their intellect, tempera-
ment, and emotional capacity. A president who is cognizant of the challenges
of processing information and sets up an intentional organization around him
in order to try to get the best help he can and can channel his emotions into
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a productive way is going to make much different decisions than a president
who is subject to emotional highs and lows or one who distrusts the informa-
tion coming from those around him. The information processing capacity and
decision making ability of presidents are strongly shaped by the psychological
characteristics set out by Greenstein.
Another way scholars have tried to understand presidential character
and its affect on the presidency is through the categorizations of Barber (1992).
He created a scheme of four categories that represent the different types of out-
looks the president can have towards the office and are created by looking at
two dimensions, energy level and affect.5 These categories attempt to under-
stand the the orientation and enthusiasm that define a president’s character
in order to determine which characteristics make for “successful” presidencies.
Success in the White House is a nebulous concept, but Barber’s typology does
provide a context to think about presidential character and approach to the
job, and when combined with the characteristics from Greenstein’s work, can
shed some light on how individuals might process information differently.
These characteristics, emotional intelligence and cognitive styles—both
from Greenstein’s work (2009) — and orientations towards the office—from the
work of Barber (1992)— are particularly significant for understanding dispro-
portionate information processing. They provide significant insight in to the
kind of cognitive and emotional limitations that affect an individual president
5For more information on what defines the four categories, read Barber’s book “The
Presidential Character: Predicting Performance in the White House” (1992).
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and shed light on they way their individual decision-making process might
work. For example, President Nixon was the kind of individual who thought
all the time and soaked up information, but struggled with what to do with the
information he had —an indication of both his cognitive style and emotional
intelligence (Greenstein 2009). However, he was a compulsive president, ac-
cording to Barber, obsessed with his own power and the successes and failures
(1992). These characteristics limited his ability to process information because
the obsession with power and success exacerbated the emotional limitations
that might have allowed the vast amount of information that is absorbed from
being integrated and processed proportionally.
Another type of president is one like Ronald Reagan. Ronald Reagan
had a much weaker grasp of logic and did not devote much energy to acquiring
new information, instead delegating it to his staff and advisors. Instead, he
used his strong emotional intelligence to appear as if he had a grasp of what
was going on around him (Greenstein 2009). Yet when combined with his
compliant character type, his need to be adored, and his reactive rather than
proactive nature, it is reasonable to expect that his character had an effect
on how he processed information preventing him from making decisions that
would advance his interests. A president who only reacts and tries to acquire
the minimum amount of information, while delegating power to others, makes
decisions and handles information in a much different way than those who are
detail oriented.
These characteristics, regardless of particular character or personality
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type, shape the president’s information processing capacity, and thus the ca-
pacity of the presidency. The institution of the presidency is transformed each
time a new person takes office because of the change in character and cognitive
capacity of the individual.
2.4.2 Organizational Styles
A second way the individual in the office reshapes the presidency is
through their organizational structures. The way that presidents have orga-
nized the White House has varied considerably over time (Burke 2009; Green-
stein 2009; Hult and Walcott 2009). However, Hess points to four characteris-
tics in organization of the modern presidency (2012). The first characteristic
is the sheer growth in the number of people in the White House. Prior to
Franklin D. Roosevelt, presidents had a small handful of aides (Burke 2000),
but the modern presidency has grown significantly in both size and complex-
ity (Allison 1971; Janis 1972; Johnson 1974). A second characteristic of the
modern presidency is a distrust of the permanent government. Rather than
rely on bureaucrats to create policy proposals, the presidency has moved to-
wards creating offices within the White House, staffed with people loyal to the
president to tackle policy, such as creating a drugs czar rather than relying on
bureaucrats with in the Drug Enforcement Agency (Hess and Pfiffner 2012).
This has created fragmentation in the policy process, making it more difficult
for those who create policy and those who implement it to share information
with each other. A third characteristic is the rising influence of White House
54
staff and the declining influence of the cabinet. This creates problems similar
to those created by the rise in functional policy offices in the White House. As
policy making occurs more and more in the president’s own staff and he listens
to them more than to the agencies and their heads, there is an increasing dis-
connect between policy formulation and implementation. Finally, presidential
staff have increasingly become tasked with insuring representation for special
groups. Although this started benignly under President Truman as a way to
insure some voice for those who would not otherwise be represented in execu-
tive branch decision making, it eventually grew until almost every interest had
a voice, making it difficult to filter all opinions (Hess and Pfiffner 2012). All
of these characteristics and changes have had important effects on the insti-
tution of the presidency, as they shape the way decisions are made and whose
perspectives are heard in the decision making process.
A central way we have thought about the organization of the White
House is in regards to whose voices are heard by the president. Each president
creates a White House structure to suit his preferences about how he wants to
be advised and the relationships he wants his advisors to have with each other.
The relationship that White House aides have with each other and the pres-
ident reflects the president’s “needs and fears, his assumptions about people,
and why he manages them as he does” (Johnson 1974). Richard Johnson’s
scholarship highlights three main types of White House structures: compet-
itive, formalistic, and collegial. In a competitive White House, there are a
small band of top staffers who compete to be assigned tasks by the president.
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Their duties often overlap and the president contributes to the competitive
environment by fostering the rivalries between staffers to reinforce their loy-
alty to him (Johnson 1974; Burke 2009). This style of White House is mostly
attributed to the Franklin Roosevelt administration, but current trends in
the Trump administration, such as a great deal of information leaking to the
media from aides and loyalty to the president as one of the most important
qualities, suggest that the competitive style may still be relevant in the con-
temporary presidency. The strength of a competitive White House is that it
maximizes presidential control and favors the creation of policy solutions that
are politically feasible (Johnson 1974; Burke 2009). The weakness is that the
president has to spend a considerable amount of energy directing the compe-
tition in productive ways and controlling interpersonal relationships between
staffers so as to create the competitive tension. Additionally, the competitive
approach has the potential to drastically limit the information that gets to the
president because individuals are incentivized to only pass along information
that is desirable to the president. This could contribute to the disproportion-
ate nature of information processing as vital information could be ignored by
staffers and never make it to the president simply because it is information
they think would upset him and risk falling into disfavor over.
In a formalistic environment, we see a great deal of delegation from the
president to top staffers and a clearly delineated, hierarchical system through
which information and advice reaches the president and tasks are assigned
(Johnson 1974; Burke 2009). The formalistic White House can be thought of
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as a pyramid with the president at the top and each rank of advisors making
up one of the supporting levels below. When Johnson wrote about this style,
he highlighted the Eisenhower administration, and its leader’s experience in
the military, with its structure, as a prime example of the formalistic White
House, but we have also seen this structure in the administration of George
W. Bush. In the case of G.W. Bush, his experience in the corporate world
formed his vision of how the White House should be organized. The strength
of the formalistic White House is that it allows for broad search about the
nature of policy problems and solutions, as lower levels of the structure could
devote their attention to search. However, in this structure there is a greater
risk of information getting distorted as it moves up the pyramid of the orga-
nization (Johnson 1974; Burke 2009). The greater the number of levels that
information has to pass through before it reaches the president, the more likely
the information is to either be dismissed as unimportant before it ever reaches
the president or for the information to be distorted, as if through a game of
“telephone” and be unhelpful for solving the real policy problem.
Finally, in a collegial environment the president is supported by a small
group of staffers, just like in the competitive environment, only instead of
being pitted against one another; they are encouraged to work together. Just
as the formalistic environment could be imagined as a pyramid, the collegial
environment could be understood as a wagon wheel, where the president is at
the center and each advisor is a spoke outward (Johnson 1974; Burke 2009).
We see this style in the Ford administration, as an attempt to heal the White
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House following the Nixon administration. We also see this style in the Obama
administration, where the president surrounded himself with a small team of
confidants who helped him process policy and make decisions.
The strength of the collegial style is that it allows information to have
more routes to the president, as each of that small group of advisors is a
potential access point for information. This style also allows for teamwork
and collaboration on an idea. All of these are excellent points when there is
a diversity of viewpoints. However, this style can have two main weaknesses.
One weakness is when the small group all thinks the same way. This can cause
an echo-chamber effect that does not allow the penetration of new ideas or
information (Johnson 1974; Janis 1972). This can exacerbate the information
processing problem because the more closed off a group is, the more likely it
is to ignore vital information about the state of a problem engaging in group-
think, which can lead to emergencies down the road. A second weakness with
the collegial White House is that it can allow too much access to the president.
One of the key reasons for a president to have a good staff is so that they
can pre-process information and reduce the cognitive strain on the president.
A collegial administration with a spokes of the wheel configuration has the
potential to not sufficiently process information and overtax the president’s
resources to get to the crux of an issue, particularly when multiple advisors
are competing for the president’s attention.
Presidents structure their White Houses to reflect both their needs
and their characters. In a healthy White House, presidents whose cognitive
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abilities are not their strength need aides that they can rely on to process
information for them more fully. Presidents who like to acquire information
directly need staff around them to debate ideas and make sure that they are
not being blinded by their own cognitive and emotional limitations (Greenstein
2009). Additionally, presidents have needs beyond direct advising that have
consequences for their organizational structures. Emotional support or the
need to generate support in Congress and the public can shape decisions that
presidents make about how to structure and populate their staffs (George
1980). The president’s choice of organization has consequences for his ability
to process information and make decisions.
2.5 Consequences of the New Approach of Presidential
Decision Making
The new approach to presidential decision making, set out in this chap-
ter, highlights the many ways in which presidential decision making may be
affected by cognitive and emotional limitations and result in disproportion-
ate information processing. Many aspects of the institution of the presidency,
such as staff structures and serial processing, have consequences for the ways
in which presidents prioritize and make decisions. By exploring a theory of
presidential information processing, we gain significant insights to president’s
decision-making processes.
The process of making decisions for an institution with a central focus
like the president is far more complicated than it is for many other institutions.
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Presidents are constantly pressed to pay attention to all policy issues and
must prioritize extensively and re-prioritize regularly to make the best use
of their most scarce resources, their time and attention. By understanding
presidential decision-making as a series of stages, where presidents must first
sort through information, decide on issue prioritization, followed by a decision
on what tool and strategy to use to tackle the selected issue, all resulting in
the policy action the president takes, we gain a great deal of insight into the
complexity of presidential decision making. Other institutions are faced with
similar prioritization challenges, but have the ability to divide the decisions
across a much wider range of decision makers than exist in the presidency.
In the subsequent chapters, we will examine the different stages of
presidential decision making, focusing on how presidents make decisions and
trade-offs about policy issues and policy tools, before considering how they
come together, but it is first important to recognize the contributions of this
study. Never before has it been possible to see the policy areas that presidents
have been paying attention to, nor have we been able to measure how presi-
dents make trade-offs between different policy areas. Nor have we studied, in
a comprehensive fashion, the range of policy tools that the president has at
his disposal and examine the decisions the president makes regarding whether
to propose policy, shape it prior to implementation, or take unilateral action.
Finally, this study brings together policy areas and tools to learn how these
two types of decisions interact with each other, getting a sense of how partic-
ular policy areas can limit the use of tools and how the limits of certain tools
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can point to certain policy areas. This dissertation represents steps forward
for a number of areas of study in the presidency.
Presidential decision-making has significant consequences for policy and
politics in our everyday lives. By trying to understand the decisions that pres-
idents make and how they make them, we can gain significant insight into
why some issues end up on the agenda and why others stay off. Additionally,
we can begin to consider questions of institutional capacity and how institu-
tional design affects the information processing capacity. All of which offer
new insights into the presidency and the policy process.
In the next chapter, we will examine presidential decision making,
specifically the decisions that presidents make about what policy areas to pay
attention to and how they make trade-offs between policy areas. Presidents
rely on the information, both about the expectations associated with the job,
but also, from the world around them in order to make decisions about what
to pay attention to. By trying to understand what presidents pay attention to
and why they pay attention to those issues, we can learn a great deal about




Each year in early November, a team of speech writers meets with the
president to begin developing a list list of policy areas that will appear in the
upcoming State of the Union address. Over the following weeks and months,
the policy priorities and language are honed to fit with events as they happen
in the world; a mass shooting may increase the length of the section devoted
to gun control or an earthquake in Haiti may direct more attention to the need
for foreign aid. The final speech reflects the president’s main policy priorities,
both in general and in response to specific events. But once a State of the
Union is over, there is great deal of time until the next one. Presidential
policy attention is constantly shifting and requires measurement from many
angles at many points in time throughout the year. In this chapter, I will
detail the data and methodology that allows for better analysis of presidential
decision-making and trade-offs.
3.1 Presidential Agendas in the Past
Presidential decision-making has long been a part of the discussion of
the policy process. Many of these studies focus on the presidential agenda.
62
The agenda is the “the list of subjects or problems to which governmental
officials are paying some serious attention” (Kingdon 1984, p.2). The presi-
dent’s agenda is a direct result of the decisions that he makes and what he
finds important to prioritize. His agenda has broader significance in the policy
process literature because many scholars have recognized that the president
has the ability to attract attention to issues and set the agenda of other actors
(Kingdon 1984; Light 1991; Baumgartner and Jones 2009; Beckmann 2010).
Before we introduce the new data, it is necessary to consider what past
studies of presidential policymaking have done and why they are insufficient to
understand presidential decision-making. One category of scholarship consid-
ers the presidential policy agenda and the factors that explain its composition.
One of the most prominent studies of presidential policy decision-making is
Paul Light’s book The President’s Agenda. In this book, Light examines the
president’s domestic policy agenda from Kennedy to Clinton, using State of
the Union addresses to highlight those policy priorities that were on the pres-
idents agenda (Light 1991). Light justifies the use of the State of the Union
through interviews with presidential staff members who stated that although
the speech includes a “laundry list of topics, it will contain the president’s
top priorities and other actors in Washington will be listening to the speech
to ascertain those priorities. This book led to a number of other studies,
including Eshbaugh-Soha and Peake (2005), who extend this study out into
the full Public Papers of the Presidency and developed a policy typology of
short- and long-term priorities paired with important and unimportant poli-
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cies to conclude that presidential policy agendas are a function of presidential
environment. These studies are insufficient on their own as a way to under-
stand presidential decision-making because they take a very overarching view
of presidential agenda without any distinctions between the types of actions
that presidents take to get involved in policy making.
Other scholars consider how the presidential agenda shapes the agenda
of other political institutions (Edwards and Wood 1999; Eshbaugh-Soha and
Peake 2004; Peake 2001; Peake and Eshbaugh-Soha 2008; Rutledge and Larsen-
Price 2014). Inter-institutional agenda setting dynamics are quite interesting
as they give some significant insight into the way the presidency, Congress,
and, in some studies, the media interact and have an effect on each others’
agenda. This is important because policy change is only possible when the
issue gets on to the agenda in the first place and the person who is able to
bring others’ attention to the issue is much more likely to be able to set problem
definition and initial terms of debate (Kingdon 1984; Cohen, March and Olsen
1972). One of the most foundational studies of this issue is Edward and Wood’s
article “Who influences whom,” in which they look at a range of important
policy issues, both foreign and domestic, and consider the relationship between
the president, Congress, and the media and find that the president largely
dominates the agenda-setting relationships, but his influence is not absolute;
in some areas the media also has significant agenda setting role (1999). These
studies offer an interesting insight to presidential decision making about policy,
but they are incomplete because they fail to uncover the true range of policy
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areas that presidents pay attention to and the trade-offs that presidents have
to make between policy areas every day.
Finally, there are a number of scholars who consider take a very dif-
ferent approach to presidential decision-making. These scholars examine the
different policy tools that the president has at his disposal to participate in
the policy process. Some consider how presidents use speeches to communicate
and, perhaps, persuade the public (Whitford and Yates 2009; Edwards 2006;
Eshbaugh-Soha 2010). Others examine tools the president has at his disposal
for direct action, such as executive orders, memoranda, signing statements,
and proclamations (Cooper 2014; Gitterman 2017). These studies all study
the way a president uses a single policy tool to great effect; to better under-
stand how these tools operate in the political system as a way of understanding
the presidency.
Those studies that examine only policy tools are incomplete because
they don’t offer us any insight into how presidents must routinely match policy
areas with policy tool. Not every policy area can be the subject of every
tool; for example, the television networks and their news directors would be
highly put out and angry with the administration if they preempted prime
time programing to do a major televised address to the nation on a relatively
minor policy area, like patents and copyright protections. Those studies that
look at policy tools in isolation miss the nuances of how the tools might be
used differently across different policy areas.
One study that takes presidential tool choice and policy area seriously
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is Heather Larsen Price’s study of presidential policy canalization, which ex-
amines how presidents channel their attention though different policy tools
depending on the policy area (2012). She finds that presidents prioritize some
policy areas more via some policy tools than others and that there is often a
coordinated effort across policy tools to attack a particular issue. This study
takes the differences between policy tools and policy areas seriously and sets
up a framework for understanding how presidents might use one tool over
another. Larsen Price’s work inspired this dissertation, in part because it
raised questions about how scholars might be missing important aspects of
the presidency by studying all actions in the same way. By urging scholars to
quantitatively measure and study the ways that presidents channel different
policy areas through different types of action, Larsen Price made an original
and significant contribution to the study of the presidency.
This dissertation goes much farther by considering what shapes presi-
dential decisions about what policy areas to pay attention to and how presi-
dents select what policy strategies they will use to make those decisions, while
considering the full range of policy areas and a wider range of tools. I do
this in order to understand how presidents, whose cognitive and emotional
limitations shape the way that they process information and direct their lim-
ited attention, try to achieve their policy goals. To do this I use a simplified
version of the Policy Agendas Project (PAP) coding scheme to study presi-
dential decision-making across all policy areas and I use 10 different policy
tool datasets, with over 27,022 observations, clustered into three main pol-
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icy strategies, to consider presidential policy decision-making and information
processing.
3.2 A New Data Approach: Policy Areas
This project relies heavily on the U.S. Policy Agendas Project (PAP)
(https://www.comparativeagendas.net/us).1 The Project began in 1993 as a
way to systematically measure government attention within and across specific
policy areas and time, becoming the founding project of the Comparative
Agenda Project (CAP) network. The Policy Agendas Project uses a consistent
policy content coding scheme. This coding scheme allows for policy attention
to be compared across topic, and institution, as well as across time. The
Policy Agendas Project’s major and minor topic codes identify the main or
general topic area (e.g., 1 = Macroeconomics) and then identify the minor
or specific subtopic area (e.g., 105 = National Budget and Debt). There
are 20 major topics and 213 minor topics in the PAP coding scheme. The
methodology used by the Policy Agendas Project to assign major and minor
topics to observations is straightforward and methodical. All data is coded
by hand, with each observation being assigned codes by two coders who work
independently. Following coding, the two codes are reconciled to make a final
1Those data that are attributed to the Policy Agendas Project used in this dissertation,
State of the Union and Executive Orders, were originally collected by Frank R. Baumgartner
and Bryan D. Jones, with the support of National Science Foundation grant numbers SBR
9320922 and 0111611, and were distributed through the Department of Government at the
University of Texas at Austin. Neither NSF nor the original collectors of the data bear any
responsibility for the analysis reported here.
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determination. The Project strives for 90% agreement on major topic and
80% on minor topic following reconciliation. The new datasets created for this
dissertation were coded in a similar, though slightly abbreviated way. One
coder assigned a code to every observation, while a second coder independently
coded a 10% sample of each dataset. These observations were than reconciled
to the same standards as the Policy Agendas Project.
3.2.1 Creating a Macro Topic Scheme for Presidential Attention
The analysis in this dissertation uses the 20 major topics of the PAP
to create a five topic macro-level coding scheme. To do the kind of analysis in
this project, where we are looking at all policy areas over a 34-year period, we
needed to simplify the number of categories; examining all 20 topics across time
is too complex to analyze. As such, I created a coding scheme of five macro-
topics: economics, international affairs, government operations, social welfare,
and other domestic policy. I devised these categories by first determining which
of the 20 major topics made up the largest parts of the presidents agenda, based
on all the observations in this dissertation. I found that presidents pay the
most attention to major topics: macroeconomics (13.8%), international affairs
(12.9%), government operations (10.9%), defense (10.5%), and health (9.1%).
I used these as the base of my macro-topic scheme, combining international
affairs with defense, and matching the remaining smaller policy areas with the
dominant major topics in a way that seemed sensible, and creating a remainder
category, other domestic policy, for those major topics that did not fit with
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Table 3.1: Major Topics Organized by Macro-Topic
Dissertation Macro-topic PAP Major-topic
Economy Macroeconomics (1)
Labor and Employment (5)
Banking, Finance, and Domestic Commerce (15)
International Affairs Immigration (9)
Defense (16)
Foreign Trade (18)
International Affairs and Foreign Aid (19)
Government Operations Government Operations (20)
Social Welfare Health (3)
Education (6)
Social Welfare (13)
Community Development and Housing Issues (14)





Law, Crime, and Family Issues (12)
Space, Science, Technology, and Communications (17)
Public Lands and Water Management (21)
the four dominant policy domains. Table 3.1 outlines which of the PAP major
topics are included in which macro-topic in this dissertation.
What we see when we move from 20 major topics to 5 macro-topics is
a condensation, but not a distortion, of presidential attention. When we look
at Figure 3.1, which shows the State of the Union address over time and all 20
macro ordered according to how the fit into macro topics, and then we look at
Figure 3.2, which shows the State of the Union address in the 5 macro topics,
we are able to see patterns much more easily. In Figure 3.1, the only easily
discernible trend is in the substantial part of the agenda that macroeconomics
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has had over time. In Figure 3.2, it is much easier to see the way international
affairs has been a substantial part of the address, and the way social welfare
has risen and fallen on the agenda, in addition to the regularity of economic
policy. This simplification is quite useful for our study moving forward.
3.3 A New Data Approach: Policy Tools and Strategies
One of the struggles in past works of presidential policy making is
exactly what level of the presidential agenda should be studied. There are
three levels to the presidential agenda: the total policy agenda level, the policy
strategy level, and the policy tool level. The policy tool level is made up of the
individual types of action that the president can take to get involved in policy,
such as give a State of the Union address, issue an executive order, or issue
a veto threat. A policy tool is any type of action that a president takes to
get involved in policy. The next level above policy tools is the policy strategy
level. This level takes the individual policy tools and organizes them into the
various general types of actions that a president can take, such as propose
policy, shape policy, or make policy unilaterally. The final level collects up all
of those strategies into one group, the sum total of all presidential actions. I
call this level the total policy agenda. Each level of this structure builds upon
each other level, so that they create a hierarchy where every tool rests within
a strategy, and every strategy rests within the total agenda. Figure 3.3 is a
visual representation of this relationship.
Each of these three levels allows us to analyze the president’s policy ac-
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tions in slightly different ways. Studying the total policy agenda level allows us
to consider the amount of attention the president has to spend on policy. This
is an important because the amount of time that the president has to spend
on policy each day is finite, limited by the number of hours in the day and
the need presidents have to devote time to other tasks. The amount of time
that is devoted to policy varies over time and presidents in response to the ur-
gency of policy problems and the influence of individual presidential character.
Different presidents have different cognitive and emotional capacities, which
allow them to devote different total amounts of attention to policy. Studying
the total presidential agenda gives us some insights into the policy-making
capacities of presidents.
The next level down is the policy strategy level. This level is made up of
the three broad types of actions that presidents can take to get involved in the
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policy process. Each type of action has a different effect on the policy-making
process and thus different strengths and weaknesses when the president uses it.
Studying the president’s choice of policy strategy can answer questions about
how presidents process information about their power and their environment
and transform information into actions. This level also offers us a excellent
view into the trade-offs that presidents make between power, attention, and
discretion that are inherent in each of the strategies, which is why it is the
main level used in this study.
The first strategy the president has at his disposal is the ability to
propose policy. From the very beginning of the republic, presidents proposed
policy ideas to Congress in hopes that the Congress would take up those ideas.
The proposal strategy, and the tools that sit within this strategy, allow the
president the ability to get involved in policy in a low-risk kind of way: the
president introduces an idea into the policy debate, bringing attention to the
policy area and a particular problem definition and solution, but works to-
gether with Congress and other political actors to bring the policy change to
fruition. This process gives the strategy its greatest strength, the ability for
the president to claim credit for the idea if all goes well, but also the ability to
distance himself if the policy should be unpopular. This strategy is not with-
out weaknesses, however. Just as the president can avoid blame, the Congress
can completely ignore the president if they don’t like the issue and want to
take action on it. There is very little a president can do to persuade a reluctant
Congress to take up an issue when they have decided they don’t want to pay
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attention to it.
The second strategy presidents have at their disposal is to shape policy
in the later stage of the legislative process. In this strategy, presidents change
policy outputs by communicating with Congress as they are trying to pass
legislation or by giving instructions to the bureaucracy about how a newly
passed law should be implemented. The shaping strategy gives the president
the ability to make subtle changes to policy to bring it more in line with his
personal preferences. The downside to the shaping strategy is two-fold: first,
presidents can only use it in response to congressional action, which means
that Congress had to take up a policy area that the president cared about in
the first place, and two, the strategy is much riskier for the president than the
others. Congress makes laws that the majority in each chamber is willing to
support. The president getting involved in the end of the process and making
changes to what Congress has done can be a really good way to anger them,
causing the president to face policy challenges over that specific issue and
a potentially reduced level of support from the House and Senate on future
policy initiatives.
The third strategy presidents have to make policy is unilateral action.
The presidency was designed with speed and responsiveness in mind. Because
of this, the president was given the ability to make policy independently in a
limited number of policy areas. Over time, Congress has delegated, both im-
plicitly and explicitly, more policy-making authority to the president. These
delegations have given the president the power to make policy unilaterally on
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a wide range of policy areas. Unilateral action has a number of strengths for
presidential policymaking. First, many of these unilateral action tools go un-
challenged in Congress because of Congress’ inability to overcome collective
action problems. This means that when the president makes policy unilat-
erally, it can be really difficult for Congress to stop the policy change. The
other strength of unilateral action is the immediate nature of policy change.
In this strategy, the president merely has to take official action and policy
changes in the way he desires, making the strategy low risk and high reward
for presidents in the short term. This is not a perfect strategy, however. In
the long term, unilateral action is much riskier. These actions have the force
of law, but can be superseded by a new law or subsequent presidential order
and they are vulnerable to court challenges. This means that just as easily as
a president can make a unilateral action, he can see his policy legacy swept
away. The characteristics of each of these three strategies, proposal, shaping,
and unilateral action, make them a very interesting way to study presidential
decisions-making, as the offer an insight into nuance, without getting lost in
complexity.
The lowest and final level of presidential agendas is the policy tool
agenda. As I said earlier, the policy tool level is made up of the individual
actions that presidents can take to influence policy. In this study, the policy
tool levels is made up of 10 policy tools: State of the Union addresses, budget
messages, speeches to a joint session of Congress, press conference opening
statements, major televised addresses to the nation, signing statements, veto
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threats, executive orders, memoranda, and proclamations. I will describe each
of these policy tools and how they fit in into the different policy strategies
in a moment, but what is important to understand is that studying these
individual tools can allow us to ask questions about the nuance of presidential
action within the policy process. Yet, studying presidential activity at this
level can be difficult, as this nuance and complexity can frustrate efforts to
understand the general trends of presidential decision-making.
3.3.1 The Individual Policy Tools
The policy tools contained within this dissertation cover a wide range of
presidential activities. Some of these activities have been studied extensively
in the past, but others have received very little attention. This dissertation is
going to focus primarily on the strategy level because it helps us to understand
how it is that presidents process information into action in the kind of broad
strokes that are useful for a first in-depth quantitative analysis. Yet, the
individual tools are incredibly rich sources of information, which I think can
be studied in greater detail in future work. For this project, I will describe each
of the individual policy tools in this section. I have organized the individual
tools by their policy strategy, which I will look at in more detail in Chapter 5.
The first strategy in this study is the proposal strategy. This strategy
contains the State of the Union address, budget messages, speeches to a joint
session of Congress, press conference opening statements, and major televised
addresses to the nation. These tools offer presidents to the opportunity to
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Table 3.2: Descriptive Statistics of Presidential Policy Tools (Total N=27,022)
Policy Tools N= Mean Obs. Max Obs. Min Obs. Strategy
Per Year (Year) (Year)
Budget Messages 34 Messages 1 1 1 Proposal
(4,088 quasi-sentences)
Major Televised Speeches 110 speeches 3.2 12 (1991) 0 (Multiple) Proposal
Press Conference 698 statements 20.5 42 (1994) 3 (1987) Proposal
Opening Statement
Speeches to a Joint 9 speeches 0.26 1 (Multiple) 0 (Multiple) Proposal
Session of Congress (1,966 quasi-sentences)
State of the Union 34 Speeches 1 1 1 Proposal
(10,195 quasi-sentences)
Signing Statements 1,309 statements 38.5 95 (2000) 2 (Multiple) Shaping
Veto Threats (1985-2014) 1,443 threats 42.4 118 (1997) 0 (Multiple) Shaping
Executive Orders 1,398 orders 41.1 66 (2001) 20 (2013) Unilateral
Presidential Memoranda 928 memoranda 27.3 53 (2000) 9 (Multiple) Unilateral
Proclamations 4,410 proclamations 129.7 171 (1986) 72 (1981) Unilateral
speak directly to different audiences and propose policy ideas for further policy
decision-making.
The first of these tools is the State of the Union address. These are
annual speeches that the president gives to a joint session of Congress and,
since the late 1940s, has regularly been televised to communicate with the
American people. Their transmission and audience have changed since the
founding, but they grow out of a constitutional requirement that the presi-
dent “give to the Congress information on the state of the union.” Studies of
presidential agenda setting have long focused on State of the Union. These
speeches can be a laundry list containing almost every policy area that the
president could possibly address. We see this in Figure 3.2, which shows that,
even with some policy areas that reoccur frequently, such as economics and
international affairs, there are other topics whose share of the speech varies
from year to year, such as government operations.
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The Policy Agendas Project collected these data
(www.comparativeagendas.net/us). In 34 years, there have been 34 speeches
with a total of 10,195 quasi-sentences. The speeches have varied considerably
in length and complexity. The shortest of these speeches was Ronald Reagan’s
1987 address, which had only 120 policy-containing quasi-sentences2 and fo-
cused primarily on economics and international affairs. The longest speech
was President Bill Cinton’s 2000 address, which had 396 policy-containing
quasi-sentences and devoted significant attention to all macro policy areas,
except government operations. State of the Union addresses offer presidents
the chance to speak to a national audience and set out a policy agenda for the
year.
The next policy tool is the address to a joint session of Congress. In
form, they look very similar to State of the Union addresses: they are speeches
before Congress and are nationally televised. In fact, State of the Unions that
are given by presidents in their first months in office are technically addresses
to a joint session of Congress.3 In function, these speeches are quite different.
Instead of addressing a wide range of policy areas and occurring annually at
the same time each year, these speeches focus on a specific policy concern and
vary in their frequency and timing.
This dataset is original to this dissertation and was collected from
2Non-policy quasi-sentences in this and any other policy tool are excluded from this
analysis.
3However, because these speeches behave like State of the Unions, I include them in that
policy tool.
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Figure 3.4: Distribution of Presidential Attention to Policy in Addresses to a
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American Presidency Project website (http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu). Pres-
idents use addresses to a joint session of Congress rarely, with only 9 speeches
in 34 years and are coded at the quasi-sentence level. As can be seen in Figure
3.4, these speeches tend to be slightly shorter then the State of the Union and
focus on one or two topics intensely with a few mentions of other topics. The
most common policy area for presidents to address Congress about is interna-
tional affairs, which was the focus of the speeches in 1983, 1985, 1990, 1991,
and 2001; social welfare, which was a focus in 1993 and 2009; and economics,
which was the focus in 1981 and 2011.4 This shows us that, unlike a State of
the Union, which because of its laundry list qualities can be used to propose
policy in any area, an address to a joint session of Congress can only be used
sparingly, when there is a large problem or the president is very passionate
about an issue.
The next tool presidents can use in the proposal strategy is the major
televised address. Like addresses to a joint session of Congress, these are
speeches in which the president focuses on one policy problem at a time. Just
like the name of the tool suggest, these are televised and carried on all of the
major networks, preempting the planned programing. Presidents use the tool
sparingly, as to use it too often would risk upsetting the television networks
4The 2011 speech looks slightly different because of the way that President Obama talked
about the economic recovery. He used the financial crisis to talk not just about economic
solutions, but labor changes, transportation infrastructure projects to put people to work,
changes in banking regulations, and government efficiency. Despite his varied language and
policy solutions, the speech, as a whole, really was focused on finding a solution to the
macroeconomic ills of the moment.
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and diluting the power of the tool. When the president goes in TV this way,
it is treated as an important newsworthy event. If the president were to use it
too often, in policy areas that were not sufficiently important as to warrant the
urgency, the press would stop covering them and they would lose the impact,
which is part of the reason the president uses them. In many ways, their
function is similar to the addresses to a joint session of Congress, in that they
offer the president the opportunity to appeal directly to the masses and offer
proposals, explanations, and reassurance in the face of extraordinary events.
These data were collected for this dissertation from American Pres-
idency Project website. We can see, in Figure 3.5, that this tool is used
sparingly, as there are many years without a speech. In Figure 3.5, we can
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see the number and distribution of policy areas in those years with a speech.
Across all 34 years, there were 110 speeches, with each speech assigned a code
based on the primary policy topic. What we see is that it is very common for
a president to give a few speeches in the years he gives them at all and they
tend to be used primarily for international affairs (69 speeches).
Presidents also have annual budget messages. These are annual written
messages that open the president’s budget proposal to Congress. They are an
opportunity for the president to communicate his priorities that are a part of
his budget proposal, which is the ultimate reflection of the presidents policy
proposals, as policy can only happen when there is money to implement and
enforce it. Yet the budget message isn’t as high profile as the three prior
tools. While Congress, the bureaucracy, and the media pay attention to the
president’s budget message and proposal, the tool barely registers with the
public. As such, the budget message is one of the most important, if low
profile, proposal tool the president has at his disposal.
That lower attention level makes the budget message a much different
policy tool than the prior proposal tools that we have discussed, and yet, in
terms of function, it is very similar to the State of the Union address. It is an
opportunity early in the year for the president to set out his policy priorities for
the year ahead and give them to Congress for them to act on. When we look at
Figure 3.6, we see that the form of the message is very different from the State
of the Union, in that it fluctuates wildly in terms of the length from president
to president, but that is similar to the State of the Union in that they touch,
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at least briefly, on a wide range of policy areas. These data were collected
for this dissertation using the FRASER budget archive, which is a part of
the St Louis Federal Reserve (https://fraser.stlouisfed.org/title/54#section-
2010). The dataset omits the budget message from 1981 as President Carter
submitted this in the last month of his administration, not President Reagan.
In the 33 years of this dataset, the average budget message was 124 quasi-
sentences long, though the longest was 380 quasi-sentences in 1982 and the
shortest was 5 quasi-sentences in 1996 amidst the government shutdowns.
The last proposal strategy tool the president has is the press conference
opening statement. Presidents routinely go before the press with a statement
that they then follow with a question and answer period with the press. These
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press conferences are an opportunity for the president to put forth a message
directly to the media, but they also offer an opportunity for the press to
ask questions about a wide range of subjects. As such, presidents want to
use these press conferences to appear responsive and accessible, but not use
them too often as they provide opportunities for gaffs and questions that the
president isn’t prepared to handle. This dataset looks only at the prepared
opening remarks that presidents give at the start of the press conference. They
were collected from both the joint and solo news conferences available via the
American Presidency Project. Over 34 years, presidents gave 698 opening
statements at press conferences, where each opening statement was given one
code based on its primary policy area. What we can see from looking at
Figure 3.7 is that most of these statements deal with international affairs,
reflecting the fact that almost every meeting with a foreign dignitary includes
a joint press conference.5 International affairs is also a prominent macro topic
as presidents tend to talk directly to the media about defense issues, such
as military operations abroad as part of the president’s commander-in-chief
function. Outside of international affairs, the most common policy area is the
economy (the subject of 76 statements).
The next strategy that presidents have a their disposal is the shaping
strategy. This is an opportunity for presidents to get involved in the later
stage of the policy process, either through negotiating with Congress prior to
5President G.H.W. Bush was the first president to hold a joint press conference with a
foreign leader, which is why President Reagan looks different.
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the passage of a law or by providing some instructions to the bureaucracy after
the passage of a law, but before it is implemented.
The first tool in this strategy is the veto threat. A veto threat is a
shorthand name for a Statement of Administration Policy in which the presi-
dent threatens to veto a piece of legislation if it comes before him with certain
provisions. These have been studied extensively by Samuel Kernell in his book
Presidential Veto Threats in Statements of Administration Policy: 1985-2004.
Kernell makes the point that a true veto threat isn’t simply a dare to Congress
to pass legislation that he wouldn’t approve (Kernell 2006). Instead, a veto
threat offers alternative policy ideas or language that would be acceptable;
a counter-offer of sorts in a negotiation with Congress. Presidents use these
threats to try and get Congress to pass a law that is closer to the president’s
position or is at least devoid of the most objectionable components. In this
dissertation, these data were collected by Kernell and updated by Jonathan
Lewallan and are available via the PAP. Due to data only being available
starting in 1985, the 27 years of the study contain 1,443 veto threats. As we
can see in Figure 3.8, presidents have used veto threats the most in the area
of other domestic policy, though it drops off precipitously in the G.W. Bush
administration, as he used the tool very rarely for any policy area in the first
six years in office.
The other tool in this strategy is a signing statement. These are both
written and oral messages from the president to the bureaucracy on the pas-
sage of a bill. Most of the time they are inconsequential, the president talking
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about just how much he likes the bill that has been passed. But occasionally,
they are an opportunity for him to provide significant guidance to bureaucrats
about how they should implement a piece of legislation; directing them to
focus on some aspects of the bill and ignoring others. It gives the president
an informal sort of line item veto, by giving him the opportunity to tell the
bureaucracy to ignore certain provisions. These statements have evoked sig-
nificant controversy at times, exemplified by Senator Arlen Specter’s objection
that congressional legislation “doesn’t amount to anything if the president can
say, ‘my constitutional authority supersedes the statute.’ And I think we’ve
got to lay down the gauntlet and challenge him on it.” This potential for
controversy complicates the president’s choice to use the tool. The Office of
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Legal Council, in 1993, wrote up an official opinion on the legal significance of
signing statements, ultimately concluding that:
Many presidents have used signing statements to make substantive
legal, constitutional, or administrative pronouncements on the bill
being signed. These uses of Presidential signing statements gener-
ally serve legitimate and defensible purposes. (1993).
These data are original to this dissertation and were collected from
the American Presidency Project. For this dissertation, I didn’t distinguish
the congratulatory, inconsequential signing statements from the controversial
signing statements, as this distinction was beyond the scope of this project.
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Instead, the 1,309 statements across 34 years were studied for what policy area
the statement was primarily about. What I find, from looking at Figure 3.9, is
that the number of signing statements peaked during the Clinton administra-
tion and has been on the decline ever since, despite maintaining considerable
variation in the breadth of topics addressed in signing statements.
The final strategy at the president’s disposal for getting involved in
policy is for them to take unilateral action. Unilateral action is where the pres-
ident gives an order or other kind of action and policy immediately changes.
There are three main types of unilateral actions used in this study and the
differences between the three on paper can be quite subtle, as in form and
function they can seem very similar. Because of this similarity, the line be-
tween each of these actions has blurred and presidents sometime use them
interchangeably.
Executive orders are directives from the president that, when founded
on the president’s constitutional or statutory authority, have the force of law.
As explained in a 1957 description from the House Committee on Government
Operations, an executive orders are “generally directed to, and govern actions
by, Government officials and agencies. They usually affect private individu-
als only indirectly” (Staff of House Comm. on Government Operations 1957).
Executive orders are used in a number of different ways, but the most promi-
nent purpose is to issue binding orders to the executive branch. This formal
direction give executive branch agencies a clear mandate for action on a given
policy area and moves the responsibility for policy change from the agency to
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the president.
The Policy Agendas Project collected these data, and in the period of
this dissertation, there were 1,397 executive orders. What we see when we look
at the distribution of policy areas over time in Figure 3.10 is that presidents
use executive orders to pay attention to every policy area, at least a little,
but that they use them more extensively in international affairs (547 orders),
other domestic policy (353 orders), and government operations (275 orders).
Additionally, there seems to be a slight downward trend in the use of executive
orders over time. This might be due in part to the increased use of the other
unilateral action tools for substantive policy making.
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Memoranda are very similar to executive orders. These are pronounce-
ments by the president directed toward the executive branch agency heads,
but are called memoranda. The fact is, memoranda are essentially equivalent
to executive orders, with a different name and without some of the formal
legal requirements of an executive order. The use of these tools is so similar
that even presidents sometimes can’t remember whether they took action via
an executive order or a memorandum (Cooper 2014). The evolution of mem-
oranda to be equivalent to an executive order highlights the importance of
studying a broad range of policy tools. If we were to do what previous studies
have done and focus simply on executive orders, we would miss a great deal
of actions that presidents consider equivalent and have similar effects on the
policy system, despite the different name.
These data are original to this dissertation project. There are 928 mem-
oranda, covering all five macro topics, which we see in Figure 3.11. Two facets
of the data become immediately obvious from the figure. First, Democrats use
memoranda more frequently and to cover a greater variety of topics than Re-
publican presidents. Second, the most prominent policy areas are exactly the
same as the most prominent topics in executive orders: international affairs
(306 memos), other domestic policy (243 memos), and government operations
(183 orders memos).
Proclamations are subtly different. Proclamations are directives that
primarily affect the activities of private individuals. As the House Committee
of Government operations noted, “since the president has no power or author-
92























































































































Economy	 Interna7onal	 Government	Opera7ons	 Social	Welfare	 Other	Domes7c	
ity over individual citizens and their rights except where he is granted such
power and authority by a provision in the Constitution or by statute, the Pres-
idents proclamations are not legally binding and are at best hortatory unless
based on such grants of authority” (Staff of House Comm. on Government Op-
erations 1957). We see this play out in the way presidents use proclamations,
as many are symbolic and issued every year, such as recognition for the Amer-
ican Red Cross association. This symbolic component of proclamations makes
it slightly more difficult to directly interpret the presidential action. If we
looked at Figure 3.12, it would seem as if presidents use this tool to make sub-
stantive policy on all policy areas every year, when anyone who looked more
closely at the titles of the proclamations would realize he does not. Instead,
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it is interesting to look at those areas where there is greater variation in the
amount of attention over time, such as the economy, which was the subject
of 16 proclamations in 2010 and 2013, but only three or four proclamations
through out most of the Clinton administration. These data were collected
specifically for this dissertation and there were a total of 4,410 proclamations.
One characteristic of note in this study is the different units of analysis
across the datasets. Some of these datasets are coded at the quasi-sentence
level, while others are coded at the document level. A quasi-sentence is the
text between periods, question marks, and semi-colons; each quasi-sentence
represents a complete grammatical phrase—an idea. A dataset is coded at
the quasi-sentence level because the policy tool the dataset focuses on cov-
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ers a wide variety of policy areas. By coding budget messages, State of the
Union addresses, and addresses to a joint session of Congress at the quasi-
sentence level, it is possible to pick up on the wide range of potential topics
that presidents can address in those speeches.
However, not all policy tools are designed to cover multiple policy areas.
Some presidential actions focus primarily on one policy area. The datasets for
these tools are assigned one macro-topic code to represent the primary policy
area that the document focuses on. Those tools that are coded at the document
level are executive orders, veto threats, signing statements, memoranda, major
televised speeches, proclamations, and press conference opening statements.
In this dissertation, I account for the differences between these two levels of
analysis by focusing on the proportions of attention the various policy areas
receive out of all the attention that the president pays to policy in a given
period of time.
Additionally, as this project moves forward, I will bring these two units
of analysis into a more comparable structure. I plan to do this by devising
a weighting scheme that would allow me to transform document-level obser-
vations into quasi-sentence-level observations. I will do this by creating an
estimation process that calculates the average length of each type of document
under each president. This calculation would allow me to better approximate
the value of a given document relative to other actions by that president.
The estimation procedure utilizes a 10 percent sample of each presi-
dents actions in each document-coded policy tool. By counting the number
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of sentences in each of the sampled observations and then taking the average,
I can create a multiplier specific to each president’s use of each document-
level policy tool. For example, if President Reagan’s average executive order
was 40 quasi-sentences long, then I would multiply every one of President
Reagan’s executive orders by 40. This will allow the executive orders, and
the other document-level datasets, to be equally represented, relative to the
quasi-sentence-level datasets, in the analysis.
3.4 Analysis Techniques
In order to make the most of all of this new data, we need to do several
types of analysis. First, it is important to study the data directly though
graphical analysis, as we began to do in this chapter with the policy tools.
This kind of analysis is helpful for answering basic questions about how the
presidents have prioritized the various policy areas and strategies, both within
presidencies and across time. Then, we have to move on to more complex
compositional analysis in order to answer the other half of the questions that
interest us: how presidents make trade-offs between the different categories of
policies and strategies. This kind of analysis is dynamic and requires thinking
quite carefully about the method of analysis.
3.4.1 Graphical Analysis
In each substantive empirical chapter, I engage in two types of graphical
analysis. First, I examine the way the policy areas and strategies are used in
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each presidency. I do this by taking the sum of a presidents actions in a given
category, whether that is a policy area or a strategy, and divide it by the total
number of actions by that president. For example, to calculate the average
amount of attention that President Reagan gave to economic policy across
his whole presidency, I take the number of actions, across all strategies, that
President Reagan took on the economy (1,554) and divide by the total number
of actions he took across all policy (5,856) to find that he spent 26.5% of his
presidency on the economy.
It is important to note that when I am talking about the percent of
time a president spent on a policy area or a strategy, either over the course
of a presidency or over smaller units of time, I am only talking about that
percentage as a portion of time that presidents spend on policy. So when I
say 27.3% of President Reagan’s time was devoted to unilateral action, what
I mean is, of the time that he spent on policy, which is a fraction of the presi-
dent’s day, 27.3% of that policy time is devoted to unilateral action. Moving
forward, I will attempt to remind readers of that fact, but it is important to be
clear from the outset about the fact that I can only calculate the proportion
of the president’s policy-dedicated time, rather than his total time.
The second step of the graphical analysis is to look at presidential
priorities over time. This allows us to see how presidents prioritization of
policies and strategies is dynamic over their time in office. It is important to
understand the dynamism over time because of the way it can reflect a change
in the way the president processes information and makes decisions. This is
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calculated very similarly to the static presidential averages, only instead of
looking at the sum total of attention to a policy area or strategy for a whole
presidency, we look at the amount of attention to that policy or strategy in a
given period of time. In chapters 4 and 5, the unit of time is the quarter, as it
allows some detail without overwhelming complexity. In chapter 6, when we
look at both the policy areas and the strategies, the unit of time is the year,
which helps to simplify the complexity that occurs by looking at both policy
and strategy.
3.4.2 Compositional Analysis
After we examine the data graphically, it is time to look at how pres-
idents make trade-offs between categories and look at the independent vari-
ables that shape these decisions. To do this we use compositional analysis,
specifically the Dynamic Pie technique developed by Philips, Rutherford, and
Whitten (2016a; 2016b). Compositional analysis is based on the reality that
much of politics is competitive; if one policy area is getting more attention,
other areas are necessarily getting less, because the total amount of attention a
decision maker, like the president, has is finite (Philips, Rutherford and Whit-
ten 2016a). Compositional analysis is a useful approach to understanding the
dynamics of trade-offs.
Let’s first define a compositional variable.6 A compositional variable is
6For a more technical description of the estimation techniques, see Philips, Rutherford
and Whitten (2016a,b).
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made up of a number of categories, the value of each must be between zero
and one and, when summed together at a specific point in time, must sum to
1. These constraints are required as the relationship between each category
in the compositional variable represents the proportion of the total attention.
Any change in a category indicates that other categories have changed as well,
so over time they must sum to a constant value. This also means that any
change in a category can not be larger than one or negative one and the sum
of the changes from one point in time to the next must sum to zero. This is
because the total absolute size of the compositional variable is static; instead,
it is the relationship between categories that changes.
Political science has been using compositional analysis to understand
the relative nature of politics for quite some time. John Aitchinson origi-
nally pioneered the technique while studying the mineral composition of lava,
in order to study the relationships between the components of the samples,
rather than the absolute amounts of the components (Aitchison 1982, 1983,
1986). Katz and King (1999) applied this idea to political science to solve the
problems associated with using standard regression models with data that has
strict bounds and additive constraints. Tomz, Tucker and Wittenberg (2002)
innovated with the technique to allow scholars to work with more than three
categories by moving from an OLS framework to a seemingly unrelated regres-
sions framework, demonstrating that it was just as easy to use and produced
more efficient estimates than the Katz and King approach. Yet the techniques
of these researchers did not tackle the challenge of dynamic data, particularly
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change in observations over time.
Instead, the standard approach for time series compositional analysis
has been to take a simplified approach, one that lumps all the categories other
than the one of interest together and compares the change in relationship over
time between the interested category and the sum of the remainder topics
(Lewis-Beck 1997; Nicholson, Segura and Woods 2002; Lipsmeyer 2011). This
can be a useful technique for understanding how one category changes over
time, but it does not help us to understand how all the different categories can
move in response to each other.
The Dynamic Pie approach of Philips, Rutherford, and Whitten is sen-
sitive to the dynamism of time and individual categories. Instead of studying
one category against all the rest, this approach allows researchers to look at
pairs of categories, tracing relationship between the categories. These pairs of
categories are the dependent variable that we are able to test other indepen-
dent variables against.
Estimating the relationship between categories in a categorical variable
requires a log-ratio transformation because the transformations are easier to
handle mathematically than the ratios (Aitchison 1986). Because these logged
ratios are not always stationary, the Dynamic Pie approach estimates the rela-
tionships between categories using a seemingly unrelated regression estimation
approach using an error correction model (Philips, Rutherford and Whitten
2016a). This approach allows for the estimation of equations that may have
correlated errors, which we should expect theoretically in our analysis, as the
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independent variables in our estimation of the relationship between each pair
of categories is the same, which would reasonably result in contemporaneous
correlation of errors (Philips, Rutherford and Whitten 2016a).
Interpreting the results from the Dynamic Pie analysis can be difficult
as there are J−1 equations, where J is the number of categories, and there are
(J−1)((K∗2)+2) parameters, where K is the number of independent variables.
This means for a model with 5 categories and 4 independent variables, there are
4 equations, 10 unique pairs of categories, and 40 total parameters to interpret.
This large number of parameters is because error correction models produce
both long and short run estimates for the effect an independent variable has
on the dependent variable.
Because of this complexity and the difficulty of interpreting the error
correction model coefficients directly because of the log-ratio transformation,
in the main text of the dissertation, we will interpret the relationships indi-
rectly. We will do this by simply looking at the directionality of the rela-
tionship between the pairs of categories estimated by the model. In the full
results, available in the chapter appendices, we distinguish between positive
and negative coefficients, where a positive coefficient means that an increase in
the independent variable leads to an increased prioritization of the numerator
category and a negative coefficient leads to an increased prioritization of the
denominator category. In each case, the additional attention the prioritized
category is getting comes from the de-prioritization of the other category. For




ratio, then we could say that increases in unemployment lead
to the president prioritizing the economy and sacrificing attention to interna-
tional affairs. In the body of the dissertation, rather than deal with positive
and negative coefficients, I swap in up (⇑) and down (⇓) arrows to symbolize
the directionality of the relationship, as it is easier to remember that an up
arrow means that the numerator category is getting attention from the de-
nominator category than it is to remember what a positive or negative sign
indicates.
3.5 Conclusion
This dissertation is driven by the data. So much of the research on the
presidency has been based on theory and individual cases. Rigorous data and
empirical analysis has been missing from most of the studies of the president
because of the way scholars have regularly focused on the individual presidents.
As I set out in the past chapter, behavioral choice is dominated by general
psychological phenomenon, which means that we must look across presidents
and their individual decision in order to find the commonalities that exist and
that past studies have ignored.
This study marshals this data, made up of ten datasets and over 27,000
observations to study what it is that presidents pay attention to, the strategies
they use to pay attention to it, and the trade-offs they make between prioritizes
to understand their decisions and gain greater insight into how they prioritize
information.
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In subsequent chapters, we will look at the data from different angles.
In the next chapter, we will focus on how president distribute attention across
different policy areas and how they make trade-offs to reflect their different
priorities. In the following chapter, we will consider the types of actions that
presidents take to get involved in the policy process and consider how presi-
dents prioritize those different strategies. Finally, in the last empirical chapter,
we will address how presidents make trade-offs in policy areas across the differ-
ent stages of the policy process. These data helps us to understand the many
ways that the president makes decisions given his cogitative and emotional
limitations and highlight the president’s true title: the prioritizer-in-chief.
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Chapter 4
Presidents and their Policy Prioritization
4.1 Policy Prioritization: The Move From Raw Infor-
mation to Policy Attention
On any given day, the president needs to pay attention to a wide range
of issues. Some days, monumental events occur, quickly changing the focus.
On one such morning, September 11, 2001, President Bush had to quickly
move from a classroom visit meant to illustrate the importance of education
to dealing with national security and the reality that the country had been
attacked. Other days, there is much more deliberate plan in which the presi-
dent has a carefully scripted message and events to reinforce it. Yet, even on
days dominated by scheduled, scripted policy roll outs, the president’s atten-
tion must be divided across a number of topics. For example, on February
27, 2014, a completely ordinary day in the White House, where the focus was
on President Obama’s “My Brother’s Keeper” initiative, which was meant to
help boys and men of color succeed, the president started his day with his
national security briefing and he ended his day meeting with the Secretary of
Treasury. The presidency requires the president’s attention to be constantly
shifting between policy areas.
Consequently, one of the most important things to understand about
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presidential decision-making is how presidents allocate attention across policy
areas. As we outlined in the theoretical chapter, presidential decision-making
hinges on the way that presidents process information and prioritize policy
areas. Issue prioritization reflects the president’s ability to decide what must
be addressed now versus what can be dealt with later. Presidential issue prior-
itization has consequences for the broader policy process, making it important
to understand what exactly it is that presidents are paying attention to.
The public policy and presidency literatures have given some serious
thought to the president’s role in the policy process. Scholars highlight three
main roles the president can play. First, the president can bring attention
to issues (Baumgartner and Jones 2009; Kingdon 1984) and set the agendas
of other institutions (Delshad 2012; Edwards and Wood 1999; Eshbaugh-Soha
and Peake 2004; Rutledge and Larsen-Price 2014; Taylor 1998). In many ways,
the president is like a human starting gun; when the president wades into an
issue, many people who hadn’t been paying attention, suddenly pay attention.
This quality of the presidency is why presidents must carefully weigh whether
they want to get involved in an issue. Presidents who are happy with the
status quo will avoid talking about an issue so as to not bring attention to it,
as attention is a necessary, but not sufficient prerequisite for policy change.
Second, presidents can activate public support (Kernell 2007). It is im-
portant to distinguish activating support from persuasion. Despite the classic
Neustadt argument that the “power of the president is the power to persuade”
(Neustadt 1991), modern scholars have found that the president isn’t very
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good at changing the minds of people who disagree with him (Edwards 2006).
Instead, the president is good at is getting people who already agree with
him to take action (Canes-Wrone 2001; Canes-Wrone and Shotts 2004; Canes-
Wrone 2006). An active public has an effect on members of Congress and the
larger political landscape. But, it all starts with the president calling public
attention to an issue.
The final role the president plays in policy making is as an independent
actor. Over time, the president has developed a number of tools to change
policy independently of the other branches of government. These tools are
subject to checks and balances, but they provide a way for the president to
move swiftly (Cooper 2014; Gitterman 2017; Mayer 2002; Pious 2009; Water-
man 2009). We discussed these tools individually in the previous chapter and
we will consider how they are used more in the next chapter, but they capture
the president’s role as an independent policy actor.
Give these three roles; it is clear that the president is an important
actor in the policy process. As such, it is vital that we take time to un-
derstand what policies the president prioritizes. If we don’t know what it is
the president is prioritizing, it is impossible to understand the true impact
the president has on the policy system. Yet, as I have outlined in previous
chapters, existing work on the presidency has subjected itself to some very
real limitations. Some work has only considered the role of the presidency in a
theoretical way; focusing on the impact the president’s agenda-setting abilities
might have on the systemic agenda (Baumgartner and Jones 2009; Kingdon
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1984; Light 1991; Neustadt 1991). Others scholars have taken a more empiri-
cal approach, but have considered only individual policy areas (Delshad 2012;
Edwards and Wood 1999; Eshbaugh-Soha and Peake 2004). This individual
policy approach is problematic because of the need of presidents to prioritize.
Presidential attention is limited, so it is best to think of the president’s atten-
tion to policy as zero-sum; most of the time, when the president starts paying
attention to a new policy area, it is because he has stopped paying attention
to another area. This creates an order of priorities that is constantly being
updated.
Yet presidential prioritization and the zero-sum nature of presidential
attention are complicated by public expectations. The public largely expects
the president to pay attention to all issues. As the most visible public official,
presidents are expected to have opinions on every issue and a solution to
propose for every problem. This expectation requires the president to be
able to quickly shift his attention when emergencies pop up in order to stay
responsive to public expectations.
All of this attention and the constant shifting of priorities require the
ability to process information in order to make decisions about what the presi-
dent is going to pay attention to. This means that presidential decision-making
is a function of constant trade-offs and juggling policy areas. Presidential
decision-making has not been studied in an empirical way that includes the
trade-off dynamic.
In this chapter, we will conduct an empirical investigation into what
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policies presidents pay attention to and how they make trade-offs between pol-
icy areas. We do this by examining some empirical expectations that come
from existing work in presidency studies. We find is that presidents largely
pay attention to those policy areas that are part of their constitutional obli-
gations, but that they are also highly responsive to policy problems in their
environment, rather than being driven by party affiliation.
4.2 Distribution of Attention: Expectations from the
Presidency Literature
Scholars of the president have long attempted to understand what mo-
tivates presidents to pay attention to particular policy areas. The academic
community recognizes that presidents are motivated by larger institutional
and political factors. The fact that the distribution of presidential attention is
primarily determined by institutional characteristics is not surprising. Many
presidents and their advisors acknowledge that the presidency is a force in
and of itself that the occupant has to learn how to harness before they can
manipulate it for their own purposes (Light 1991). As such, we should expect
presidents to largely prioritize those policy areas that are a function of the
institution rather than the individual or the campaign. These motivations fall
into three categories: constitutional obligations, economic accountability, and
party preferences. This chapter tests these motivations to see how presidential
decision making about what policies to address matchs with the literature.
The first expectation is that presidential attention is driven by the
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Constitution and powers and policies set out by the framers. Article 2, section
2 sets out three main powers and duties of the presidency: to be commander-
in-chief of the armed forces,1 to be chief diplomat,2 and to be the head of the
executive branch.3
The first power laid out by the Constitution that was specifically vested
in the presidency was the power to be commander-in-chief of the armed forces.
The founders intentionally reserved the ability to declare war to Congress, but
they knew that once war was declared, the military needed to be able to look
to a singular leader, one who could act with speed and decisiveness (Howell
and Johnson 2009; Howell, Jackman and Rogowski 2013). As commander-in-
chief, the president is the central political figure when it comes to military
decision-making, so we should expect him to prioritize the issue regularly.
The second power set out in the Constitution can be summed up as the
president’s position as diplomat-in-chief. Explicitly, the Constitution grants
1“The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United
States, and of the Militia of the several States, when called into the actual Service of the
United States...”
2“He shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make
Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur; and he shall nominate, and by
and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors...”
3“...he may require the Opinion, in writing, of the principal Officer in each of the executive
Departments, upon any Subject relating to the Duties of their respective Offices...” and
“... he shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall
appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court,
and all other Officers of the United States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise
provided for, and which shall be established by Law: but the Congress may by Law vest the
Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the
Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments.” And “The President shall have Power to fill
up all Vacancies that may happen during the Recess of the Senate, by granting Commissions
which shall expire at the End of their next Session.”
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the power to make treaties and appoint ambassadors, subject to Senate ap-
proval. That power, along with the necessity of presenting a unified message
when speaking to the world and dealing with foreign leaders directly, has
evolved to mean that the president is the primary decision maker when it
comes to matters of foreign affairs (Howell, Jackman and Rogowski 2013).
The post-WWII world order has rested on a dominant, commanding U.S.
president setting out a vision for diplomacy and the democratic free world.
Consequently, it is reasonable to expect the president to regularly prioritize
international affairs.
The final power explicitly set out in the Constitution declares that the
president is head of the executive branch. The Constitution imagined this to
be a limited role, giving the president the power to appoint cabinet members
and to require reports from the heads of the executive departments. The power
to appoint individuals insures that cabinet officials are attentive to the prior-
ities and preferences of the president, but insuring their compliance requires
that the president be attentive to what is going on in the executive branch.
Overtime, Congress has granted the president the power to reorganize the ex-
ecutive branch; consequently, the president is concerned its efficient operation.
All of these powers mean that we should expect the president to prioritize his
attention to government operations. The powers of the presidency, of course,
have grown in the last 230 years, creating an institution far beyond anything
the founders could have imagined, but it is unsurprising that the central pur-
pose of the institution would survive to this day and be an important force in
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shaping presidential policy priorities.
H: Policy areas that are part of the president’s constitutional duties are
routinely on the agenda
Presidential policy attention is not merely a function of the Constitu-
tion, however. Most notably, presidents must also pay attention to the econ-
omy. Indeed, they receive much of the credit and blame from the public for
economic conditions, despite having few tools at their disposal to manipulate
macroeconomics, as fiscal and monetary policy are largely out of the presi-
dent’s control (Peterson and Rom 1989). In fact, many economists have found
that the state of the economy is one of the best predictors of presidential vote
choice (Fair 1978, 2009; Kahane 2009). Given that electoral fortunes are so
closely tied to the economy, I expect that the president will regularly prioritize
the economy.
H: The president will prioritize the economy at all times in response to
public accountability.
Policy priorities are not simply shaped by the institution. They are
also a function of who holds the office. While there may be some variation
in priorities that is a function of the exact individual in the office, there is
reason to believe that the pattern is not dominated by the precise individual,
but rather the party they represent (Budge and Farlie 1983; Petrocik 1996).
Issue ownership theory says that, in a campaign, a candidate will succeed
when they are able to claim that they are the better able to solve certain
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issues and problems than the other candidate (Petrocik 1996). Because of
these dynamics in campaigns, the Democratic and Republican parties have
developed reputations for having certain competencies and policy experience.
Presidents will work to advance the reputation of their party by prioritizing
those issues that their party is associated with.
Additionally, presidents prioritize policies in line with their party’s vi-
sion for the proper role of government. Ever since Ronald Reagan, in his inau-
gural address, said “government is not the solution to our problem; government
is the problem,”4 one of the fundamental schisms between the Democratic and
Republican parties is on whether government is the problem or the solution
to the challenges society faces. Republicans fundamentally believe that gov-
ernment, particularly the federal government, should be very limited, focusing
on policies such as national defense, and get out of the way of industry. They
also believe that it is not the government’s role to provide a social safety net.
Democrats fundamentally believe the opposite. They believe that the role of
the federal government is to level the playing field for all, by providing social
services to lift up the poor and chronically underrepresented so that they can
succeed. Additionally, they believe that businesses, if left to self-regulate, will
pursue actions that are disadvantageous to society, such as polluting, and must
be regulated.5
4Ronald Reagan: “Inaugural Address,” January 20, 1981. Online by
Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project.
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/”pid=43130
5See the Democratic and Republican party platforms from the last few presidential elec-
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Issues ownership theory and the gap between the philosophical posi-
tions of the two major parties mean that we should expect Democratic and
Republican presidents to prioritize different policy issues. For Democratic
presidents, we should expect them to prioritize social welfare and other do-
mestic policy issues. For Republican presidents, we should expect them to
prioritize business issues and world affairs.
H: Presidents will prioritize the issues most associated with their party.
Democratic presidents will prioritize social welfare and other domestic policy,
while Republicans will prioritize business issues and world affairs.
4.3 Graphically Analyzing Presidential Priorities
When analyzing presidential priorities, an important first step is to ob-
serve what it is that presidents are paying attention to. We can look at this a
number of ways; here we are going to first aggregate priorities over presidents
and then examine them across time. When we summarize priorities by presi-
dent, we are able to see the general dynamics; how a president prioritized the
issue across the 4 or 8 years he was in office, but we are unable to see how
they made trade-offs between policy areas. When we examine the policy areas
over time, we are able to see the changes in prioritization across time, but it
is more difficult to generalize about what it is that presidents pay attention
to. Because of the strengths and weaknesses of each type of analysis, we will
tions for evidence of these beliefs (Available on the Datasets Page of the U.S. Policy Agendas
Project http://www.comparativeagendas.net/us).
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do both.
4.3.1 Policy Prioritization Across Presidents
When we look at figure 4.1, we are able to see the general prioritization
dynamics across the five policy areas and five presidents. The first takeaway
from the table is that there is general support for the constitutional obliga-
tion hypothesis. The international affairs category, which contains both de-
fense and international relations, including diplomacy, is routinely prioritized
by presidents, making up anywhere from 42.7% of President G. W. Bush’s
policy attention, to 21.3% under President Obama. We also see regular pri-
oritization of government operations. Although this category represents the
114
smallest overall share of the presidential agenda under each president, this
single policy area makes up between 8.2% and 14.7% of presidential attention.
Although this substantively smaller than the other policy areas, it is also a
much more narrow segment of the policy agenda, so it is significant that this
one area even receives as much attention as it does.6 The routine prioritiza-
tion of international affairs and government operations provides support for
the constitutional obligation hypothesis.
Figure 4.1 also provides some initial support for the economic account-
ability hypothesis. We see that the economy is routinely prioritized, making up
at least 12.8% of President George W. Bush’s attention. But the issue seems
to be prioritized much more prominently in times of economic crisis than the
economic accountability hypothesis might suggest. President Obama paid the
most attention, 28.1%, and President Reagan the second most, 26.5%, to the
economy. The slightly lower amounts of attention paid by Presidents George
H. W. Bush, Clinton, and George W. Bush are interesting, as these presi-
dents were still responsible, in the eyes of the people, for economic conditions.
So, although there is clearly some support for the economic accountability
hypothesis, it is not as robust as the support for the constitutional obliga-
tion hypothesis. This means that it will be an important area of focus in the
compositional analysis.
When we turn to examining the party preferences hypothesis in Figure
6For a reminder of which PAP major topics make up each of the five categories, see
Chapter 3
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4.1, we see some differences between how Democratic and Republican presi-
dents pay attention to policy, but the exact pattern is unclear. Remember,
issue ownership theory would say that Democrats should prioritize social wel-
fare and other domestic policy areas more than Republicans do, but they don’t,
or at least they don’t prioritize those issues more than all Republicans. When
it comes to social welfare, we do see Presidents Clinton and Obama pay more
attention than the Republicans, paying 25.7% and 20.4% respectively. That is
substantially more than Presidents Reagan and G.H.W. Bush, who averaged
across the entirety of their presidencies paid 14.2% and 14.1% respectively.
Yet, President G.W. Bush paid 17.9% of his attention to social welfare, look-
ing more like President Obama, than the other Republican. When we look
at other domestic policies, we see Presidents Reagan and G.W. Bush paying
similarly low levels of attention, 18.8% and 18.4%. Presidents Clinton, G.W.
Bush, and Obama all paid similar levels of attention, with President Clinton
paying the most attention at 25.2, G.H.W. Bush paying the next most amount
of attention, at 22.6%, and President Obama paying the least amount of at-
tention at 21.8%. Across these two issues the Democrats pay more attention,
but in each case there is one Republican president who is not far behind.
When we look at those priorities that Republicans would “own” under
issue ownership theory, we see a complicated picture. Part of the complex-
ity is inherent in the nature of Republican issues. Business issues and world
affairs significantly overlap with the president’s constitutional obligation to in-
ternational affairs and the economic accountability expectation. This overlap
116
between the core of presidential responsibilities and issue ownership theory is
part of the reason why Democratic candidates have a harder time making their
case to voters that they can solve the problems facing the country. When we
look at Figure 4.1 to see how Republican presidents prioritize international
affairs, we see that the President Bushes certainly prioritized the policy areas
quite strongly, with President George H.W. Bush devoting 35.5% of his time
and President George W. Bush devoting 42.7% of his time to the issue. How-
ever, our other Republican president, who some might say was the archetype
of the modern Republican president, President Reagan, spent only 25.9% of
his attention on the issue, looking a lot more like the Democrats, who spent
22.2% (President Clinton) and 21.3% (President Obama) of their time on in-
ternational affairs. This suggests that the prioritization of international affairs
is more of a function of US involvement in wars abroad and other exigent cir-
cumstances, than it is a function of peacekeeping, diplomacy, and involvement
in international organizations.
When it comes to the economy, we also are missing support for the
idea that Republicans “own” the issue. The two presidents who prioritized
the economy the most were Presidents Reagan and Obama, with the economy
making up 28.1% of President Obama’s attention and 26.5% of President Rea-
gan’s attention. This suggests that, like international affairs, the prioritization
of the economy crosses party lines and is instead a response to the urgency
of the policy problem. Presidents Reagan and Obama’s times in office were
characterized by severe economic recessions, which forced the presidents to
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pay considerable attention to the economy and make many decisions about
how to get the country out of the economic hole that it had found itself in.
The urgency of the problem had similar effects on both Democratic and Re-
publican presidents, putting to bed the idea that the economy is an issue
associated with one party. Both the phenomenon here and in international
affairs suggests that prioritization of these issues is a function of crisis, not
party preferences.
4.3.2 Policy Prioritization Across Time
We see a much more complicated picture when we move to looking
at these dynamics across time, rather than by aggregating across a whole
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presidency. In Figure 4.2, we can observe the way each of the five policy areas
is prioritized in every quarter from 1981 to 2014 and how changes in those
priorities require the president to make trade-offs. For instance, we still see
the regular prioritization of international affairs, government operations, and
the economy across all presidents, but the amount of attention given to each
is subject to peaks and valleys in response to the other policy areas.
We also see substantial spikes in attention to social welfare, particularly
under Presidents Clinton and Obama. This suggests that, while on average
presidents pay similar amounts of attention to social welfare across the course
of their presidency, Democrats do it in a concentrated way, and then once
the policy change is achieved or abandoned, there is a shift to focusing on
other policy areas, while Republican presidents take lower intensity, but more
constant approach to social welfare policy.
We also see more nuanced patterns when we look at international af-
fairs. In Figure 4.1, we noted that the two President Bushes paid more atten-
tion to international affairs than the other three presidents. What we see when
we look at that over time, in Figure 4.2, is that under President George H.W.
Bush and President George W. Bush, international affairs was a pretty con-
stant priority; when a trade-off needed to occur in order to increase attention
to another policy area, they didn’t sacrifice their attention to international
affairs. Instead, they would decrease their attention to one of the other three
policy areas. President Reagan, over the course of his presidency, paid less over
all attention to international affairs than the other Republican presidents, but
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his presidency is really interesting in that, when he did prioritize the issue, it
received a lot of attention, crowding out the other policy areas. The Demo-
cratic presidents on the other hand, paid less attention to international affairs
over all and, at certain points in time, such as when they were trying to make
big changes to social welfare policy, allowed those priorities to push interna-
tional affairs almost completely off the agenda.
These graphical analyses make it clear that there are some interesting
and complex dynamics at hand in understanding what it is that presidents pay
attention to and how they prioritize that attention. It also raises questions
about the factors that shape the trade-offs that presidents must make between
policy areas. After all, in the limited attention world of the presidency, if one
policy area is on the rise, another is in decline.
4.4 The Trade-Off Game: Compositional Analysis of
Presidential Policy Priorities
Statistical analysis techniques, like compositional analysis, allow us to
examine how presidents make trade-offs and understand the factors that affect
those trade-offs. Dynamic Pie analysis, which we described in some detail in
chapter 3, allows us to examine pairs of policy areas to see the relationships be-
tween them. For instance, we can see if an increase in a particular independent
variable, like the defense spending, has a significant influence on the relation-
ship between a pair of policy areas, such as social welfare and international
relations. By being able to see whether the defense spending has a significant
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effect, but also the direction of the effect, we can test those hypotheses we set
out earlier and learn how constitutional obligations, economic accountability,
and party preferences shape policy trade-offs.
To test these hypotheses, we need to introduce a series of independent
variables that represent the aspects of the world that we think affect presiden-
tial trade-offs. All in all, this is a very simple model; testing only the effects
of the economy, defense, and presidents’ party. The first thing that we are
interested is the effect the economy has on presidential policy trade-offs. This
is examined via two independent variables: percent gross domestic product
(GDP) growth and the number of people who were unemployed. These in-
dicators allow us to see the effect of good and bad economic conditions. By
using these two variables, we can see how an improvement in the economy,
measured by an increase in the percent GDP change, and we can see how a
increase in unfavorable economic conditions, measured by an increase in the
number of people who are unemployed, affect presidential decision making.
To examine the effect of world events on presidential decision-making,
I also include the level of military spending. This is a very loose proxy for
how active the U.S. is around the world, with the assumption being that the
more the U.S. is spending on defense, the more the U.S. is involved around
the world. This is only an approximation of U.S. involvement, because it does
not factor in any increases in diplomatic action around the world, but logic
would say that if the U.S. is needing to conduct more foreign relations and
diplomatic efforts, it is because of a problem occurring in the world and that
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it might be paired with an increase in military spending to prepare in case it
should it become necessary for the military to get involved. In many ways,
military spending can reflect both current needs and the perception of what
might be needed in the future. Things like planes and ships and submarines
take quite some time to build, so if the writing is on the wall for a military
buildup, the U.S. government has to start spending money well in advance of
the actual need.
Finally, I include a dummy variable for the president’s party at each
point in time to test for any party effects. As we saw in the graphical analysis,
the role that party is quite complicated. There doesn’t seem to be any issue
ownership effects, but there do seem to be some differences between the two
parties, making it important to take into account in the analysis. This dummy
variable is a very simply way to see if there is a systematic effect.
The compositional analysis is conducted at the quarterly level in order
to get a better look at the way presidents are constantly juggling, while still
allowing for some level of pattern to emerge. Monthly analyses have too much
variation to be able to discern any kind of a pattern, while annual analysis
obscure some of the variation that occurs so we miss out on the interesting
complexities of the decision-making process.
Although I have covered the details of compositional analysis in the
previous chapter, let’s quickly review the important characteristics of Dynamic
Pie analysis. First, it is important to remember that the dependent variables
are the ratio of the one policy area to another. As the ratio gets bigger, the
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numerator policy is increasingly prioritized, and when the ratio gets smaller,
it is the denominator policy that is prioritized. Yet, this is complicated by
the fact that the coefficient produced by the seemingly unrelated regression
with an error correction model cannot be direct interpreted. Instead, we can
only learn directionality and statistical significance from the regression results.
Additionally, as the underlying model is an error correction model, we need
to consider both the short- and long-run effects of the independent variables.
Short-run effects represent the effect that the independent variable has on
quarter to quarter changes, while the long run effects represent the effect the
variable has on the trend over time.
So, in the tables presented in this and the following chapters, I present
the results using arrows. An arrow with an asterisk, whether it points up
or down, means that the relationship is significant at the 0.05 level. An up
arrow (⇑) means that the ratio is getting bigger and that the numerator policy
is gaining the president’s attention and that attention is coming from the
denominator policy. A down arrow (⇓) means that the ratio is getting smaller
and that the numerator policy area is losing presidential attention and that
attention is going to the denominator policy area. For those who are interested,
full coefficient tables are available in the chapter appendix.
4.4.1 Results
When we look at Table 4.1, which considers the short-term effects, and
Table 4.2, which considers long-term effects we see a variety of results. First,
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Unemployment Level ⇓*
Defense Spending ⇑*
Democratic President ⇓* ⇓*
R-Squared
⇑*: significant at 0.05 level
it is important to note that when the economy is good and GDP is going
up, presidents are able to have more diverse policy agendas, in part because
they are able to prioritize other domestic policies. In each of the three signif-
icant relationships across the short- and long-term, the other domestic policy
category is prioritized over social welfare, over international affairs, and over
government operations as the percent change of GDP rises. One way to think
of this is that, when times are good, presidents have the freedom to prioritize
issues such as the environment and civil rights, and it is less important that
they pay attention to their central responsibilities of international affairs and
government operations and that it is less important that they pay attention to
social welfare, as fewer people are likely to need a bolstered social safety net.
This changes as economy gets worse and the unemployment level rises.
Conventional wisdom would suggest that the only policy area that would be
prioritized in that situation would be economics, as high levels of unemploy-
ment occur during bad economies and require a comprehensive solution to fix.
What we see is that over the long term, while the economy is prioritized over
international affairs, higher levels of unemployment have a broader affect on
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presidential prioritization. When the unemployment level is high, rather than
just focusing on the economy, presidents also prioritize other domestic poli-
cies over social and economic policy, and government operations over domestic
policy and international affairs. One thing that is very interesting to note in
the short-term analysis, is that when the unemployment level rises, it can take
some time for the president to adjust to the new state of things. As such, we
see that the president prioritizes other domestic policies over social welfare.
It can take some time for the president to realize there is a problem, so in
the short term, might ignore social welfare issues because it hasn’t yet become
clear that it matters.
While not what I initially expected, the prioritization of government
operations isn’t terribly surprising. Recent presidents like to talk about making
government more efficient, more responsive, and that is a particularly good
argument to make when the economy is struggling. After all, when there
are high levels of civilian unemployment, a bloated federal government and
bureaucracy, which runs on the taxpayer’s dollars, is a particularly unappealing
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political image.7 The focus on other domestic policy was more of a surprise;
however, when we think about periods of high unemployment in the past, like
during the Great Recession, we saw an emphasis on infrastructure projects
under the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act as a way of putting people
back to work. As infrastructure is considered an other domestic policy area in
this coding macro-topic scheme, it makes sense that it would be prioritized at
times of higher unemployment.
When we consider the effect that defense spending has on the presi-
dent’s priorities, conventional wisdom would say that an increase in spending
might cause an increase in the prioritization of international affairs. While
we do see that dynamic in two cases, where the president is more likely to
prioritize international affairs over the economy in the short term and interna-
tional affairs over government operations in the long term, we also see defense
spending having an effect on the relationship between social welfare and gov-
ernment operations, with the president prioritizing social welfare policy, and
between other domestic policies and government operations, with other do-
mestic policies being more highly prioritized. The fact that defense spending
had an effect on the relationship that government operations has with other
policy areas was unexpected. Perhaps the relationship between government
operations and defense spending is a function of the rhetoric that is commonly
7Some might wonder how nominations fit into this picture, as the Policy Agendas coding
scheme includes those in this category. The short answer is that they don’t fit in: nomi-
nations were not the subject of a significant number of the actions in this project. This is
because nominations are largely their own action, that has been much studied in the agency
control literature.
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used around government operations. Often, when the issue is prioritized it is
discussed in terms of making government smaller and more efficient. This is
a great argument to make when you are calling for cuts in spending across
the board, but it is a much more difficult argument to make when there is an
increase in defense spending. Consequently, it makes sense that the president
would not prioritize government operations.
Finally, lets consider the role that the president’s party plays in his
prioritization. One of my initial expectations was that Democratic presidents
would “own” social welfare and other domestic policy issues, which were not
born out in the simple, aggregate graphical analysis. Yet, when we looked
at the trends in presidential priorities over time, there seemed to be differ-
ences between the Democratic and Republican presidents. The results here
demonstrate that, while issue ownership theory may not explain presidential
decision-making, there is a role for party. In this compositional analysis, we see
that Democratic presidents prioritize other domestic policy along with govern-
ment operations. But in each case, those policies are being prioritized at the
expense of international affairs, a marked distinction from Republican presi-
dents. This is extremely interesting as the category of international affairs is a
policy area that contains two of the president’s constitutional obligations. The
fact is that Democratic presidents not only prioritize a range of other policy
areas more, but do so by paying less attention to one of their main duties is
quite startling and a very telling difference in priorities between Democratic
and Republican presidents. It lends some credence to the argument that Re-
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publican presidential candidates make that they are better at focusing on the
core of the presidencies responsibilities: foreign affairs and defense. While
there might be a reasonable disagreement over whether Republican positions
on those issues are better than Democratic positions, these results certainly
show that Republicans put a higher priority on those issues.
4.5 Conclusions
The goals of this chapter were quite simple: to study what it is that
presidents pay attention to, in order to understand the trade-offs that they
have to make, and the factors that shape those decisions. I did this by looking
at the distribution of attention across policy areas, both as averages across a
whole presidency as well as broken up over time to see the trends and trade-
offs. I also did this by examining how they made trade-offs. Dynamic Pie
compositional analysis techniques allowed us to understand how it is that
president use their finite time and the factors that have a significant effect on
their decision making.
What I found was, in some cases, confirmation for existing theories,
and in other cases quite surprising. One of the central findings was that,
across time, political party, and political context, presidents have common
obligations. The structure of the job and its constitutional requirements and
expectations require presidents to regularly make decisions to prioritize the
economy, defense and international affairs, and government operations. These
have been their core duties since the founding and, as we see, they constantly
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fulfill them. Yet the domination of these core duties also has the potential
to crowd out other more “discretionary” policy areas. If you are constantly
focused on those policy areas, it can take a huge effort or an emergency for
those core areas to get de-prioritized and another policy area to take center
stage.
Another finding is that presidents are constantly forced to make trade-
offs and decide how to re-prioritize their attention to issues. Amongst all
policy areas, but particular when dealing with discretionary policy areas like
social welfare and other domestic policy, presidents must constantly reassess
whether and how much to prioritize an issue. That is a substantial, on-going
cognitive task that means they constantly have to juggle different issues. That
juggling requires a huge effort and has an impact on their ability to process
information smoothly. If you are having to regularly decide whether to pay
attention to an issue, it means you are also having to analyze the information
coming in. By having to ask over and over “should I/can I/do I pay attention
to this issue,” presidents earn their title of Prioritizer-in Chief.
One finding highlighted is that those decisions about what policy ar-
eas to pay attention to and the trade-offs between them are, as we saw in
the compositional analysis, responsive to environmental pressures. Presiden-
tial attention to economics and international affairs are particularly sensitive
to what is occurring in the world and thus the state of the policy problem.
Both President Bushes heavily prioritized international affairs because of U.S.
involvement in wars abroad, while Presidents Reagan and Obama paid more
129
than the average amount of attention to the economy because of recessions
that the country experienced during their presidencies. Presidents change the
way they treat their issue priorities based on pressures from the environment.
The final part of all of this is the role that party plays in decisions
about what to prioritize. What we find is that there are not simple dynam-
ics at play. Issue ownership theory doesn’t explain presidential priorities and
yet, there are differences between what Democrats and Republicans prioritize,
with Democrats paying more attention to some issues and Republicans paying
more attention to others. We do see Democrats make some large pushes for
social welfare issues at specific points in time, like when Obama and Clin-
ton made attempts to reform the health care system, but in the aggregate
Democrats don’t that much pay more attention to social welfare than than
President G.W. Bush. Likewise in the economy, there doesn’t seem to be a
substantial difference between the parties, but rather the response is driven by
economic conditions. The only area in which we see regular differences between
the parties is in the Dynamic Pie analysis, where we see Democrats regularly
de-prioritize international affairs. This is significant because the international
affairs category contains two of the president’s constitutional obligations. By
making that choice, whether consciously or not, to de-prioritize international
affairs, the decision-making process of Democrats is very different from the
process of a Republican, and that is important, particularly in an era where
presidential policy preferences set the agenda of Congress. Presidential prior-
ities have huge consequences for the American people.
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It is worthwhile taking a moment to consider the generalizability of
what we have observed in this chapter. One aspect that is particularly of
concern is whether these results are a product of the sample. By focusing on
Presidents Reagan, Bush, Clinton, Bush, and Obama, have the results been
biased by the dynamics at play from the 1980s to present and the personalities
of the individuals in the sample? This is particularly worth thinking about
in the area of international affairs and the finding that Democrats prioritized
the area less. In this era, Republicans were more likely to engage in wars
of choice than Democrats. After all, Kuwait and the Second Iraq War were
policy decisions of Republican presidents, though it is arguable that the war in
Afghanistan was an inevitability after the 9/11 terror attacks, while Democrats
were in control either at times of relative peace, as in the case of Bill Clinton,
or worked to draw down and extricate the country from war, in the case
of President Obama. If we were to go back to the decisions of Presidents
Carter or Johnson, would we see the same effects, or would international affairs
become another area in which there is no difference between Democrats and
Republicans? While we currently have no way of knowing, it is worthwhile to
think about the effect the period of study might have on the generalizability
of these findings.
This chapter considers what issues president’s look at and how they
make trade-offs between them. But these aren’t the only decisions that presi-
dents face. They must also decide what tool strategies they are going to use,
because presidential decision making about policy is not merely a function of
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the president’s issue prioritization, it is also a function of how he is goes about
doing it. The next chapter focuses on the policy tool strategies that presidents
have at their disposal and how they make trade-offs between them.
132
Chapter 5
Presidents and the Selection of Strategy
Presidential decision-making is a complex process. Before the president
can take action that may affect the larger policy process, he must sift through
information and make two decisions. The first decision relates to which policy
areas need his attention. That topic was examined extensively in the previous
chapter. His second decision is the subject of this chapter: which of the three
general strategies that the president has for policy action should be utilized in
order to pay attention to the selected policy area.
Every strategy is made up of many different policy tools, which is de-
fined as any action the president takes to get involved in the policy process.
The decision about what tool to use and, thus which of the general strategies
to use, is strongly shaped by the president’s ability to process information.
Presidents use the information they have about the state of the policy world
and the political environment to take action within a wider political and policy
system. In many policy areas, presidents have strong preferences about policy
outcomes. Sometimes they desire substantial change in a policy area, such as
the desire of Presidents Clinton and Obama to reshape the American health
care system, and sometimes they prefer the status quo, such as the position
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of ever president since 1972 to affirm the “One China” policy with regard to
Mainland China and Taiwan.1 Presidents want to maximize their limited time
and attention and take actions in pursuit of their preferences. They use in-
formation about the world around them and their own power and ability, to
select the strategy best suited to achieving their preferred policy outcomes.
In this chapter, I will examine how presidents use the three different
policy tool strategies they have at their disposal and consider how they make
trade-offs between theses strategies. The three strategies at the president’s
disposal are the ability to propose policy, the ability to shape policy late in
the legislative process, and the ability to make policy unilaterally. I expect
that presidents will largely be responsive to their political environments and
prioritize different policy strategies in response to the political conditions that
they face, whether that be the amount of support they have in Congress or
the public, and that presidents are sensitive to political time, both across the
years since an election and within a year as the legislative calendar progresses
I find confirmation for my expectation that presidents are sensitive to
their political environments, but that they are much more sensitive to time,
than they are to level of congressional support. Public support and the level of
support the president’s party has in the House of Representatives has no effect
on how presidents prioritize their policy tool strategies. The Senate, on the
other hand, does have a significant effect on the president, leading him to select
1Not counting President-Elect D. Trumps phone call on December 2, 2016 with ROC
President Tsai Ing-wen and subsequent statements, which he later backtracked upon.
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unilateral and proposal tools over shaping tools. Additionally, as the length of
time since an election increases, so too does a president’s reliance on shaping
and unilateral action tools. Finally, over the course of a year, presidents favor
late stage and unilateral action strategies suggesting that, overtime, as the
legislative year ends, presidents race to achieve their policy goals.
5.1 Presidents as Strategic Actors
One of the most important thing to remember when trying to under-
stand presidential decision-making is to remember that the people who become
president are savvy political actors. Most are life long politicians and public
servants, although the exact route that they take to the White House varies a
great deal. Their path to the presidency ensures that they have developed the
necessary political skills and instincts to take advantage of the power of the
office. In particular, they have to develop a sense of their own power and the
political environment in order to make strategically smart decisions about the
course of action to pursue in order to achieve their policy goals. The choice of
what actions to take and general strategy to pursue to make policy is tightly
linked to their ability to process information about their political environment
and their own power to affect policy change, whether through direct action
or persuasion. Two factors influence presidents as they make these strategic
calculations: first, they need to consider the amount of support they have from
others in the political environment, as that support can translate into political
capital, and, two, the expectations about the presidency and its role in the
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policy process.
5.1.1 Sources of Support
The president looks to a number of different political actors and groups
for support. The first group they look to is the public. Public support is
thought to be the backbone of the modern presidency, as the president is the
only elected official with a national constituency. With the rise of public opin-
ion polling, presidents feel obligated to gain a sense of what the public prefers
and be responsive, at least in some respects, to those preferences (Jacobs and
Shapiro 1994, 2000; Wlezien and Soroka 2007). Public support is important
because it has implications for reelection, presidential legacy, and for policy
making (Light 1991). The public presidency has transformed the institution
from one primarily concerned with making policy to one that is also concerned
with selling it to the public (Tulis 2017). Beckmann’s research on the presiden-
tial strategy of going public shows that public support for presidential goals
can have an influence on Congress (2010). High levels of public support for
the president and the policy agenda that he is pursuing can give the president
freedom to get involved in the policy process. Low levels of public support can
encourage a president to be cautious about policy making, as they don’t have
the public to turn to as a means to get what they want.
Another type of support that presidents have consider is the support
that they have in Congress. A president’s co-partisans in the House and Senate
are the individuals who will carry the ball on the president’s legislative policy
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proposals. Having the president’s party in the majority in the House and
Senate can give a substantial boost to the president’s policy making powers,
as they are more likely to share policy goals, which would allow the president
to pursue policy change via the proposal strategy. Unified government is by
no means a guarantee of success; sometimes the party of the president is beset
with internal factions that prevent majority party status for providing the
kind of support presidents need to make policy, but, generally, the more co-
partisans the president has in Congress, the more freedom he should have to
get involved in the policy process.
Public support and legislative support are important factors in presi-
dential decision making. The amount of support the president has from these
two sources tells the president a great deal about the political environment
and the amount of freedom and cooperation he might expect when he makes
a policy move. We often think of that freedom as translating into political
capital for the president; that is, a kind of currency that presidents accrue
when they have support and must spend in order to achieve their goals. If we
want to understand how a president makes decisions about the policy strategy
to pursue, we must consider how he analyzes information about the political
environment and his political capital.
5.1.2 Expectations of the Institutional Presidency
The choice about which of the three general strategies that presidents
can use to make policy is not merely a function of the support they have
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from other political actors and the public. Their choice of strategy is also a
function of presidential sensitivities to what the job of president entails. Many
of the powers and functions of the presidency were set out in the Constitution.
Yet many other tools came about as the presidency expanded in practice over
time. The tools of the presidency expanded to allow the president to fulfill the
various duties set out in the Constitution, such as being commander in chief
of the armed forces, chief diplomat, and head of the executive branch.
One such expansion was in the realm of unilateral action. While the
Constitution didn’t explicitly set out any methods for the president to make
policy on his own, the founders knew that such ability was needed in the exec-
utive branch. In Federalist 70, Alexander Hamilton articulated an argument
for a unitary executive, stating, “Energy in the Executive is a leading charac-
ter in the definition of good government.” Since George Washington, energy in
the executive branch has been conveyed though actions, ranging from procla-
mations to executive orders, in which the president acted independently of
Congress. Although unilateral action is often thought of as an innovation of
the modern imperial presidency, some of the most consequential policy deci-
sions in history have been the result of independent presidential action, such
as Washington’s Neutrality proclamation or Lincoln’s emancipation proclama-
tion (Fisher 1999; Rudalevige 2008). To understand how presidents use the
different tool strategies, we need to be mindful of how presidents have come
to view their own role in the policy making process. These beliefs and expec-
tations are impossible to quantify, but they can help us to understand why
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certain presidents might systematically make different strategic choices than
others
5.2 The Information that Shapes Strategy Selection:
Expectations from the Literature
The decisions a president makes about what actions to pursue are
largely a response to information they are receiving from the environment:
both information about the strategy itself and information about their polit-
ical contexts. It is important to remember, however, that presidents don’t
always interpret information correctly. Disproportionate information process-
ing means that they regularly misread a situation based on the information
that they have, whether that information is about the political environment or
about the strategy, itself, and make decisions about the strategy they should
pursue that dont help them achieve their goals. Yet even with the risk that
presidents won’t always make the right choice about what strategy to pursue,
there are still strong reason to believe that presidents can assess the strengths
and weaknesses of the strategies and the world around them in order to make
strategic choices and trade-offs about what tool strategies to pursue.
5.2.1 The Strategies
Presidents have three general strategies at their disposal: the ability
to propose policy, shape policy, or take unilateral action. The first strategy is
to propose the desired policy outcome, whether that is policy change or the
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continuation of the status quo, and make an argument for that outcome. This
strategy originates in the Constitution via the direction that “[the president]
shall from time to time give to the Congress Information on the State of the
Union, and recommend to their Consideration such Measures as he shall judge
necessary and expedient.”2
Presidents are not limited to making policy proposals via the State of
the Union. Presidents have interpreted that Constitutional obligation more
broadly and, as discussed in Chapter 3, have developed a wide range of tools
for communicating policy proposals. This range of tools offers the president a
number of venues and opportunities to shape the policy process.
From a theoretical standpoint, it is reasonable to believe that that
proposing policy is the president’s preferred course of action because, if he
can propose policy and it gets enacted, he gets his favored outcome in the
format that is most durable, with the fewest costs (Jenkins and Patashnik
2012; Krehbiel 2010). A successful presidential proposal will result in new
legislation, which is ideal because it is durable; only the courts or another
piece of legislation can overturn the policy change, while the courts, Congress,
or a subsequent president can overturn unilateral actions. However, there
are many times the president cannot get what he wants simply by proposing
policy, so he needs to use other strategies.
The second general strategy presidents have is to shape policy at the
2From Article 2, section 3
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late stages of the legislative process either just before or just after passage.
Just as with proposing policy, this strategy originates in the Constitution, but
the exact way presidents use it has evolved since the time of the founding.
The Constitution charged the president with the power to check the legisla-
tive branch through the veto,3 enabling him to give a final up or down vote on
legislation. Over time, this power has grown to become more flexible; offering
more proactive avenues, though still reactive to congressional activity, for in-
volvement in the formal legislative process. Whether through a veto threat or
a signing statement, presidents have extended the role they play in the legisla-
tive process. Presidents shape policy through communications with Congress
and the bureaucracy in an effort to make their wishes known before policy is
enacted. These tools do require initial action on the part of Congress, but
once those initial conditions are met, presidents have a fair amount of latitude
for shaping the policy that emerges.
The third and final general strategy that presidents have to make policy
is unilateral action. As mentioned earlier, the origin of the unitary executive
was the desire for an institution with the energy to tackle problems quickly in
response to the changing situation in the world. This required giving presidents
the power and tools to act on their own. While the use of unilateral action has
grown from largely symbolic proclamations to more substantive memorandum
3Article 1, section 7: “Every Bill which shall have passed the House of Representatives
and the Senate, shall, before it become a Law, be presented to the President of the United
States: If he approve he shall sign it, but if not he shall return it, with his Objections to
that House in which it shall have originated...”
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Table 5.1: The Distribution of Individual Policy Tools into Tool Strategies
Policy Tools N= Strategy
Budget Messages 34 Messages Proposal
Major Televised Speeches 110 speeches Proposal
Press Conference 698 statements Proposal
Speeches to a Joint 9 speeches Proposal
State of the Union 34 Speeches Proposal
Signing Statements 1,309 statements Shaping
Veto Threats (1985-2014) 1,443 threats Shaping
Executive Orders 1,398 orders Unilateral
Presidential Memoranda 928 memoranda Unilateral
Proclamations 4,410 proclamations Unilateral
and executive orders, each evolution has come about as presidents have tried
to solve problems. Many times throughout history, presidents have looked to
a hopelessly divided Congress and taken action on their own to secure the
change that they thought was necessary.
One component that is important to remember is that each of these
strategies encompasses multiple tools. Some tools have only one strategic use.
For example, executive orders are only useful for pursuing unilateral action.
After all, the purpose of an executive order is to provide instructions to the
bureaucracy about a policy change that the president wants implemented.
Other tools are more flexible. The more flexible tools can be used to pursue
a couple of strategies, but each tool still has one primary strategy. Two of
the tools that work this way are press conferences and major addresses to the
nation. Most of the time, they are used by presidents to propose the policy
change they want to see happen, but occasionally these can be a venue for the
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announcement of unilateral action, as they provide a chance for the president
to speak directly to the American people about issues that the president cares
about. For example, when President Obama announced the Deferred Action
for Parents of Americans program, which was actually implemented via a
unilateral policy change made at the president’s direction by the Department
of Homeland Security, he gave a major televised address to announce the
action. This was a different way of using the televised address, which is most
commonly used to propose policy changes, like when President Reagan gave a
prime time address to build support for his tax reform plans in 1985. President
Obama and President Reagan prove that there are some instances in which
a tool that is primarily associated with one strategy can be used to pursue
another strategy.4
5.2.2 The Political Environment
The tool strategies are not the only piece of information that shapes
the presidents choice of action; he must also pay attention to his environment.
Presidents are heavily reliant on political capital, or the support of others
whose opinion matters, in order to get things done. Policy accomplishments
require others within politics to either support the president’s policies or pre-
vent active opposition. Because of this, presidents constantly need to assess
how much political capital they have and the amount they might lose by taking
any particular action or strategic approach.
4All actions of a single tool will be categorized according to that tool’s primary purpose.
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Political capital gives presidents the freedom to pursue their preferred
course of action: proposing policy. As I mentioned earlier, it is reasonable
to believe that presidents prefer to propose policy over the other two strate-
gies, if they have any reasonable expectation that it will be effective (Krehbiel
2010).The power to do so is rooted in the Constitution and the resulting pol-
icy change is more durable than policy change that happens via unilateral or
shaping strategies (Jenkins and Patashnik 2012). Additionally, when the pres-
ident is proposing policy, there is time between an idea becoming public and
its implementation to allow for public reaction and the adjustment of policy
in response to those opinions.
However, proposing policy can also be highly ineffective. All of the
strengths of the proposal strategy assume that the president’s proposals are
placed on the congressional agenda and that, when the issue is on the agenda,
the president’s preferred problem definition and solution are advanced. Many
times, particularly when the opposite party of the president holds one or both
of the chambers of Congress, the president can have trouble getting his agenda
adopted by Congress. So while presidents might prefer to make policy via
proposal strategies, they end up having to use their political capital to take
unilateral action far more often than they are able to translate their political
capital into policy proposals.
Just as political capital is useful for convincing members of Congress
to take up presidential policy proposals, political capital is useful for getting
members of Congress to ignore unilateral action. Unilateral action has the
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force of law, as long as no one overturns it. This makes it an incredibly useful
tool when Congress is unlikely to take the president’s preferred action if he
proposed it. A publicly popular president can take action independently and
the force of his public support can dissuade members of Congress from actively
resisting his choices, making it a potentially much more effective, though less
preferred policy strategy.
Political capital is generated from a number of different sources. One
potential sources is public support. The president relies on public support, as
it is the key to electoral success, both for the president and for members of the
House and Senate. A publicly popular president is able to use that support
as a cudgel with reluctant members of Congress by highlighting to he member
that their electoral chances are intimately tied to the successes of the president
(Mayhew 1974).
One way that political capital via public support can be measured is
by Gallup opinion polls, which measure how much the public approves or
disapproves of the president’s job performance. As a regularly tracked public
opinion measure, presidents and pundits have closely monitored responses to
this question as a sign of presidential strength. Presidential approval has been
tracked via responses to the question “Do you approve or disapprove of the
way [the president] is handling his job as president?”
Public approval numbers are meaningful largely because they increase
the president’s credibility when he “goes public” (Beckmann 2010). Going
public is a phenomenon where presidents try to bring public attention and par-
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ticipation to an issue. The ultimate goal of the strategy is not to change hearts
and minds, though presidents like to think they can, but to activate those
who already support the president’s position and get them to put pressure on
their members of Congress (Beckmann 2010; Edwards 2006; Edwards III 2009;
Canes-Wrone and Shotts 2004; Canes-Wrone 2006). This creates a chain of
support from the president through the public to the Congress, enabling a pop-
ular president to get what he wants accomplished. This makes the waxing and
waning of presidential power particularly significant, because an unpopular
president is not only in danger of losing reelection, but they are less effective
at making what they want happen while they are in office.
H: Presidents with more public support will act unilaterally more often
because they trust the public to support their decisions, which prevents Congress
from overruling them.
Another potential source of political capital is electoral success in Congress.
The president relies on his co-partisans in Congress to support his agenda. Un-
der unified government, where the same party controls the presidency, House,
and Senate, this support should be easier for the president to attain. In the-
ory, unified government means that people with similar priorities and values
hold the decision-making authority in each branch. These shared values can
make it easier for the president to get his preferred policy through Congress,
however that is not always true. In 1964, as President Johnson was trying
to pass the Civil Rights Act, he faced significant opposition from Southern
Democrats, a perfect illustration of how unified government does not mean
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unanimous support for a presidents plans.
In general, the hyper-partisan era that has developed over the last
30 years means that a president’s co-partisans in the House and Senate are
more likely to be supportive than members of the opposing party, so it is
worthwhile thinking about the amount of support that the president’s party
had in the House and Senate. Rather than simply evaluating whether there
was unified government or not, which is a rather simplistic measure, we will
consider the net number of seats that the president’s party has in the House
and Senate. This is a much more useful way to think about the level of
cooperation the president has in Congress for a number of reasons. First,
during this period, there are very few periods of unified government. Because
unified government is rare, using it as a measure of presidential support would
only help us to differentiate those 8 years from the other 26, but it does not help
us to understand the majority of the time, which is under a variety of different
configurations of divided government. A second improvement is based on the
idea that the amount of support the president has is an important factor in his
decision making. A president is likely to behave much more cautiously when
he had only a small advantage in Congress, as losing a few votes can sink his
goals, while as they might be much more daring and push for bigger changes
when his party has a large majority. Finally, the net number of seats allows us
to see the different relationships the president has with the House and Senate.
The institutional differences, such as institutional norms, procedures, loyalty
between the president and each chambers, deserve attention particularly when
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we try to understand the amount of power the president has and how the
president’s party’s status in the chamber affects his decision-making and policy
tool strategies.
H: Presidents who have more support in Congress will use proposal tools
more because they are more likely to get support for their proposals.
A third source of presidential political capital is timing. Right after a
president has been elected, they have the most public support and political
power. The power that they have right at the beginning of a term in office is a
function of the wave that brought them to power. Over time, presidents lose
political capital as they make decisions. Thus, over the course of the four years
of a presidential term, there are changes in the way the president strategizes
in his job because of declining political capital.
H: The first year after an election the president will propose more policy
because he has the political capital to persuade Congress to take up the issue.
As the number of years since an election increases, presidents will propose less
policy because of a decrease in political capital
But presidential time is not just a function of declining political capital
over the four years in office; there is also a cycle to the legislative year. Every
presidential year starts off with a State of the Union address in which the pres-
ident sets out his goals for the year. It marks the beginning of the president’s
policy-making year and is an opportunity for him to build political capital
within Washington. It is in that moment that his ability to propose policy is
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most potent. As the year progresses, the president’s success at making policy
via proposal tools declines as the distance from that political capital-generating
speech grows.
H: The president will propose more policy in the first quarter of the
year because of the focus and political capital that is generated via the State of
the Union address. As the year proceeds, the president will use proposal tools
less.
5.3 Graphically Analyzing Tool Selection
When it comes to analyzing presidential tool selection strategies, the
first thing that we need to do is to look at how presidents use each of these tools
on average across their presidencies. This strategy allows us to understand the
general phenomenon that we are dealing with, even though it is not particularly
useful for testing our expectation, as many of the hypotheses that we test are
either a function of time or the effect of particular independent variables.
5.3.1 Strategy Selection Across Presidents
The first thing that we observe, when we look at Figure 5.1, is that
all presidents use proposal tools in roughly the same proportion. Presidents
spend roughly 60% of the time that they devote to policy pursuing change
via proposing policy.5 President Reagan used this strategy the most, propos-
5These are calculated based on the amount of time the president has already devoted
to policymaking. From the data here, it is impossible to calculate what percentage of the
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Note: The proposal strategy includes budget messages, major televised speeches, press
conference opening statements, addresses to a joint session of Congress, and State of the
Union addresses. The shaping strategy includes signing statements and veto threats. The
unilateral actions strategy includes executive orders, presidential memoranda, and
proclamations
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ing policy 64% of the time when he was involved in the policy process. His
sucesessor G.H.W. Bush used proposal tools the least, with only 54.4% of the
time. Presidents Clinton and Obama proposed policy at approximately the
same rates: 62.2% and 62.4% respectively. President G.W. Bush used pro-
posal strategies at a similar rate to his father, using them 57.7% of the time.
The differences between each of these steps are modest and non-statistically
significant, indicating that while presidents like proposal tools, and use them
the majority of the time, they cannot rely solely on proposing policy. Instead,
they have to use other strategies.
When we look at how presidents shape policy at the late stage of the
legislative process, we see similar levels of variation, but with different presi-
dents emphasizing this strategy than we saw in the proposal strategy. Just as
President G.H.W. Bush was the president who used the proposal strategy the
least, we see that he was the president who tried to shape policy the most,
using that strategy 18.6% of the time. President Clinton used this strategy a
fair amount compared to the other presidents, 13.6% of the time. Presidents
Obama, Reagan, and G.W. Bush used these tools the least, with President
Obama using them 9.6%, President Reagan using them 8.7%, and G.W. Bush
using them 8.5%. This is actually quite interesting as, while President G.W.
Bush is thought of as one of the chief innovators in the strategic use of late
stage policy tools, Ronald Reagan was the one who transformed their use as a
president’s total time is devoted to policy, as such detailed records of the president time are
not publicly available.
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strategic tool (Cooper 2014). The fact that G.W. Bush used that category of
strategy least of all presidents in this study is quite puzzling. It suggests that
there is a difference between the frequency and the style of usage.
Finally, when we look at the unilateral action strategy, we see that all
presidents make policy via these tools quite often. In fact, the president who
used these tools least was President Clinton, and even in last place, he used the
strategy in 24.2% of his policy change efforts. Presidents Reagan and G.H.W.
Bush used these tools each about 27% of the time and President Obama only
used them a little bit more, coming in 28% of the time. President G.W. Bush
used unilateral action tools the most, pursuing 33.8% of his policy efforts via
this strategy.
This graph, which shows how presidents use the three general strate-
gies across their whole presidencies, does not present any clear indications of
what motivates the choice of strategy. Nor does this graph give us a sense of
why we see differences between presidents. What it does do is start to hint at
the fact that presidents make trade-offs between the strategies they pursue. A
president like G.H.W. Bush came in first place for his use of shaping strategies
and last place in his use of proposal tools, relative to the other presidents.
It suggests that there was something different his presidency than the others,
which led him to pursue policy in a slightly different fashion than the other
presidents of this study. All in all, while this graph is a good first cut at un-
derstanding how much presidents use the three general strategies, it motivates
us to look more closely at the trends over time, as well as move on to more
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complex compositional analysis in order to study the trade-offs.
5.3.2 Strategy Selection Across Time
The next step is to consider how presidents use these strategies over
time. Looking at the presidents use of the tools at the quarterly level gives us
a chance to see the variation that occurs within year, without being subjected
to the continual noise that a monthly level analysis is consumed by. What
we see is that there is both seasonality and regularity to the way in which
presidents use their policy strategies.
When we look at Figure 5.2, we can immediately observe the seasonal
trade-offs that presidents make. Every year, presidents spend a great deal of
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their time at the start of the year proposing policy. This is largely unsurprising
as the first quarter of the year typically contains the State of the Union address
and the budget message. As the year goes on, the president does less and less
policy proposing and more unilateral action and shaping of policy as he tries to
accomplish those goals that he set out in the first quarter. Shaping strategies
seem to happen most in the third and fourth quarters of the year, as the
legislative process for the year starts to reach its climax and conclusion. Only
in very rare instances is the president prioritizing shaping strategies in the first
quarter of the year, as there is usually very little legislation nearing completion
at that stage of the calendar. Finally, we see the president prioritize unilateral
action most of the time, but not quite as strongly in the first quarter of the
year. This suggests that the president has to make a trade-off between acting
on his own and proposing policy for others to take up. Yet when we look
at that same figure with an eye towards how presidents use the strategies
regularly, we observe that the president is always using his unilateral action
strategy, though the amount of the agenda that is channeled through these
tools changes from quarter to quarter.
The final thing that is worth noting from Figure 5.2 is that the dif-
ferences between presidents are quite subtle. Some of the findings of Figure
5.1, such as President G.H.W. Bush’s heavy use of shaping tools and Presi-
dent Reagan, G.W. Bush, and Obama’s lighter use of late-stage shaping tools
compared with the other presidents, are still discernible when we look over
time in Figure 5.2. Yet observing those patterns in Figure 5.2 requires looking
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quite closely with some prior knowledge of what to look for, as the differences
between presidents are much less stark than they were over policy choice.
5.4 Making Trade-Offs: Compositional Analysis of Pres-
idential Strategy Selection
Just as with policy areas in the last chapter, it is important to consider
how presidents make trade-offs between different tool strategies. On their face,
the strategies the presidents have at their disposal might not be governed by
zero-sum dynamics. However, the actions the president takes at any point in
time are still limited by the president’s available time. Even if the president
chooses to act unilaterally and propose policy at the same time, he is still
limited in terms of how much he can propose or enact because he still only
spends so many hours of the day on policy. This means that it is necessary to
understand the relationships between the different strategies, in part because
decision making in regards to strategies requires the president to make trade-
offs and compositional analysis helps us to understand why presidents favor
certain strategies over others, as Dynamic Pie analysis illuminates the shifting
relationships between different categories in response to external forces.
To test the hypotheses developed earlier in the chapter, we need to
introduce a series of independent variables. The first variable is a measure
of presidential approval. This measure comes from responses to the Gallup
survey question: “Do you approve or disapprove of the way [the president]
is handling his job as president?” Responses are aggregated to the quarterly
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level to match the president’s choice of policy strategy. The exact number of
surveys that are included in the average changes overtime. In the early 1980s,
this question was included on surveys approximately once a month. Over time,
there has been a growth in the frequency of polling, so that by the Obama
presidency, there is data about presidential approval almost every few days.
A graph of presidential approval is available in the chapter appendix.
The next independent variables are the net number of seats for the
president’s party in the House and in the Senate. As I discussed earlier, these
variables indicate not only whether the president’s party has the majority in
each chamber, but how large of a margin the president’s party has. This
variable is calculated by subtracting the number of seats the opposing party
has from the number of seats occupied by the president’s party. A positive
value for this variable indicates that the president’s party has the majority,
while a negative number indicates that the president’s party is in the minority.
A graph of the net number of seats for the president’s party in each chamber
is available in the chapter appendix.
The next few independent variables of interest are quite simple. The
third is the number of years since the last presidential election. This allows
us to track the declining political capital presidents have in between elections.
The second variable is a counter of the quarters of the year. This allows us
to see how political capital changes over time within the year and assess how
strategy might change over time in response. The final variable is the party
of the president. I include this to see if there is a systematic difference in the
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way Democratic and Republican presidents strategize their tool use.
5.4.1 Results
Compositional analysis, particularly the Dynamic Pie analysis in this
study, requires examining the effect that independent variables have on the
relationship between pairs of categories, in this case, pairs of strategies. The
SUR framework with an error correction model produces estimates that are not
directly interpretable (Philips, Rutherford and Whitten 2016a), so I report the
direction of the ratio using arrows. If the ratio is positive, I indicate that with
an up arrow (⇑), which denotes that the strategy in the numerator is being
prioritized more and the increased prioritization has caused the denominator
strategy to be utilized less. If the ratio is negative, I use a down arrow (⇓),
showing that the strategy in the denominator is being prioritized, with the
additional attention coming from the numerator strategy. In the body of the
chapter, I only report relationships that are significant at the 0.05 level, but in
the appendix to the chapter, I report the coefficients and include indications
of significance at both the 0.05 level and the 0.1 level.
When we look at Tables 5.1 and 5.2, we see confirmation for some of
our expectations, but not all. The first expectation I had was that presidents
with more public support would act unilaterally more because they have the
trust of the public to support their decisions. What I found was that the
president’s approval rating has no statistically significant effect on the selection
and prioritization of strategies in either the short or long term. This suggests
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Net Seats in House
Net Seats in Senate
Quarter ⇓* ⇓* ⇓*
Years Since Election
Percent Approval
Democratic President ⇓* ⇓*
R-squared 0.59 0.90 0.91
*: significant at 0.05 level
that the president’s general strategy about how to approach policymaking is
not tied to how well they are doing in the public opinion, as an increase in
public support does not lead to the president selecting one strategy over any
other. This is curious as we think that public opinion of the president is
important.6 This encourages us to turn to other explanations for a sense of
what shapes the president’s choice of strategies, particularly if it is not public
approval.
Our second expectation was that presidents with greater levels of parti-
san support in the chambers of Congress would be more likely to prioritize the
proposal strategy because presidents are more likely to get support for their
ideas initially when they have more co-partisans in Congress. We find mixed
support for this expectation. In the House of Representatives, an increase in
the number of seats the president’s party occupies produces no statistically
6The fact that Gallup now polls presidential approval weekly, if not multiple times a
week, suggests that this is true.
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Net Seats in House
Net Seats in Senate ⇑* ⇑*
Quarter ⇓* ⇓*
Years Since Election ⇓* ⇓*
Percent Approval
Democratic President ⇓* ⇓*
R-squared 0.59 0.90 0.91
*: significant at 0.05 level
significant effect in either the short- or the long-run. Yet, when we look at
the Senate, we do find effects. In the short term, from one quarter to the
next, we see that an increase in the number of seats has no effect on presiden-
tial strategy selection. The lack of short-term effects in both the House and
Senate is not surprising as the membership of the chambers does not change
much over the year. Instead, we must look at the long-term effects, as that is
where we will find the impact of elections and any potential changes in cham-
ber majorities. Elections can increase the number of seats controlled by the
president’s party, which has an effect on their strategic choices. An increase in
the president’s party control of the Senate, in the long run, leads the president
to move away from the shaping strategy, instead choosing proposal tools and
unilateral action tools. This suggests that, over time, increased support in the
Senate frees the president to focus on either proposing policy for the House
and Senate to act on or acting unilaterally, knowing that he is likely free from
congressional interference.
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The third expectation was that the first year after an election, the
president would prioritize proposing policy because he has the political capital
to persuade Congress to take up the issue. In the short term, as in from one
year to the next, we find that the passage of time has no effect on presidential
strategies, yet over the long term presidents prioritize shaping and unilateral
action more than proposal strategies. This suggests that the effect of time
since a president has been elected or re-elected is cumulative. The passage of
time has no effect on the selection of different strategies from the first year
to the second or the second to the third, but when we look at the long-term
effect, from the first year following an election to the fourth year since an
election, we see a significant de-prioritization of proposal tools. This suggests
that as a president nears reelection or the end of his time in office, he stops
proposing policy and starts trying to make his policy vision happen more
directly, whether that is through unilateral action or shaping what is coming
out of Congress. This is likely because as an election or the end of their time
in office nears, presidents are hit with a sense of urgency; the need to complete
their policy goals, as they might not have the power and time to try again
later.
This result is actually quite interesting because of the way that the
president’s political capital declines with use. President’s start their time in
office riding the wave of support that brought them in to office. Typically,
presidents start their time in office with the most support, the most flexibility,
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the most political capital they will have their whole time in office.7 Due to
this maximal amount of political capital, presidents tend to be very thoughtful
about the issues the prioritize at the beginning of their presidencies, as it is
likely the best opportunity they will have to achieve their policy goals. As
the term progresses, presidents make decisions about policy and politics that
use up some of that support and political capital. That decline in leverage
and capital makes it extremely interesting that late-term presidents will use
shaping and unilateral action strategies more. It suggests that as re-election
or the completion of the presidency nears, the president will try to take policy
change in to their own hands because they are unable to cultivate the support
and cooperation they need to propose policy, as other sources of political
capital may be gone by this point.
Our fourth expectation was that presidents would propose more policy
in the first quarter of the year because the start of the year traditionally
involves annual events that lend themselves to agenda setting, such as the
State of the Union and budget message. Our results were largely in line with
this expectation. As the year progresses, we see a prioritization of the shaping
strategy over unilateral action and proposal strategies, from one quarter to
the next and from the first quarter of the year to the last, representing a
prioritization of shaping policy over unilateral action and unilateral action
over proposal strategies. This suggests that the earlier in the year it is, the
7Extreme circumstances, such as 9/11 with President G. W. Bush, can increase the
amount of political capital a president has at a later point in office, but those circumstances
are very rare.
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more proposal tools are being used and as the year progresses, the shift towards
other strategies.
Finally, we look at the difference in strategy selection between the two
parties. We find is that Democratic presidents significantly prioritize shaping
policy strategies in the late stage of the legislative process over unilateral
action or proposal strategies. This might be a response to the fact that each
of these presidencies spent three-fourths of their time in office with one or both
chambers in the hands of the opposite party. Divided government meant that
they couldn’t rely on proposal tools to get what they want and that they were
much likely to face resistance if they took unilateral action. Consequently,
they used signing statements and veto threats more often as a way to get
involved in the policy process.
5.5 Conclusions
This chapter has demonstrated how presidents utilize different strate-
gies to respond to the circumstances they find themselves in. Presidents must
be sensitive to environmental and political constraints, as presidents do not
make policy in a vacuum. Policymaking is an interconnected process in which
action provokes reaction. By being aware of and responsive to the circum-
stances they find themselves in, presidents increase their chances of success.
In every case, presidential decisions about policy strategy are a function
of how they are processing information, in particular, information about their
environments. They must constantly assess the amount of political capital they
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have in Congress. They must also assess political time, whether that is their
power in relation to the election cycle or the annual calendar of policymaking.
They use all of that information to decide whether they can make one type of
decision or another.
Yet the processing of all of that information is a difficult task, one
in which presidents struggles to discern the true meaning of a piece of in-
formation. The process of understanding what a piece of information means
and translating that meaning in to choice is vitally important for scholars to
understand. It is also incredibly complex to study in the face of the dispropor-
tionate way presidents process and integrate new information. Presidents do
not merely learn facts about the world and alter their strategies to fit them.
Instead, there is friction and delay and mistakes arising out of cognitive and
emotional limitations. This chapter seeks to understand a small slice of this
process: how presidents use the general strategies they have at their disposal
and what information about the political environment is most significant for
making trade-offs between those strategies.
We can conclude a few things from this analysis. First, the graphical
analysis in this chapter makes it startlingly clear that not only do presidents
prefer to propose policy, it is also the strategy they pursue the most often.
As easy as it might seem for presidents to get what they want by acting
unilaterally or shaping policy coming out of Congress, it is something that
they have to be judicious about. They can propose policy with relatively
few risks, but if they want to shape policy they need Congress to have already
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taken up the issue and if they want to act unilaterally, they need the confidence
that they won’t have problems from Congress or the courts. Proposing policy,
might not always get them the policy change they want, but they also don’t
court as much risk.
Second, when we move to thinking about presidential strategy selection
over time, rather than as a function of a whole presidency, we find that the
choice of what strategy to pursue is not merely a function of ease of use, it
is also a function of the time of the year. Presidents use unilateral action
to varying degrees all the time, but proposing policy is primarily a first and
second quarter of the year approach and shaping policy late in the legislative
process is much more of a second, third, and fourth quarter of the year strategy.
When we look at the compositional analysis, we are able to understand
a lot more about the trade-offs that presidents make between the strategies.
First, we see that the relationship between the level of support the president
has in the public and his actions are much more complicated than we had
initially assumed. None of the relationships between the pairs of strategies are
significant, suggesting that presidents don’t make trade-offs between strategies
with public approval directly in mind. So while trying to sell policy to the
public may be important, the reaction they have to his attempts at persuasion
don’t seem to shape his strategy going forward, as the level of support he has
doesnt determine when he goes public and when he tries to shape policy or act
unilaterally. Going public via communication strategies and proposing policy
might be in response to perceptions of support, but it isn’t in response to an
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actual increase in the level of support.
Another thing that we find from studying trade-off is that the rela-
tionship between the president and the House and Senate was more complex
than we would have initially assumed. The fact that the House and Senate
don’t have an effect on presidential strategy in the short term was not terribly
surprising, as there are two years in between substantial changes the amount
of support the president has in either chamber. In the long term, the lack
of any effect of the House of Representatives on the president, paired with a
statistically significant effect in the Senate is quite interesting. It suggests par-
tisan support in the Senate is much more influential for the presidents strategic
choices. One explanation for this could be the difference in the voting rules in
the House and Senate. In the House, the president needs things to get on the
agenda, but once they do, he only needs a simple majority. Thus an increase
in the size of his margin of support has little impact. Making policy in the
Senate, in most cases, requires enough support to invoke cloture, raising the
threshold of support that the president needs in the chamber. This means
that the president’s choice of strategy is much more sensitive to the margin of
support he has in the Senate.
A third finding from the compositional analysis highlights the long-run
effects that the number of years since the last election has on the president’s
choice of strategy. We find that in the early years of an administration, the
president relies more on proposing policy, but as years pass and he is closer
to reelection or the end of his time in office, there is an increase in the pri-
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oritization of shaping legislation and using unilateral action strategies and a
de-prioritization of proposal strategies. This comports with our expectation
about presidential priorities, and thus strategy, changing as presidential time
passes. The beginning of a term is the time to throw ideas out there and see
what can get accomplished via Congress, but as election time approaches, the
goal becomes securing his legacy and completing policy, whether by acting
alone or by shaping policy as it nears the end of the legislative calendar. The
same is true across the course of a single year; the first months of the year
are for proposing policy, but as the year progresses it is all about completing
policy. Presidents get credit for policy change that actually gets completed,
while proposals that die along the way get completely forgotten. Additionally,
presidents gain knowledge and experience about what will work each time they
set out to make policy. Over time, the lessons about efficacy and successful
policy change accumulate. Later in a term, presidents are going to rely more
heavily on tools and strategies they feel are more effective, while reduce the
amount of “wasted” time on proposing policy.
These findings leave us with a few questions to consider. The first
question that is one that I also raised in the last chapter: how much are these
results a function of the president’s studied? Particularly when we talk about
the effect the House and Senate have on presidential strategy, how much of
these effects are a product of the large stretches of divided government during
the period of this study? As I noted earlier in the chapter, only 8 of the 34
years in this sample were under unified government. Could periods with unified
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government and larger margins either for or against the president’s party lead
to the president to prioritize more proposal tools? Or would the presence of
intra-party factions during those periods keep the president’s ability to propose
policy limited like it is in this dissertations time period?
Additionally, the lack of effect the level of partisan support in the House
on presidential prioritization raises an interesting question. The president
needs party support in order to get his proposed policies through the commit-
tee system, on to the floor, and passed into law. Yet as we saw in this analysis,
the net number of seats in the House of Representatives had no effect on pres-
idential strategy. Is this always true, or perhaps the policy area has an effect
on the relationship between the president and the House of Representatives?
In the next chapter when we break out the trade-offs by policy area and stage,
we will see if support in the House of Representatives has any effect in any
other policy area.
In the next chapter, we will bring together the two stages of decision
making that we have talked about in the last chapter and in this chapter,
issue prioritization and strategy selection, to understand the effect that each
has on the other in the decision-making process. Presidential decision-making
requires understanding how presidents unite information about what policy
area to address with which strategy will be most effective given the political
context. In considering both policy area and strategy at the same time, we
will get a better view in to how the process is much more iterative, and less
linear, which is the way we have been thinking about the process up until now.
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Chapter 6
Policy-Strategy Decision Making: Analyzing
Presidential Decision Making With Both
Policy Prioritization and Strategy Selection
The process of making policy is a process of learning: learning what
strategies you should use in which policy areas. All presidents are forced to
learn, sooner or later, that they can’t use the same tool to achieve all of their
policy goals. One example of this was during the 104th Congress. During those
two years, President Clinton both succeeded and failed to use veto threats, a
tool within the category of the shaping strategy, to get his preferred policy
change. President Clinton succeeded in June of 1995, when he used a series of
veto threats to object to the removal of family planning assistance the Foreign
Operations, Export Financing and Related Programs Appropriations Act of
1996 (H.R. 1868). It took five separate threats from June until December of
1995 for Congress to remove the objectionable language, allowing him to sign
the bill on February 12, 1996. These veto threats gave the president a say in
the final form of the legislation.
Only a few months later, President Clinton was forced to use his veto
power, after his threats failed to get the change he desired on the Partial Birth
Abortion Ban Act of 1995. In the lead up to the April 10, 1996 veto, he issued
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two veto threats, one on November 11, 1995 and one on December 6th, in
which he said that
The Administration cannot support H.R. 1833 because it fails to
provide for consideration of the need to preserve the life and health
of the mother, consistent with the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision
in Roe v. Wade. If the bill is not amended to rectify these constitu-
tional defects, the Attorney General and the White House Counsel
will recommend that the President veto the bill.
Despite that strong statement, the House and Senate passed the legislation.
President Clinton was forced to follow through on his threat and veto the bill.
What was so different between these two situations? In this two year
period, neither the policy environment nor the political environment had rad-
ically changed. One obvious difference between these two cases was the policy
area. When the president tried to make policy about international affairs he
was able to use a veto threat, but when he tried to use it in domestic policy
his efforts failed.
The past two chapters have focused on analyzing the two main compo-
nents of presidential decision making: the policies presidents prioritize and the
strategies they select. In reality, these decisions occur simultaneously. Presi-
dents do not decide to prioritize issues without thinking about the strategies
they might use, nor do they devise strategy without a policy area in mind.
Instead, presidential decision making is characterized by the constant, simul-
taneous decision about policies and strategies. In order to truly understand
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presidential decision making and information processing, scholars must study
the combined choices that presidents make. This chapter follows the progres-
sion of this dissertation towards understanding how presidents make decisions
about policy, by analyzing simultaneous policy prioritization and strategy se-
lection.
In this chapter, we will consider how both the policy environment and
the political environment can unveil new aspects of the decisions that presi-
dents make to prioritize policies and select strategies. This analysis is largely
exploratory, building upon the expectations that drove the previous empiri-
cal chapters, in order to learn how presidential decision making varies across
both policies and strategies. In order to learn how presidents make decisions
about both policy and strategy, this chapter will examine the distribution of
presidential attention across the five macro-policy areas,1 in each of the three
tool strategies.2 After studying the distribution of attention to policy in each
strategy by president and over time, the chapter examines the ways presidents
use information about the political and policy environment to make trade-offs
between the policy areas in each of the strategies. I find that presidential
decision making about policy and strategy is complex, requiring the president
to pay attention to a large number of competing factors, many of which have
different effects on his decisions, depending on the strategy and the decision
making environment. Presidential decision making in the proposal strategy
1Which are the economy, international affairs, social welfare, government operations, and
other domestic policy
2Which are proposal, shaping, and unilateral action
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is sensitive to the amount of support they have in the House, Senate, and
public, the level of unemployment, defense spending, and the party of the
president. The president is less reactive to information in the shaping strat-
egy, though they are systematically affected by the amount of support they
have in the House of Representatives and defense spending. In the unilateral
action strategy, there is a resurgent role for information, particularly for in-
formation about the political environment, as the amount of support in the
House, Senate, and public, the number of years since the last election, and
the party of the president all have widespread effects on the way presidents
prioritize information.
6.1 When Policies Met Politics: Expectations of Presi-
dential Prioritization of Policy Areas and Strategies
The focus of the last two chapters has been on understanding the two
components of presidential decision making individually: policy prioritization,
in chapter 4, and strategy selection, in chapter 5. By studying them separately,
it was possible to learn how presidents process information about each of these
components. This was an important step in developing this research, as the
results from the simpler analysis provides a foundation for the more complex,
but more realistic analysis in this chapter.
In this chapter, we are interested in answering the same questions as we
were in the previous two chapters: what policies/strategies do presidents pri-
oritize and what shapes the trade-offs between policy areas/strategies? How-
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ever, in this chapter, instead of examining the prioritization of policy across
all strategies or between strategies across the policy areas, we will examine
the way policies are prioritized in each of the three strategies. By studying
the way policy is used and juggled in each of the three strategies, we are able
to learn a number of different things. First, we can learn how the different
policies are used in each strategy and answer many questions, such as whether
international affairs makes up an equal proportion of a presidents attention
in all three strategies, or does its importance, relative to the other policy ar-
eas, shift across strategies? Second, we can learn the relative relationships
between policy areas in a single strategy across different presidents, enabling
us to observe whether behavior by one president is significantly different from
the other presidents or if all presidents use a particular strategy to tackle a
particular policy area in the same way. Finally, this stage-by-stage analysis lets
us see how the same information causes presidents to make different trade-offs
between policy areas. When the same piece of information produces different
trade-offs, we get a window into how strategies provide their own information
for presidential decision-making.
All of this analysis allows us to understand how policy and strategies
shape each other. This joint decision, about what policy to prioritize via
which strategy, is called the policy-strategy decision. This term denotes the
fact that, contained within each decision the president makes, are decisions
about which policies to prioritize and what strategy to use to pursue the
policy. I expect that there will be substantial differences in the way that
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presidents pay attention to and prioritize policy across the three strategies, as
each strategy involves different tools and interacts with a different part of the
policy making process. These differences result in decision makers applying
information differently in each of the different strategies.
In the policy-strategy decision, which is diagrammed in Figure 6.1,
presidential decisions are affected by three quantities: information about the
political and policy environment, policies, and strategies. At the center of
all decision making is the president. He must process information about the
policy and political environment and balance that with information about
policies and strategies. Decisions about policies and strategies must be weighed
against each other, as the choice of strategy can limit the choice of policy and
vis versa, as not every strategy can be used for every policy and not every
policy is best approached through every strategy.3 Presidents have to use
their knowledge about policies and strategies, their strengths and weaknesses,
and the political and policy environments to decide what policy to pursue via




In this model of decision making, information is continually shaping
the process, with each component providing more information, forcing the
president to make trade-offs between policies and strategies in the pursuit of
his policy goals. This chapter will explore the policy-strategy decision and how
information about the policy and political environment causes the president to
make different trade-offs between policy areas in each of the three strategies.
6.1.1 A Review of Policy Areas and Strategies
Before we can engage in the in-depth analysis of policy-strategy deci-
sions, it is worthwhile reviewing the different policy areas and strategies at
play. In chapter 4, we learned how presidents make decisions about which
policy areas to prioritize. The five macro topic policy areas in this study are
the economy, international affairs, government operations, social welfare, and
other domestic policy.
I had hypothesized that presidents would prioritize three types of poli-
cies: first, Constitutional responsibilities, such as international affairs and
government operations; the economy; and political party-related issues. To
learn about how presidents made trade-offs between policy areas, I introduced
a series of independent variables to understand how aspects of the policy envi-
ronment informed presidential decision-making. These independent variables
give a sense of the state of policy problems in the policy-making environment.
I found that presidents do consistently prioritize their constitutional
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issues, regularly prioritizing those policy areas that are delegated to the pres-
ident. I also found that, while all presidents pay at least some attention to
economics, the presidents that pay the most attention are those who are faced
with large economic crises. Finally, while I found that there were substantive
differences in the agendas of Democratic and Republican presidents, those
priorities were not in line with issue ownership theory.
In chapter 5, the goal was to analyze how presidents use the three
general strategies and information about the political environment in order
to make trade-offs between the strategies. The three general strategies in
this study are the proposal strategy, shaping strategy, and unilateral action
strategy. These three strategies involve the president in different aspects of
the policy process and have different strengths and weaknesses for action.
The expectations in this chapter were that the political environment,
specifically the amount of support and political capital that the president
had, would be instrumental in shaping the decisions about what strategies
to select. I expected that the more public support the president had, the
more they would rely on unilateral action. I also expected that congressional
support would cause presidents to rely on proposing policy. Finally, I expected
that the longer it had been since a presidential election and the later it is
in the legislative year, the more that the president would rely on shaping
and unilateral action. To learn about how presidents make those trade-offs, I
introduced a series of independent variable to understand how political support
and timing provide information about the political environment.
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In the fifth chapter, I found that, by and large, the political environment
has little effect on the selection of strategy, as public support has no effect
on presidential strategy selection. It is also possible to see that the effect
of support in Congress is only significant for presidential decision-making in
the Senate and only over the long-term, suggesting that presidents are far
more independent in their selection of strategy than they are reliant on the
support of other actors. The one area of the political environment that has
a substantial significant effect on decision making is time. Both time within
the year and time since the last election were statistically significant. As the
year progresses, presidents become more likely to favor shaping and unilateral
action strategies, rather than the proposal strategy and as the number of years
since the last presidential election increases, the more presidents favor shaping
and unilateral action strategies, rather than the proposal strategy, but only
over the long run. These findings illustrate that the effect of the political world
on presidential decision making is far more nuanced than we presume.
One concern stemming from both these chapter revolved around the
fact that these results might change in different policies or strategies. Pres-
idents may pay attention to policy one way in the proposal strategy, but an
entirely different way in the unilateral action or shaping strategies. Only by
looking at how presidents prioritize policy and make trade-offs between them
in each strategy, can we comprehensively understand presidential decision-
making.
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6.2 Graphically Analyzing Policy-Strategy Decisions
6.2.1 Policy-Strategy Decisions Across Presidents
When we examine the way presidents prioritize policy areas on average
across their whole presidencies in the different strategies, we immediately see,
in Figures 6.2 through 6.4, that presidents use the strategies differently, to
focus on some policies more in some strategies, and less in others. President
Reagan used the proposal strategy, more than the shaping or unilateral action
strategies, to prioritize the economy, the shaping strategy to deal with gov-
ernment operations and other domestic policy, unilateral action to deal with
social welfare, and proposal and unilateral action in roughly equal proportions
to deal with international affairs. President G.H.W. Bush used the proposal
strategy the most to deal with the economy and international affairs, the shap-
ing strategy to deal with government operations and other domestic policy, and
unilateral action to deal with social welfare policy. President Clinton utilized
the proposal strategy the most of the three strategies when focusing on the
economy and social welfare policy, shaping strategy for government operations,
and the unilateral action strategy for international affairs and other domestic
policy. President G.W. Bush uses the proposal strategy more than the others
for the economy, international affairs, and social welfare, the shaping strategy
for government operations, and the unilateral action strategy for other do-
mestic policy. President Obama used the proposal strategy the most for the
economy and social welfare, shaping policy for government operations, and
unilateral action for international affairs and other domestic policy. While
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there are some commonalities between the most utilized strategies for each
policy area, such as the fact that all five presidents use the proposal strategy
the most when they want to prioritize the economy, there are also differences,
such as the fact that some presidents use the proposal strategy the most for
international affairs, while other presidents use the unilateral action strategy
the most.
When I look at the prioritization of policy areas within each of the
different strategies, some observations arise. First, in the proposal stage (Fig-
ure 6.2), most presidents emphasize international affairs and the economy,
although there is considerable variability, with Presidents Reagan and Obama
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paying the most attention to the economy and the President Bushes paying the
most attention to international affairs. This repeats the pattern that we saw
in chapter 4, that presidents prioritize issues in part because of constitutional
obligations and public expectations, and part in response to policy problems
such as recessions and wars. Yet presidents also use the proposal strategy in
other ways, such as to pay substantial attention to social welfare policy, as was
done by Presidents Clinton (32.1%) and Obama (22%). This suggests that, at
the proposal stage, presidents mostly stick to those policy areas in line with
what the job requires, but that they will propose policy in other areas when
they feel strongly about the issue. It is quite interesting that, by and large,
presidents only use the strategy to deal with government operation and other
domestic policy a little. It suggests that presidents engage with these policy
areas more in other strategies, perhaps because the other strategy types are
more effective for enacting policy change than proposing policy in thees areas.
In the shaping stage, we see a much different distribution of attention.
Instead of seeing a focus on constitutionally-mandated policy or economics,
we see, in Figure 6.3, that the prioritization of policy areas is much more com-
plex and individualized. In government and international affairs, we see that
most presidents prioritized these issues a moderate amount (between 15.2%
and 23.7% for government operations and 15.9% and 32.3% for international
affairs). Yet each area has an exception: for government operations, President
Clinton prioritized the issue 23.7% of the time, which is 4.2% more than the
next highest president. For international affairs, President G.W. Bush priori-
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tized the issue 32.3%, which is 11.3% more than the next highest president. It
is also interesting because, when we looked at this prioritization in Chapter 4,
both President Bushes substantially prioritized international affairs, but here
only G.W. Bush prioritizes the issue more than other presidents. This sug-
gest that G.H.W. Bush was able to get what he wanted via proposing policy,
while G.W. had to use both proposal and shaping strategy in order to get the
outcomes he wanted.
In the economy, we see similar use across all presidents (12.6% to
15.8%), except for President Obama who used this strategy for this policy
area 25.1% of the time. This is almost 10.9% more than the average of the
other presidents. This difference might be in part because of the fact that he
had to deal with a large financial crisis combined with the increased level of
party polarization from the last time there was a major financial crisis during
the Reagan administration. Under President Obama, the financial crisis and
its policy solutions were very politicized, requiring President Obama to use
the shaping strategy much more, while President Reagan could simply pro-
pose what he wanted and, even though he had a Democratic Congress, they
were more willing to listen to his ideas and work towards bipartisan solutions.
In other domestic policy and social welfare, we see very different out-
comes. Presidents use shaping tools only in a minimally in the social welfare,
with President Obama using them the most at 15% and G.W. Bush the least
at 8.5%, but all presidents using shaping tools extensively in other domestic
policy, with Presidents G.H.W. Bush and Reagan using them the most at 38%
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and G.W. Bush using them the least at 27.1%. This is curious as the analysis
in neither chapters 4 nor 5 would have predicted this pairing of policy and
strategy. Perhaps this high level of shaping occurs because presidents do not
have any Constitutional responsibility in other domestic policy. Consequently,
they let Congress take the lead on these issues and get involved if they need
to because of a disagreement with Congress’s solution.
When we look at Figure 6.4 to understand how presidents prioritize
policy attention in the unilateral action strategy, we see presidents use the
strategy more in two primary policy areas: first in international affairs, as
that is a policy area in which they have the primary policy making role, and
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second, in policy areas where presidents think that there is no other way to get
the change they desire, such as other domestic policy and social welfare. Given
the fact that the presidency was created to offer a unified front for international
affairs, it is not surprising that all presidents prioritize international affairs at
roughly the same level (24% to 28.7%) for unilateral action. When we look at
other domestic policy (28.8% to 38.9%) and social welfare (18.4% to 24.8%),
we see presidents taking action unilaterally in order to ensure their preferred
policy outcomes. These areas are much more difficult for presidents to influence
via proposal or shaping tools, though of course they still try. Ultimately, when
the president wants to get involved in policy making, unilateral action is an
appealing approach because of the swift and uncompromising policy change
that occurs.
6.2.2 Policy-Strategy Decisions Across Time
In examining presidential policy-strategy decisions across time, the unit
of time is the year, rather than the quarter as it was in past chapters. The
annual level helps to simplify the complex dynamics that occur when we look
at five different policy areas across three different strategies. At the quarterly
level the data becomes zero-inflated. Because there are so many quarters
in which the president doesn’t take action in some of the policy areas, it is
impossible to estimate a model for the proposal strategy. While other analysis
techniques can handle data with a high quantity of zeros, the Dynamic Pie
approach does not, and the strength of this approach, namely the ability to
183
handle pairs of categories for the dependent variable, is significant enough that
it is worthwhile moving to a higher unit of time.
When we look at policy prioritization across time and strategies, we
see much more nuance then when we looked at the presidency. The first
thing we see is that there are some strategies where the distribution of policy
priorities is more stable across time, and others that are more subject to
fluctuation. Proposal (Figure 6.5) and shaping (Figure 6.6) strategies reflect
regularly shifting priorities over time. The unilateral action stage (Figure 6.7)
shows that presidents use the strategy for each policy area in roughly the same
amount all the time and that, over time, changes are more incremental, rather
than subject to the same kind of huge trade-offs between policy areas that we
see occurring in the other strategies.
In the proposal stage, there are large shifts in what policies the pres-
idents are prioritizing. While the largest shifts occur when there is a change
in the president, there are substantial re-prioritization of policy within pres-
idencies. Two of the biggest changes we see are in the Clinton and Obama
presidencies. In 1993 and 2009, there are large shifts towards social welfare,
followed in the next year by the re-prioritization of other issues, such as other
domestic policy in Clinton and the economy in Obama. In the Reagan admin-
istration, the first year was marked by substantial attention to the economy,
but over time, other areas, such as international affairs and other domestic
policy, came to be a bigger part of President Reagan’s agenda. President
G.H.W. Bush’s proposal strategy was used primarily to focus on international
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affairs, though in the first and last year in office he paid more attention to
the economy. During the G.W. Bush administration, the president also used
the proposal tool to talk about international affairs, but right after he was
reelected he slightly de-prioritized the issue in order to increase attention to
social welfare policy, specifically because of his interest in reforming social
security.
When we look at prioritization across time in the shaping strategy,
we see some substantial trade-offs in policy attention, where individual pol-
icy areas dominate the agenda before receding. During President Reagan’s
time in office, he made trade-offs between social welfare, international affairs,
other domestic policy, and government operations, so that, for example in
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1983, when he increased the amount of attention for government operations
and social welfare, it came from the reduction of attention to other domes-
tic policy and international affairs. In the G.H.W. Bush administration, the
economy and other domestic policy changed the most over time, rising and
falling on the agenda, creating space for the other policy areas. During the
Clinton administration, government operations got prioritized at the expense
of other policy areas in the shaping strategy. During the G.W. Bush presi-
dency international affairs played a substantial role, though it was not immune
from being re-prioritized like it was in the proposal strategy. President Obama
shifted attention from social welfare to the economy and other domestic policy
over the course of his presidency. It is also noteworthy how other domestic
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policy remains a substantial part of the agenda within the shaping strategy
overtime. Other domestic policy takes up anywhere between 15.6% and 45.5%
of the presidents shaping agenda, with an average of 30.6%, sometimes leaving
only minimal room for each of the other four policy areas.
In the unilateral action strategy, the amount of attention that presi-
dents pay to each policy area is comparatively stable over time. Each pres-
ident pays a pretty consistent amount of attention to each policy area, with
any changes in the amount of attention an issue received relatively minor com-
pared with the overall trend in Figure 6.7, which shows that the economy is
2.8% to 10.6% of the unilateral action strategy, international affairs is 19.8%
to 35%, government operations is 7.8% to 19.3%, social welfare is 12.9% to
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33.5%, and other domestic policy is 23.5% to 45.5%. The results across Figures
6.5 through 6.7 suggest an important role for timing, not just in the choice of
policy area or strategy, but in the joint decision of what strategy to pursue in
which policy area.
6.3 Making Trade-Offs: Compositional Analysis of Policy-
Strategy Decisions
As we have already seen in the graphical analysis in this chapter, it is
very important to break down the analysis of trade-offs by strategy. To do
this, we will examine the effect that the policy environment and the political
environment have on the prioritization of policy in each of the different strate-
gies. As a reminder, Dynamic Pie analysis allows us to examine the effect
that independent variables have on pairs of categories, which in this chapter
are pairs of policy areas. By modeling the effect of the political and policy
environment, utilizing all the independent variables that were in the previous
chapters, in the three separate models, one for each of the three general strate-
gies, we can see the effect that information about the environment has on the
joint policy-strategy decision-making process.
Dynamic Pie analysis produces estimates in both the long- and short-
run that are not directly interpretable (Philips, Rutherford and Whitten 2016a).
Consequently, I report the directionality of the result using arrows. If the es-
timated coefficient is positive, it is indicated with an up arrow (⇑), which
denotes that the strategy in the numerator is being prioritized more and the
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increased prioritization has caused the denominator strategy to be utilized less.
If the coefficient is negative, it is indicated with a down arrow (⇓), showing
that the strategy in the denominator is being prioritized, with the additional
attention coming from the numerator strategy. In the body of the chapter,
only significant relationships at the 0.05 level are reported, but in the appendix
to the chapter, are tables of coefficients that include indications of significance
at both the 0.05 level and the 0.1 level.
It is important to recognize what short- and long-term effects mean in
this analysis. In this analysis, the unit of time is a year. Short term effects are
those that affect the analysis from one year to the next. Long term effects are
those that affect the overall trend. For example, if we looked at the first two
lines of Table 6.1, we would see the short- and long-term effects the number
of seats the president’s party in the House of Representatives has on pairs of
policies in the proposal strategy. We can see that, from one year to the next, an
increase in the number of seats the president’s party possesses is likely to cause
the president to prioritize social welfare over international affairs, government
operations over international affairs, the economy over international affairs,
social policy over other domestic policy, economics over other domestic policy,
and government operations over other domestic policy. Yet, when we consider
the long-term trend in prioritization that is caused by an increased number of
seats for the president’s party in the House of Representatives, we see that the
president prioritizes social welfare policy over economics, social welfare policy
over international affairs, and social welfare policy over other domestic policy.
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In this case, the long term trend of the independent variable had a much
narrower, specific effect on policy prioritization in the proposal strategy, than
that same information has on presidential prioritization from year to year.
In this chapter, three models, one for each strategy, include all the
independent variables from the prior analyses. This include the policy envi-
ronmental indicators and the political environmental indicators: percent GDP
change, unemployment level, party of the president, number of seats for the
president’s party in the House and Senate, public approval of the president,
and number of years since the last election.4 Using these variables, we can
see how different types of information influence the president’s prioritization
of policy in the three different strategies.
6.3.1 Results
The results from the compositional analysis in Tables 6.1-6.3, are ex-
tremely intricate; it is very easy to get overwhelmed by the complexity of the
results. As such, the focus of this chapter is not on the individual trade-offs
in every variable in every strategy in both the short- and the long-run in this
chapter. Instead, this section will summarize the findings; examining the gen-
eral effect that policy and political environment has on the prioritization of
policy in the different strategies and highlight particularly interesting results.
The first thing that is apparent in the results in Tables 6.1 to 6.3
4For justification and descriptions of the independent variables, see chapter 4 and 5.
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is that different strategies are significantly influenced by different kinds of
information. The proposal strategy is influenced by both information about
the policy environment, notably by unemployment, defense spending, and the
party of the president, and by information about the political environment,
specifically the number of seats the president’s party has in the House and
Senate and the amount of public approval. The number of years since the last
presidential elections has some effects, but they are less profound.
The shaping strategy, in Table 6.2, shows a far weaker role for informa-
tion in policy prioritization. In this strategy, the only independent variables
that have substantial effects are: the number of seats the president’s party has
in the House, which causes presidents to de-prioritize other domestic policy
in favor of all the other policy areas, and defense spending, which encourages
presidents to prioritize the economy, international affairs, and other domestic
policy. This result is really interesting as it shows that presidents are not im-
mune to both policy and political information, but that it has a limited role in
shaping priorities in the shaping strategy. This is likely because this strategy
is the only one in which the president is reliant on other’s actions. Given that
a president can not shape policy until it has been created by Congress, his
choice of policies to prioritize is less reliant on the kinds of policy and political
information that are in this analysis, and more reliant on prior action. It may
be possible to get a clearer causal mechanism in a future piece of scholarship
that focuses on the shaping strategy and includes a measure of congressional
attention at a prior point in time to each policy area.
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Seats in House-Short ⇓* ⇓* ⇓* ⇑* ⇑* ⇑*
Seats in House-Long ⇑* ⇓* ⇑*
Seats in Senate-Short ⇑* ⇑* ⇑* ⇓* ⇓*
Seats in Senate-Long ⇓* ⇓*
Approval-Short ⇓* ⇓* ⇓*
Approval-Long ⇑* ⇑* ⇓* ⇓* ⇓*
Years since Last
Election-Short ⇓* ⇓* ⇓*
Years since Last
Election-Long ⇓* ⇓*
% GDP Change-Short ⇓*
% GDP Change-Long ⇓* ⇓*
Unemployment-Short ⇓* ⇓*
Unemployment-Long ⇓* ⇓* ⇓* ⇓* ⇑* ⇑*
Defense Spending-Short ⇑* ⇑* ⇑*
Defense Spending-Long ⇑* ⇑* ⇑* ⇓* ⇓* ⇓*
Democratic President ⇑* ⇓* ⇓* ⇓*
R-Squared 0.777 0.693 0.711 0.860 0.651 0.673 0.872 0.835 0.739 0.696
*: significant at 0.05 level
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Seats in House-Short ⇑* ⇑*
Seats in House-Long ⇑* ⇑* ⇑* ⇑*












Defense Spending-Short ⇑* ⇑* ⇓* ⇓*
Defense Spending-Long ⇑* ⇑* ⇓*
Democratic President ⇓*
R-Squared 0.788 0.713 0.753 0.791 0.754 0.583 0.889 0.757 0.732 0.795
*: significant at 0.05 level
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Seats in House-Short ⇑*
Seats in House-Long ⇓* ⇓* ⇑*
Seats in Senate-Short ⇑* ⇑* ⇓*
Seats in Senate-Long ⇑* ⇑* ⇓*
Approval-Short ⇓* ⇓* ⇓*
Approval-Long ⇑* ⇑* ⇓* ⇑* ⇓* ⇓*
Years since Last
Election-Short ⇑* ⇑* ⇑* ⇓* ⇓* ⇓*
Years since Last
Election-Long ⇑* ⇑* ⇓* ⇓* ⇓*
% GDP Change-Short ⇑* ⇓*
% GDP Change-Long ⇑* ⇓*
Unemployment-Short
Unemployment-Long ⇓* ⇑* ⇑*
Defense Spending-Short
Defense Spending-Long ⇓* ⇑* ⇓* ⇑* ⇓*
Democratic President ⇑* ⇑* ⇓* ⇓* ⇓*
R-Squared 0.746 0.626 0.724 0.661 0.837 0.695 0.777 0.696 0.605 0.803
*: significant at 0.05 level
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The unilateral action strategy, in Table 6.3, is somewhat in between
the shaping strategy and the proposal strategy as to how much of an effect
information has on policy prioritization. The political environment variables
have a more robust effect, with the number of seats in the House and Senate,
public approval, and the length of time since the last presidential election
having repeated influence on policy prioritization. That does not mean that
the policy environmental variables are insignificant; in general they have a
more limited effect, focused on particular pairs of policies, but defense spending
in the long term has a significant effect on a number of different policy trade-
offs.
Besides these general differences between the three strategies, there are
some other findings that are quite interesting. One of these findings is the
role the president’s party plays in policy trade-offs. In the analysis in chapter
4, being a Democrat caused presidents to de-prioritize international affairs in
favor of government operations and other domestic policy.5 In this chapter,
when we break out the effect of party by strategy, the results are very differ-
ent. First, the extent to which party has any affect at all varies by strategy; in
the shaping strategy, there is only one trade-off where party has a significant
effect. In the proposal and unilateral action strategies, the effects of party are
more pervasive, with four trade-offs in the proposal strategy and five trade-
offs in the unilateral action strategy significantly shaped by party. Second,
the particular policy areas that are prioritized because of party change across
5See Tables 4.1 and 4.2
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the three strategies. In the proposal strategy, Democratic presidents prioritize
social welfare, other domestic policy, and government operations over inter-
national affairs and economics. In the shaping stage, Democratic presidents
prioritize other domestic policy over social welfare. Finally in unilateral ac-
tion, we see Democratic presidents prioritize international affairs and other
domestic policies over government operations, economics, and social welfare.
The reversal of international affairs from being an issue that is de-prioritized
in the proposal strategy to a policy that is prioritized in the unilateral action
strategy is incredibly interesting as it highlights how much presidents tailor
their choice of policy strategically. We see this dynamic occur in other areas,
such as in the effect of the Senate,6 the effect of public approval,7 and the
effect of defense spending,8 all in the long run.
Another interesting finding from the compositional analysis revolves
around the way information about the political environment affects decision
making, specifically the different effect that congressional support has on pres-
idential policy prioritization across the three strategies. In chapter 5, the
6An increase in the number of seats held in the Senate by the president’s party in the
proposal and unilateral action strategies causes presidents to prioritize other domestic pol-
icy over international affairs, but in the shaping strategy causes presidents to prioritize
international affairs over other domestic policy
7An increase in public approval for the president in the proposal strategy causes presi-
dents to prioritize international affairs over social welfare and in the unilateral action strat-
egy causes presidents to prioritize social welfare over international affairs. Public approval
has no statistically significant effect on prioritization in the shaping strategy.
8An increase in defense spending causes presidents to prioritize other domestic policy
over the economy in the proposal strategy, the economy over other domestic policy in the
unilateral action strategy, and there is no statistically significant effect in the shaping strat-
egy.
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expectation was that congressional support would allow presidents to priori-
tize the proposal strategy. In that chapter, which didn’t distinguish between
policy areas, the results indicated that the only congressional variable that
had a statistically significant effect on presidential strategy selection was in
the amount of support the president’s party had in the Senate in the long
run, and that support made presidents more likely to select the unilateral and
proposal strategies over the shaping strategy. In this chapter, where policy pri-
oritization is separated out by strategy, there is a very different result. Here,
the support the president has in the House and Senate are both important,
but have different effects in all three strategies. In the proposal strategy, con-
gressional support leads the president to prioritize social policy (over economic
policy and international affairs) when there is both House and Senate support,
and leads the president to de-prioritize international affairs with support only
in the House, and other domestic policy when there is support only in the Sen-
ate. In the shaping strategy, the Senate has very little effect, but increases in
the number of seats the president’s party has in the House causes presidents to
de-prioritize other domestic policy. The unilateral action strategy looks much
more like the proposal strategy, where congressional support leads to a priori-
tization of social welfare policy. These results are interesting as they show how
the political environment can have different effect on the policy prioritization
in the different strategies.
These results, and the many others discussed in the chapter appendix,
illustrate the complicated way that presidents process information and use
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what they have learned to make decisions about different policies and strate-
gies. The effect of information is neither static nor is it applied uniformly.
Presidents use the information that they have about policy and politics and
think about the policy areas and strategies at their disposal to try and make
the best decisions, the one that gets them closer to their policy goals. Some-
times that means that they must prioritize some policies via one strategy rather
than another, and sometimes it means that they can use whatever strategy
their like in order to achieve their goals.
6.4 Conclusions
In this chapter, we looked at the way strategies and policy areas interact
to shed light on the complexity of presidential decision-making. Across the
three strategies and five policy areas, we find some similar patterns, but also
many differences that are worth trying to understand. Nowhere is this clearer
than in the compositional analysis, which helps us understand presidential
trade-offs. If we look across the three strategies, we can see instances where the
same independent variable produced opposite effects in the different strategies,
for example, when we look at the effect the president’s party has on their
decisions. This is a signal that it is incredibly important to consider the
president’s policy prioritization across the different strategies, as we had simply
stopped at the aggregate analysis in chapter 4, we never would have learned
that the effect that the party has on decision-making is as complex. There are
times when presidents prioritize and de-prioritize the same issue and it largely
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depends on the strategy they are using to pursue it.
In this chapter, we also learned a great deal more about policy prioriti-
zation by looking at the policy strategies individually. Without the combined
analysis, we would not have been able to understand just how differently a role
information plays in the shaping strategy than in the proposal and unilateral
action strategies. The information that routinely shapes the prioritization of
policy areas in the proposal and unilateral action strategies has only a limited
effect in the shaping strategy. In the unilateral action strategy, the state of
the policy environment has an effect on presidential priorities, but primarily
in the long run. When presidents act on their own, they seem to approach
information about the policy environment with more caution, causing it to
have an effect more often in the long run, rather than the short run.
When it comes to understanding the effect that the political world has
on presidential priorities in the unilateral action strategy, things get much
more complex. In most cases, political support frees the president to prioritize
those policy areas he can’t regularly attend to, but in other cases, it causes
him to prioritize those policy areas that are his to deal with because of the
Constitution. This suggests that presidents rely on different types of political
support in order to prioritize different issues.
Across the three strategies, the effect of increased support in the House
and Senate in largely consistent. This suggests that the effect an increase
in support has on the relationship between the president and the institution
is a characteristic of the relationship between the institutions, rather than a
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function of time. The relationship between the president and the public is
not nearly so stable. In each of the three strategies, the trade-offs that are
significantly affected by an increase in public support change in the short-
and long-run. This suggests that the effect the public has on the president is
constantly shifting and he has to juggle what the public will support him in
and allow him to deal with later.
Even with all these lessons, I am left with a few questions for future
study. First, considering all the different, and sometimes contradictory, effects
the political and policy environment has on policy trade-offs in the proposal
strategy, I would be interested in examining these actions more closely. Does
the fact that the proposal strategy covers multiple tools, all of which might
behave and be used slightly differently, drive the complicated analysis in Table
6.3? Or are the policy-strategy decisions surrounding proposing policy natu-
rally complex and subject to multiple influences? Only a deeper dive would
give us answers to this question, which makes it a fruitful direction for future
research.
Another question that comes out of this study, comes from the ob-
servation that when we compare this chapter with the fourth chapter, where
we study only policy prioritization, it is very clear that the proposal strategy
dominates the general analysis, in terms of both number of observations and
proportion of the president’s policy activity. As such, the results from the
analysis of the proposal strategy are not much different than the analysis of
the first empirical chapter, though this chapter does include measures of the
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political environment. One of the flaws in this analysis comes from the fact
that many of the proposal strategy tools are coded at the quasi-sentence level,
while the shaping and unilateral action tools are coded at the document level.
If we converted the document level observations to the quasi-sentence level,
would we see the same relationships between the strategies and the same re-
sults from the graphical analysis or the compositional analysis? Perhaps we
would see different results, in which the proposal strategy is less dominant,
but perhaps we would still see similar effects.
In this chapter, we focused in the policy-strategy decisions that presi-
dents make, exploring the complexity of the joint decision that presidents must
make about what policy areas to prioritize and the strategy to pursue. This
chapter represents the goal that we have been progressing towards through
this whole project: a complex understanding of presidential decision-making.
In the first chapter, I highlighted why it is important to study presidential
decision making, in the second, I outlined a theory for how presidents use
their abilities to process information to make decisions. In the third chapter, I
outlined the seven new datasets, and join them with three existing datasets to
study presidential decision-making quantitatively, before introducing the pri-
marily methodological tool, Dynamic Pie compositional analysis, that I used
to study these data.
The fourth chapter offered a chance to study the simple phenomenon of
what policy areas presidents prioritize and the forces in the policy environment
that shape those trade-offs. The fifth chapter takes the same simple, one
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dimensional approach and studies the president’s choice of strategy and the
way the political environment can lead to the prioritization of some strategies
over others. This chapter brought all of those chapters together, building a
unified approach to of policy prioritization and strategy selection. In the next
chapter, we will explore what we have learned and think about what it means




The first six months of the Trump presidency saw a great deal of policy
action. In that time, the president gave a State of the Union address that had
297 policy quasi-sentences; a budget message, with 41 policy quasi-sentences;
43 executive orders; 13 press conferences; 65 memoranda; 53 proclamations;
and 10 signing statements. These actions represented all three presidential
policy strategies, and included high profile decisions, like the president’s ex-
ecutive orders banning the entry of individuals from several Muslim-majority
countries; a memorandum overturning President Obama’s memorandum that
had blocked the Mexico City policy, putting back in place a ban on foreign
aid for non-government organizations who provide information about abor-
tion; and a series of memoranda advancing the construction of oil pipelines,
the building of which had been the center of mass protests during the Obama
administration, due to concerns about environmental degradation and the vi-
olation of Native burial sites. It did not take President Trump very long to
reshape the direction of policy making in the United States.
All of these decisions were rooted in the way that President Trump
understood the world. His beliefs about what was necessary to make Amer-
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ica safe and prosperous, guided by information that fit with these beliefs,
shaped his decision making, just as it does for every president. Presidential
decision-making is shaped by the way presidents, burdened by their cognitive
and emotional limitations, beliefs, and the responsibility of one of the most
complex jobs in the world, process information, prioritize policy areas, and
select strategies to achieve their goals.
This dissertation set out a fresh approach to understand presidential
decision-making by connecting the presidency to information processing the-
ories. This approach to behavioral choice highlights how the structure of
the presidency creates a decision-making process that relies on the cognitive
and emotional capacities of the individuals in the office, while the institu-
tional structure and the political and policy environment put pressures on
their choices. Once presidents have decided to get involved in policy making,
they have to process information about the responsibilities of the office, the
policy and political environment, as well as their own political strength, to
make decisions about what policy areas to prioritize and what strategies they
should use to pursue those policy goals.
To examine those decisions and understand the forces that shape them,
I analyzed ten datasets of presidential actions, seven of which were original
to this project: presidential press conferences, budget messages, State of the
Union addresses, major televised addresses, addresses to a joint session of
Congress, proclamations, memoranda, signing statements, executive orders,
and veto threats. All of these dataset gave us insight into the wide range of
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ways that presidents try to affect policy. By examining these datasets of pres-
idential policy action from Ronald Reagan (1981) to Barack Obama (2014),
we gain a much clearer insight into the decisions that presidents make about
the policy process, their strategies, and the factors that affect their abilities
to make trade-offs between their policy priorities and strategies. This disser-
tation makes a contribution to the presidency and policy process literatures
by moving away from purely theoretical and case-based studies of presidential
policy decision-making to a empirically-grounded study of the presidency, one
which relies on the combination of theory and data to better understand the
decisions that presidents make and the factors that shape those decisions.
7.1 The Conclusions
This dissertation explored the decisions that presidents make about
what policy areas to prioritize and the strategies to use. These questions let us
understand how presidents translate information into action. These decisions
are important because they fundamentally affect presidential involvement in
the policy process; the president can’t be involved unless he is paying attention
and taking some sort of action. As we conclude this dissertation, let’s take a
moment to appreciate what we have learned from this study before turning
our attention to the contributions of this study to the presidency and policy
process literatures.
In chapter 3, which introduced us to the individual policy tools, we
began to learn what policies presidents prioritize and how they use the different
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tools. We see a great deal of variety in the frequency, in the timing, and in
the distribution of attention in the tools, which is not surprising as there are
10 different tools. We saw that some tools, like executive orders, deal with
many policy areas, while other tools deal with only a few, like addresses to
a joint session of Congress. We also see some tools occur with the regularity
of clockwork, like the State of the Union address, while many others occur at
the president’s discretion, such as press conferences and veto threats. These
observations only begin to scratch the surface of presidential decision-making,
but give us a flavor of the complexity of what is to come in the dissertation.
In chapter 4, which is the first empirically-focused chapter of this dis-
sertation, I focused on what policies presidents prioritize. I hypothesized that
presidents would be affected by their constitutional obligations, economic re-
sponsibility, and party issue ownership. What I found was that presidents
are motivated by the constitutional demands of the job, but that economic
responsibility and issue ownership are more nuanced than I had initially ex-
pected. Instead of all presidents taking action on the economy in similar ways
because they are expected to be stewards of the economy in good times and
bad, I found that presidents pay much more attention to the economy when
there are problems and will prioritize other issues much more when economic
conditions are good. When it came to party, I had initially assumed that
presidents would pay attention to issues in line with their “brand.” Instead
of that straight forward relationship, I found that Democratic and Republican
presidents prioritize different issues, but that those issues do not match cleanly
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with those issues they are supposed to favor based on existing theories. The
decision about what to prioritize seems to be sensitive to duty to the job and
the way the president perceives the policy problem, characteristics that will
appear again when we unite policy prioritization with strategy selection in the
last empirical chapter.
In the next chapter, chapter 5, I focused on the selection of strategies
that presidents use to engage in policy. I first set out the three general strate-
gies that presidents have for policy making: proposing, shaping, and unilateral
action. I hypothesized that presidents will evaluate the strengths and weak-
nesses of the individual tools and measure their own political strength in the
policy making environment to decide which tools to rely on. Specifically, I
hypothesized that public support would empower presidents to take unilateral
action, congressional support would empower presidents to propose policy, and
that timing, both within the legislative year and across a presidential term,
would have a significant effect on the choice of strategy. I found support for
some of these ideas, particularly the importance of timing: as the legislative
year comes to a close and as presidential elections near, presidents favor shap-
ing and unilateral action. I also found that public approval and congressional
support in the House have no affect on presidential decision making and that
support in the Senate is only effective in the long term, but that it encourages
presidents to shy away from using the shaping strategy. The decision about
what strategy to use is important, as it reflects the president’s ability to read
the political environment and translate that information into choices about
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action.
Finally, in chapter six, we saw the culmination of the two earlier chap-
ters, the examination of what we have learned about policy prioritization and
strategy selection. I hypothesized that presidents would use information about
the policy environment and the political environment to make decisions about
which policy areas to prioritize in each of the three strategies. The most fun-
damental expectation was that policy prioritization would differ across the
strategies. This was born out in the analysis; presidents use the different
strategies to prioritize different policy areas, though they still strongly pri-
oritize the constitutional policy areas that were at the center of chapter 4.
Additionally, the trade-offs that presidents make differ across the strategies.
Presidents are much more sensitive to the political and policy environment
in the proposal strategy than they are in the shaping strategy, where a pres-
ident’s priorities are less likely to require regular trade-offs. The unilateral
action strategy clearly shows that the sensitivity that presidents have to their
political environments does not require the same kind of policy environment
sensitivity that the proposal strategy required. These findings reinforce the
need for empirical study of presidential action in both the policy area and the




This dissertation offers three contributions to the study of the presi-
dency and policy process. First, it offers a fresh approach to presidential de-
cision making, by offering a way to think about the general behavioral choice
of presidents. Past studies of the presidency have long focused on the particu-
larities of each president, arguing that the psychologies of the individual men
are sufficiently distinct as to make it difficult to generalize about the office.
The idea is that the “small N” — or small number of presidents— results
in an inability to generalize. I look at studying the presidency differently.
Just a the field of psychology has move from focusing on individual cases to
studying general phenomenon, I believe that we should move from studying
how individual presidents make decisions to studying how the presidency—the
institution—makes decisions. I do this by focusing on the general forces that
shape presidential decision making: information supply, organizational infor-
mation pre-processing, and the president’s serial processing limitations. By
moving from a discussion of individual differences, as much of the presidency
literature had focused in the past, to a study of general characteristics, we are
able to move the study of the presidency forward.
To understand the general process of presidential decision making, I
moved from studying the individual president to studying the presidential de-
cision. In this framework, decisions are the product of information, policy
prioritization, and strategy selection. Information in the disproportionate in-
formation processing world is abundant. Presidents have to sort through it in
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order to decide what is important and what is not and they struggle to assim-
ilate new information with what they already know and believe in a timely
fashion. Once they have information, they must use it to decide what policies
to pay attention to and what strategies to use. In this dissertation, I studied
the prioritization of policy areas and the selection of strategies independently in
chapters 4 and 5, before studying the joint policy-strategy decision in chapter
6. This process of studying the components of the decision before the decision
as a whole allowed for the gradual development of understanding before diving
into the complexity of real-life decision making.
The second contribution of this study is in the way it challenges the
supposed “small-N” problem of presidency studies. Scholars have said that
the small number of presidents makes empirical research difficult, compared
with an institution like Congress and its 535 members. One way to tackle
this problem, however, is to study the presidential decision instead of study-
ing the individual president. This means that instead of 5 presidents in this
study, there are 27,022 decisions. This move towards studying decisions al-
lows for extensive empirical analysis and a new appreciation for what it is that
presidents actually do. Empirical analysis of any institution is difficult. The
task of collecting data and coding it is labor intensive and long, and requires
considerable attention to detail. The Policy Agendas Project offers scholars a
structure and a coding scheme to attack the problem of comparability across
time, action, and institution, and should be looked to for an example of how
to create and code policy data. Importantly, particularly for the president,
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the PAP encourages hand coding of data, in order to account for the complex-
ity of language, how it changes over time, and has nuance and flow that are
impossible for current computer coding models to pick up.1 This hand coding
of data makes adding to presidency data difficult, but more accurate.
It sounds simplistic to say, but despite incredible public and scholarly
interest in the president, studies of the presidency have not tried to compre-
hensively examine what it is that presidents do in office. The actions of the
president, whether it is the type and frequency of tools used or the policy
areas that they pay attention to have not, prior to this dissertation, been di-
rectly studied. Prior scholars have been able to accurately theorize the general
presidential agenda from simple observation, as the president is often at the
center of media attention, but actual measurement of the presidential agenda,
whether that be through the total agenda, the strategy agendas, or the policy
tool agendas, has not been done before. This fact alone makes this dissertation
a contribution to the study of the presidency. Scholars of the presidency must
not be intimidated by the amount of data necessary to analyze in order to
study the president. Instead, they need to pick a point and start. Every new
policy tool dataset and year of data enrich our understanding of the office and
1Current work in Natural Language Processing can use dictionaries to code explicit policy
mentions at roughly 80% accuracy, but cannot code implicit policy mentions that are rife
in rhetoric. Think of the example “Education is the most important tool for advancing
creativity in the sciences. It will open doors for the future!” Computer coding would do
just fine with the first sentence, but be unable to recognize that the second sentence is still
implicitly about the power of education. Speeches, such as the State of the Union address,
addresses to a joint session of Congress, and press conference opening statements are full of
passages similar to these.
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the way that these individuals have made decisions in the highest office in the
land.
Finally, this dissertation offers a way of studying the trade-offs that
an individual makes when faced with limited time and attention. Prior work
applying compositional analysis to political science has largely looked at how
groups of individuals act in response to changes in the environment (Katz
and King 1999; Tomz, Tucker and Wittenberg 2002; Lipsmeyer 2011; Philips,
Rutherford and Whitten 2016a). These analyses aggregate the decision making
capacity of many individuals in order to understand how a system works and,
implicitly, processes information. In this dissertation, compositional analysis is
used to take a look at the decision making of a very small group of individuals:
United States presidents. This select group of people have faced down some
of the most difficult decisions of modern time: do I meet with the Soviets or
do I address the AIDS epidemic that is killing thousands? Do I focus all my
attention on the terror attack that has just been perpetrated again my country
or do divert some of my attention to the many other problems that face the
American people? For presidents, the decision about what to concentrate on
now versus later can have life-or-death consequences.
Consequently, it is vital that we understand what shapes those trade-
offs. What we found in this study is that presidents are sensitive to information
about policy problems, but that they are also sensitive to political concerns.
Their decisions about what policies to prioritize and what strategies to pursue
are complex, but they are responsive to information. This should give us
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hope. The United States relies on having a president who can make good
decisions to protect the country and advance our interests. Perhaps the worst
nightmare for Americans is having a president who is so overwhelmed with
their own cognitive and emotional limitations that they can not make coherent
decisions. What the analysis in this dissertation show is that, while presidents
do process information disproportionately, requiring them to make massive
shifts in attention, they are able to make routine trade-offs in response to new
information.
7.3 New Directions
This dissertation offers a fresh approach to presidential decision-making.
Building on theories of decision making and information processing that cen-
tered on Congress, the work of Jones and Baumgartner (2005) offered the
policy process community a way of thinking about behavioral choice that was
rooted in the bounded rationality of Simon (1957, 1983). Decision making is
neither simple nor based purely on preferences. Instead, it is based on informa-
tion and an actor’s ability to makes sense of and integrate it in a world where
there is far too much information to make sense of it all. While scholars of the
presidency have long tried to understand how presidents make decisions, the
work was largely based on the assumption that presidents struggled to get the
information they needed. This dissertation moves away from this perspective
towards the information processing perspective.
But there is still much more work that needs to be done. We need to
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think more deeply about and study information pre-processing. While this
dissertation acknowledges the importance of White House organization and
the management style of presidents for their ability to process information, it
only begins to scratch the surface of how information search happens in the
presidency. The Politics of Information by Baumgartner and Jones (2015)
highlights two different ways individuals search for information: expert search
and entropic search. Expert search is focused and based on a single, well-
defined problem. Entropic search is more diffuse and complex, searching to
find a problem to tackle and a solution.2 Each has a different situation in which
it works best, as expert search works well when there is hierarchy and jurisdic-
tional boundaries and entropic search works well in decentralized environments
with overlapping jurisdictions (Baumgartner and Jones 2015). While institu-
tions like Congress and the bureaucracy contain structural elements that lend
themselves to both expert and entropic search under particular conditions, the
organization of the presidency and its information pre-processors can shift so
much from one president to another that it is difficult to know whether the
information processing of the president is dominated by expert or entropic
search. Perhaps the way an issue comes on to the agenda could affect the type
of search associate with it; issues that the president pro-actively puts on the
agenda could be subject to entropic search, but those issues that come on to
the presidential agenda in response to exigent circumstances might be char-
2Think of expert search like an big game hunter: he knows exactly what he wants to
find, his trophy, and merely has to hunt for it. Think of entropic search as a fisherman:
casting a wide net and then has to make use of what is in the net.
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acterized more by expert search. As little is know about information search
in the presidency, it is a fruitful potential avenue for future research, as the
decision making ability of the president is deeply rooted in how they wade
through information.
Additionally, this dissertation is merely the start of empirical studies
of the presidency. A data-driven approach to the presidency, much like has
been done to study Congress, must be our goal so as to be able to test positive
theories of presidential behavior and the effect the presidency has on other
political actors. The Neustadt axiom that that guided so much of presidency
studies is that “the power of the president is the power to persuade (Neustadt
1991). Yet research that has attempted to understand the president’s persua-
siveness has cast doubts on the truth of the statement. Perhaps it is because
past scholars have been looking in the wrong place for persuasion, by focus-
ing on the presidents’ speeches. Perhaps it is his actions that persuade other
political actors to pay attention to an issue or follow the president’s position.
By studying a wider array of presidential actions and speeches and focusing
on measuring the relationships between presidents and other actors, we could
gain a whole new insight into the role the president plays in the larger policy
making process that this dissertation only begins to touch on.
In order to do that however, there needs to be a commitment to pres-
idential data. By focusing for so long on the differences between presidents,
scholars said “empirical work can’t be done—the number of presidents is just
too small.” That perspective completely ignores the hundreds upon thousands
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of individual decisions each president makes. By moving from thinking about
the president as the unit of analysis to the decision, I increase the amount
there is to study, erasing the complaints that have prevented people from
studying the president empirically. And even with the seven new datasets in
this dissertation and the application of three more, there are still yet many
other types of presidential action that haven’t been studied, such as speeches
to the UN General Assembly, national security decision directives, other pub-
lic speeches and events, and many others. Presidential tweets are currently a
topic of fascination, as President Trump’s fondness for the medium offers the
public, political actors, and scholars an unusually honest insight into presi-
dential thinking. With a new dedication to data, there are enough avenues of
data work to keep scholars busy for years.
Finally, it is worth thinking about different ways to study the data that
is already available. For example, in this dissertation, I barely began to study
the individual tools. For this project, I stayed primarily at the strategy level
in order to simplify the analysis in chapter 6 as I looked at both policy area
and strategy. But we need to look more deeply into how presidents have used
their individual policy tools. A panel data approach that looks at the different
policy areas in the different tools at a single point in time might give us different
insights than we gained from this dissertation, as the constant environment
removes the need to look at all the different environmental forces. Or we could
use a time series cross-sectional approach to look at what predicts the use of
the different tools overtime, which is a variation on the compositional analysis
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in chapter 4. In Chapter 3, I offered a first look into what policy areas the
presidents focus on in each of these tools, but there is so much more we could
learn from looking more intently at these data. The role of the president in
the policy process has been so understudied from an empirical angle that there
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Lagged Dependent Variable -1.151* -1.015* -1.040* -1.048* -1.178* -1.100* -1.050* -1.068*
Percent GDP Change-Short 0.004 0.019 0.020 0.035 -0.046∧ -0.069∧ -0.034 -0.054*
Percent GDP Change-Long -0.037 0.033 -0.005 -0.013 -0.103* -0.061 -0.074* -0.068*
Defense Spending-Short -0.002 0.006 0.003 0.018* -0.001 -0.014∧ 0.003 0.000
Defense Spending-Long 0.001* 0.001 0.001* 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 -0.002*
Unemployment Level-Short -.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000* -0.000 -0.000∧ -0.000∧
Unemployment Level-Long -.000 -0.000∧ -0.000* -0.000* 0.000* 0.000* 0.000 0.000*
Democratic President -0.072 -0.283∧ -0.374* -0.255 -0.217 -0.260 -0.515* -0.140
Constant 0.391 0.667 1.088* 1.735* -0.100 -1.078* 0.737* -0.380
R-Squared 0.585 0.507 0.552 0.570 0.636 0.658 0.549 0.582
*: significant at 0.05 level, ∧ signifiant at 0.1 level
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Appendix for Chapter Five
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Lagged Dependent Variable -0.744* -1.079* -1.099*
Net Seats in House-Short-Term 0.005 0.005 0.000
Net Seats in House-Long-Term 0.001 0.004 0.003
Net Seats in Senate-Short-Term 0.007 -0.005 -0.018
Net Seats in Senate-Long-Term 0.030* 0.041* 0.001
Quarter-Short-Term -0.289* -1.590* -1.271*
Quarter-Long-Term -0.217* -0.835 -0.492*
Years Since Election-Short-Term -0.018 -0.234 -0.139
Years Since Election-Long-Term 0.062 -0.298* -0.342*
Percent Approval -Short-Term 0.009 0.012 -0.004
Percent Approval -Long-Term -0.006 0.013 0.007
Democratic President -0.491* -0.772* -0.054
Constant 1.773* 4.144* -1.438
R-squared 0.59 0.90 0.91
*: significant at 0.05 level
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Appendix for Chapter Six
C.1 Policy-Strategy Compositional Analysis Tables with
Coefficients
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Lagged Dependent -0.970* -1.196* -0.990* -1.163* -1.050* -0.943* -1.300* -1.104* -0.967* -0.956*
Seats in House-Short -0.003 -0.001 -0.005 -0.012* -0.016* -0.013* 0.010* 0.011* -0.004 0.011*
Seats in House-Long 0.007* 0.001 0.006 -0.014* -0.005 -0.004 0.014* 0.003 -0.002 0.002
Seats in Senate-Short 0.062* 0.063∧ 0.118* 0.019 0.134* 0.066∧ 0.000 -0.064* 0.009 -0.112*
Seats in Senate-Long -0.023 0.036 0.013 0.048∧ 0.057 0.012 -0.059* -0.037∧ -0.017 -0.066*
Years since Last
Election-Short 0.015 0.081 0.100 -0.027 0.062 -0.055 -0.133 -0.186* -0.222* -0.256*
Years since Last
Election-Long 0.126 0.201 0.344∧ -0.076 0.227 -0.047 -0.167 -0.277* -0.261 -0.441*
Approval-Short -0.011 -0.007 -0.021 0.009 -0.011 -0.001 -0.042* -0.030* -0.031* -0.018
Approval-Long -0.005 0.025∧ 0.020 0.029* 0.048* 0.020 -0.056* -0.048* -0.020 -0.065*
% GDP Change-Short -0.028 0.002 0.027 -0.164∧ -0.115 -0.153 -0.079 -0.139∧ -0.302* -0.208∧
% GDP Change-Long -0.020 -0.009 -0.023 -0.243* -0.188 -0.200 -0.045 -0.102 -0.315* -0.160
Unemployment-Short -0.000∧ 0.000 -0.000 -0.000* -0.000 -0.000* 0.000 0.000 -0.000∧ -0.000
Unemployment-Long -0.000* -0.000 -.000* -0.000 -0.000* -0.000* 0.000∧ 0.000* 0.000 0.000*
Defense Spending-Short 0.003 -0.002 0.001 0.012* 0.012 0.013* 0.002 0.002∧ 0.016* 0.005
Defense Spending-Long 0.000 0.003* 0.003* 0.001 0.004* 0.001 -0.002* -0.003* -0.001 -0.005*
Democratic President 0.609* -0.195 0.612 -0.763* -0.160* -0.125 -0.143 -0.712* -0.702∧ -0.598
Constant 1.049 -0.636 0.066 1.318 1.268* 2.149 4.012 2.824* 4.713* 3.663*
R-Squared 0.777 0.693 0.711 0.860 0.651 0.673 0.872 0.835 0.739 0.696
*: significant at 0.05 level, ∧ significant at 0.1 level
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Lagged Dependent -1.357* -1.207* -1.124* -1.063* -1.177* -0.888* -1.300* -1.388* -0.974 -1.105*
Seats in House-Short 0.001 0.008∧ 0.008 -0.004 0.003 -0.001 0.001* 0.010* 0.005 0.000
Seats in House-Long -0.000 -0.003 -0.003 0.004 0.000 0.005 0.008* 0.009* 0.011* .010*
Seats in Senate-Short 0.012 -0.059* -0.045 0.013 -0.024 0.006 -0.028 -0.044∧ -0.011 0.022
Seats in Senate-Long 0.031 -0.019 0.013 -0.027 -0.010 -0.009 0.014 -0.019 -0.014 0.002
Approval-Short -0.001 0.022∧ 0.018 0.004 0.019∧ -0.001 0.016∧ 0.017∧ 0.018* -0.004
Approval-Long 0.024 0.0136 0.032∧ 0.002 0.034* 0.017 0.013 -0.010 0.011 -0.22∧
Years since Last
Election-Short -0.093 0.008 -0.043 0.178 0.141* 0.132 -0.128∧ -0.037 0.061 -0.077
Years since Last
Election-Long -0.125 -0.160 -0.241 0.401* 0.194∧ 0.276∧ -0.245* -0.131 0.181∧ 0.025
% GDP Change-Short 0.175 0.074 0.277∧ -0.267∧ -0.004 -0.033 0.203* 0.035 -0.071 -0.087
% GDP Change-Long -0.119 0.125 0.260 -0.082 0.160 0.098 0.103 -0.002 -0.010 -0.185
Unemployment-Short -0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000
Unemployment-Long 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000∧ 0.000 0.000 -0.000
Defense Spending-Short -0.009 0.009 -0.003 0.017* 0.015* 0.002 -0.015* -0.006 0.000 -0.013*
Defense Spending-Long -0.001 0.003* 0.002∧ -0.000 0.002* -0.001 -0.000 0.001 -0.001 -0.003*
Democratic President -0.624 0.102 -0.457 0.479 0.073 -0.180 -0.961* -0.343 -0.503∧ -0.498
Constant -1.628 -4.332 -5.619 0.373 -4.963* -1.530 -2.404 -1.099 -1.135 3.853
R-Squared 0.788 0.713 0.753 0.791 0.754 0.583 0.889 0.757 0.732 0.795
*: significant at 0.05 level, ∧ significant at 0.1 level
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Lagged Dependent -0.989* -1.082* -0.728* -0.971* -1.226* -1.013* -0.672* -1.056* -0.826* -0.853*
Seats in House-Short -0.004∧ 0.004 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.005∧ 0.001 0.006* 0.000 0.002
Seats in House-Long -0.002 -0.002 -0.004* 0.001 -0.003* -0.001 -0.001 0.001 -0.000 0.003*
Seats in Senate-Short 0.031* -0.026 0.015 0.012 0.017 0.044* -0.005 -0.046* 0.000 -0.021∧
Seats in Senate-Long 0.026∧ -0.000 0.028* -0.002 0.025* 0.024 0.006 -0.025∧ -0.001 -0.024*
Approval-Short 0.000 0.010 0.008 -0.014* -0.005 -0.014* 0.001 0.001 -0.011* -0.008∧
Approval-Long 0.016* -0.001 0.015* -0.003 0.010* 0.013 0.003 -0.017* -0.001 -0.014*
Years since Last
Election-Short 0.066 0.135 0.129* 0.064∧ 0.149* 0.134* -0.065* -0.150* -0.022 -0.186*
Years since Last
Election-Long 0.106 -0.062 0.073 0.105∧ 0.189* 0.220* -0.100* -0.248* -0.024 -0.183*
% GDP Change-Short -0.080 0.161* 0.082∧ -0.048 0.023 -0.130* 0.032 0.094∧ -0.028 -0.058
% GDP Change-Long -0.111∧ 0.187* 0.092 -0.009 0.049 -0.123 -0.003 0.086 -0.034 -0.099*
Unemployment-Short -0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000
Unemployment-Long -0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000* -0.000 0.000 0.000* 0.000 0.000*
Defense Spending-Short 0.002 -0.003 -0.000 0.001 -0.001 0.003 -0.002 -0.004 -0.000 -0.002
Defense Spending-Long -0.002* 0.003* 0.001 -0.000 0.000 -0.002* -0.000 0.001* -0.001 -0.001*
Democratic President 0.208 -0.163 0.190 0.256∧ 0.282* 0.471* -0.371* -0.791* -0.210 -0.610*
Constant 2.025* -2.805* -1.026 0.303 0.079 2.411* -0.220 -2.207* 0.112 0.733
R-Squared 0.746 0.626 0.724 0.661 0.837 0.695 0.777 0.696 0.605 0.803
*: significant at 0.05 level, ∧ significant at 0.1 level
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C.2 Analysis of Individual Results in Compositional Anal-
ysis
C.2.1 Compositional Analysis in the Proposal Strategy
Table 6.1 (for a complete table with all coefficients, see Table C.1)
shows the statistically significant effects policy and political information has
on trade-offs between policy areas in the proposal strategy. In this strategy,
every continuous or categorical independent variable is reported with both
short- and long-term effect, due to the Error Correction Model framework of
the analysis. This means that only one variable, the dummy variable for the
president’s party, is reported once in the tables. In this chapter, short-term
effects look at the impact that change in the independent variable has on pairs
of policy areas from one year to the next. The long-term effects look at the
impact that a change in the independent variable has on the trend over time in
the pairs of variables, as error correction models seek out a stable equilibrium
over time.
The number of seats for the president’s party in the House of Repre-
sentatives has a statistically significant effect at the 0.05 level on six pairs of
policies in the short-term. In the relationship between international relations
and social welfare, government operations, the economy, when the number of
seats for the president’s party increases, social welfare, government operations,
or the economy each get prioritized and the extra attention comes from inter-
national affairs. The number of seats the president’s party has in the house
also has an effect on the relationship between other domestic policy and social
welfare, the economy, and government operations, where each of those other
issues gets prioritized over other domestic policy. These results suggest that
immediately after the president’s party gains seats, the president is less likely
to deal with issues of international affairs or other domestic policy. In the
long term, there is less of an effect. The relationship between social welfare
and the economy, international affairs, and other domestic policy is such that
an increase in presidential support in the House leads presidents to prioritize
social welfare policy over the other three policy areas.
The number of seats for the president’s party in the Senate has a sta-
tistically significant effect on five pairs of policies in the short term. First,
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an increase in the Senate leads presidents to prioritize social welfare over eco-
nomics and government operations. Second, it causes the president to pri-
oritize international affairs over government operations. Third, it causes the
president to prioritize other domestic policy over the economy and government
operations. These results reveal the way senatorial support in the short term
can cause presidents to pay less attention to government operations and the
economy, just as much as it causes presidents to pay more attention to social
welfare and other domestic policy. In the long term, the effect of the Senate
is much weaker: it causes presidents to prioritize other domestic policy over
social welfare and government operations.
The public approval rating of the president has a smaller effect in the
short run than in the long run. In the short run, only three pairs of policy
areas are statistically significant: an increase in the president’s public approval
rating leads presidents to propose more other domestic policy and less social
welfare, economic, international affairs. In the long run, five pairs of pol-
icy areas are significant: presidents still prioritize other domestic policy over
social welfare and economics, but they also prioritize other domestic policy
over government operations and international affairs over social welfare and
government operations.
The number of years since the last presidential election has a specific
effect on presidential prioritization. In the short term, it causes presidents to
prioritize other domestic policy over the economy, international affairs, and
government operations, and in the long term, it causes presidents to prioritize
other domestic policy over the economy and government operations. It’s really
quite interesting that the effect of time since the last election is so persistent;
it means that, when it comes to proposing policy, time increases presidential
freedom. Presidents are free to propose a wider range of policies, than just
their core functions.
The percent change in Gross Domestic Product (GDP) causes presi-
dents to de-prioritize international affairs. In the short term, as the percent
change in GDP increases, presidents choose to prioritize other domestic policy
over international affairs. In the long term, an increase in the amount the
GDP changes causes presidents to prioritize social welfare policy and other
domestic policy over international affairs.
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The level of unemployment has a modest effect on presidential decision
making in the short-term, but a widespread effect in the long-term. In the
short term, an increase in the number of people who are unemployed causes
presidents to prioritize social welfare policy and economic policy at the expense
of international affairs. In the long term, presidents prioritize economic policy
and government operations. They prioritize these two issues over the three
other issues in this study. Both government operations and economics get
more attention, attention which comes from social welfare policy, international
affairs, and other domestic policy. This suggests that when the economy is
tanking, presidents turn their attention to the home front and the policy areas
they might need to consider in order to solve the problem and are willing to
sacrifice attention to everything else.
An increase in the level of defense spending causes presidents to pri-
oritize, in the short term, international affairs. From one year to the next,
an increase in the amount being spent on defense causes presidents to de-
prioritize social welfare, the economy, and other domestic policy in favor of
more attention for international affairs. The long-term effect of an increase
in spending on defense is more diffuse. In the long-term, presidents propose
less policy about government operations, and prioritizing the economy, social
welfare, international affairs, and other domestic policy. Additionally, they
prioritize other domestic policy over social welfare and the economy. While
there is a case to be made that it makes sense for presidents to de-prioritization
of government operations in response to defense spending,1 it is much less ob-
vious why defense spending should increase the way presidents take action
on other domestic policy. This is one of the more mysterious findings in this
dissertation.
Finally, the party of the president causes Democratic presidents to pay
more attention to social welfare, government operations, and other domestic
policy, and less attention to economic policy and international affairs. This
would suggest that, in the proposal stage, we see much more evidence for issue
ownership theory than we did in the aggregate analysis in chapter 4. Here
Democrats are giving more of their attention to the issues that the theory
1See Chapter 4
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would predict, namely social welfare and other domestic policy and Republi-
cans are giving more attention to economic policy an international affairs.2
C.2.2 Compositional Analysis in the Shaping Strategy
Table 6.2 (for a complete table with all coefficients, see Table C.2)
shows the statistically significant effects (at the 0.05 level) that policy and
political information has on trade-offs between policy areas in the shaping
strategy. In this strategy, the number of seats for the president’s party in the
House of Representatives, in the short term, causes the president to prioritize
either social welfare policy or economic policy over other domestic policy. In
the long run, this relationship is even stronger, with the president prioritizing
every other issue over other domestic policy. Consequently, we can say that
the effect of increased support in the House is that the president would rather
use the shaping strategy for social welfare, economics, international affairs, or
government operations, than use it for other domestic policy.
The number of seats for the president’s party in the Senate has a very
minor effect. In the short run, the only relationship that is affected is the
relationship between the economy and government operations. In this case,
an increase in the number of seats the president’s party has in the Senate
causes presidents to prioritize government operations, decreasing the amount
the strategy is used for economic policy. In the long run, the number of seats
for the president’s party has no statistically significant effect.
In the shaping strategy, the public approval rating of the president
affects international affairs, causing the issue to be prioritized over other is-
sues. In the short run, an increase in presidential approval causes international
affairs to be prioritized over other domestic policy and, in the long run, in-
ternational affairs is prioritized over government operations. This shows that
public support gives presidents more freedom to shape congressional action on
international affairs.
The number of years since the last presidential election affects the way
2Issue ownership theory is agnostic about the effect that party would have on attention
to government operations.
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presidents shape policy, causing them to prioritize international affairs and
de-prioritize social welfare policy. In the short term, each passing year of the
presidency courages presidents to pay more attention to international affairs
and less to government operations. In the long term, as presidents get close to
reelection or the end of their time in office, they prioritize international affairs
and other domestic policy, but always at the expense of social welfare policy.
The percent Gross Domestic Product (GDP) change has a minor effect
on shaping strategy. It is statistically significant only in the short term, where
an increase in the percent GDP change causes presidents to prioritize social
welfare policy over other domestic policy. GDP change has no statistically
significant effects in the long run.
The level of unemployment has no effect on the choice of policy areas
in the shaping strategy.
The level of defense spending affects the way presidents prioritize in-
ternational affairs, other domestic policy, and de-prioritize government opera-
tions. In the short term, an increase in defense spending causes presidents to
pay more attention to international affairs, favoring it over social welfare and
government operations, and other domestic policy, favoring it over social wel-
fare and other government operations. In the long term, presidents prioritize
the economy, international affairs, and other domestic policy over government
operations.
The party of the president doesn’t have as robust an effect as it had in
the proposal strategy. In the shaping strategy, the president being a Democrat
only affects one pair of policies. A Democrat is more likely to prioritize other
domestic policy over social welfare.
C.2.3 Compositional Analysis in the Unilateral Action Strategy
Table 6.3 (for a complete table with all coefficients, see Table C.3) shows
the statistically significant effects policy and political information has on trade-
offs between policy areas in the unilateral action strategy at the 0.05 level. The
number of seats for the president’s party in the House of Representatives has
different effects in the short- and long-term in the unilateral action strategy. In
the short term, it affects only one relationship, causing presidents to prioritize
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the economy over other domestic policy. In the long run, an increase in the
number of seats held by the president’s party in the House causes the president
to prioritize government operations, doing so over social welfare, international
affairs, and other domestic policy.
The number of seats for the president’s party in the Senate, in the
short term, causes presidents to de-prioritize the economy. From year to year,
president’s choose to prioritize other issues, namely social welfare, interna-
tional affairs, and other domestic policy, rather than the economy when they
have increased senatorial support. In the long term, support in the Senate
has a different effect; causing presidents to prefer to take unilateral action
on issues other than government operations. Presidents prioritize social wel-
fare, international affairs, and other domestic policy, rather than government
operations.
The public approval rating of the president affects the way president’s
prioritize international affairs. For the pairs of international affairs and social
welfare, international affairs and economics, and international affairs and other
domestic policy, the president chooses to pay less attention to international
affairs and more attention to the other policy in the short term. In the long
term, there are more diffuse effects. Presidents prioritize social welfare over
the economy, government operations, and international affairs, and other do-
mestic policy over the economy and government operations, and de-prioritize
government operations by instead prioritizing social welfare, international af-
fairs, and other domestic policy.
The number of years since the last presidential election has an effect on
many different pairs of policy areas. In the short term, the number of years
since the last election causes presidents to prioritize international affairs over
government operation and the economy. It also causes presidents to prioritize
other domestic policy over social welfare policy, the economy, and government
operation. Finally, it causes presidents to de-prioritize government operations,
instead giving attention to social welfare policy, international affairs and other
domestic policy. In the long term, the number of years since the last election
has a similar effect: the closer a president gets to reelection or the end of their
time in office, the more likely they are to prioritize international affairs at the
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expense of government operations and the economy, and other domestic policy,
at the expense of social welfare, the economy, and government operations.
The percent Gross Domestic Product (GDP) change has a limited effect
in unilateral action strategy. In the short term, the greater the change in the
percent GDP, the more the president prioritizes the economy over government
operations and international affairs. In the long term, the effect of the relation-
ship shifts a little. Instead of the commonality between pairs of relationships
being the prioritization of the economy, the commonality is the de-prioritize of
government operations. In the long term, presidents de-prioritize government
operations in favor of paying attention to the economy and other domestic
policy.
The level of unemployment has no statistically significant effect in the
short run, but in the long run, as the number of unemployed people increases,
presidents are more likely to prioritize government operations and de-prioritize
other domestic policy. They prioritize government operations over interna-
tional affairs and other domestic policy and de-prioritize other domestic policy
in favor of government operations and the economy.
The level of defense spending has no statistically significant effect in the
short term. In the long term, it has much more of an effect, causing presidents
to prioritize the economy and prioritize government operations. The economy
is prioritized over social welfare policy, international affairs, and other domestic
policy. Increased defense spending causes presidents to prioritize issues other
than government operations, namely the economy and other domestic policy.
The party of the president has an effect on what presidents prioritize.
Democratic presidents are more likely to prioritize international affairs over
government operations and the economy. Additionally, they prioritize other
domestic policy over social policy, the economy, and government operations.
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